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FOREWORD – NARROWING THE 
SUBJECT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At first glance, the past few decades of the life insurance market in Hungary 
(and probably in the majority of the European, or at least Central-Eastern Eu-
ropean countries) give the impression that annuity insurance is a marginal 
product that is not worthy of special attention, since most people (with the 
exception of a few specific groups such as disabled miners) clearly do not tend 
to purchase such products.  
A completely different view unfolds, however, if the onlooker regards not 
the past, but the possible future. It is highly probable that within a decade an-
nuity insurance can move from being a marginal product to a distinctly leading 
product within the Central-European region. 1 2 
Considering the importance and complexity of the phenomenon, one can 
hardly find literature dealing with the subject and this is especially true in the 
case of Hungarian language publications3; we can, however, witness a gradual 
                                                          
1The fundamental World Bank publication, which set off the changes to the Central-
Eastern European pension systems (World Bank [1994]), only deals with annuities 
among other topics in its Appendix, although more recent publications forecast the 
increasing future significance of annuities and annuities markets in view of the rise of 
defined contribution (DC) systems, in addition to stating that, in contrast with the ac-
cumulation phase, problems relating to the annuities phase have so far been neglected. 
(See e.g.: Wadsworth [2002], Cardinale-Findlater-Orszag [2002], Rocha-Thorburn 
[2007], Stewart [2007], Antolin-Pugh-Stewart [2008]). Blake, in his much-quoted paper 
(Blake [1999]) already warned about the increasing importance of annuities and deter-
mined a list of the most important related tasks. Davis (Davis [2003]) was also quick to 
compile a list of tasks relating to the regulation of annuities. 
2This book was written in 2008-2010, so I reviewed related literature up to and in-
cluding 2010. After this time I mainly dealt with other projects, so I did not really 
follow new literature on annuities. In spite of this, I must mention two important books 
published since then about this topic. The first was written by experts from the World 
Bank (Rocha–Vittas–Rudolph [2011]) and the second by OECD experts (OECD 
[2014]). 
3After the launching of the private pension funds, Réti warned (Réti [1999]) of the 
incredibly (and needlessly) detailed regulation of the institutional system of private 
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change within the past few years concerning literature in English. Accordingly, 
the exploration of the specific features of how annuities operate, the impact of 
the different factors, the resulting hazards for service providers, consumers and 
regulators, as well as the exploration of means of protection against these haz-
ards, is important. A separate, important question is what needs to be regulated 
and what it is worth regulating, and how coherent regulation may be achieved. 
Due to the complicated inherences there is a major risk of ending up with bad, 
voluntarist solutions and this should avoided at all costs.  
I hope that my book contributes to the abovementioned goals, to the devel-
opment of sustainable products for the market, to the drafting of regulations 
that optimally protects customers, and last but not least to promoting a better 
understanding of the specific ways in which annuities operate. 
Although I insert the subject matter into a wider context, in the book I do 
narrow my subject from several aspects. I deal primarily with life annuities, 
but this is technically often coupled with annuities certain and the phased or 
otherwise regular withdrawal of funds, which I therefore also discuss here. 
Life annuity is a much broader category in a technical sense than its meaning 
as a commonplace term, for example it also includes the payment of life annui-
ty premiums and certain loan instalments. Here, I only deal with life annuities 
according to the commonplace meaning (though at the beginning of the paper I 
insert those into a broader context of life annuities in a technical sense), so I 
deal with the situation in which a service provider makes regular disburse-
ments to a client, but I do not deal with the inverse situation.  Life annuities are 
suitable for paying orphan’s annuity, handicapped annuity, disability annuity, 
etc., but I narrow down my subject to old-age, i.e. pension annuities. Among 
these I only detail mandatory life annuities, so my supposition is that at the 
time of retirement the funds on pension accounts must be mandatorily convert-
ed into annuity. This criterion is of great importance, because the mandatory 
conversion into annuity cuts through a vicious circle, which is the reason why 
voluntary annuity markets are typically insignificant all around the world 
(compared to the life insurance market, but also in itself). The core of the vi-
                                                                                                                               
pension funds, although the regulation of the services they provide is extremely flimsy 
and suggests that it was not thought through properly from an insurance mathematics 
perspective. This was also admitted by Stahl, who actively took part in the elaboration 
of the regulations (Augusztinovics-Gál-Máté-Matits-Simonovits-Stahl [2002], Stahl 
[2005]). Erdős (Barabás-Bodor-Erdős-Fehér-Hamecz-Holtzer [2006]) states bluntly that 
“In 1997, when the bill on private pension funds was being drafted, the first services to 
be provided appeared so distant and the bill was written in such a hurry, that the provi-
sions on services were hastily cobbled together.” 
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cious circle is extremely strong auto-selection4, meaning people who do not 
expect a long life do not buy annuity, but instead consume the assets and thus 
retain the possibility of eventually leaving an inheritance. As a result, the an-
nuitant’s lifecycle becomes longer than average and forces annuity providers 
to raise their premiums accordingly, which in turn diverts yet more people 
from concluding annuity agreements. Consequently, making old-age annuities 
compulsory eliminates one of the strongest sources of adverse selection, and so 
this factor must certainly be taken into account when designing an annuity 
system.  In other words, this book would be completely different if I assumed 
that converting the funds on individual accounts into annuities was voluntary. 
However, I further narrow my subject by assuming that the mandatory annuity 
system is coupled with the prohibition of differentiation among insured indi-
viduals. This is also a supposition of similar strength to compulsory conver-
sion, but with an opposite impact: while obligation eliminates the possibility of 
adverse selection, prohibition of differentiation returns it to the equation across 
a broad spectrum, which must be handled somehow. The options for providers 
are totally different with possibilities to differentiate (according to gender, 
qualification, health etc.), or with legislation in place that prohibits it. EU poli-
cy recently adopted the prohibition of differentiation, so this must certainly be 
dealt with, and this is the major reason why the mandatory annuity system 
disintegrates into models, which I present below. 
Above, I presented the ways in which I narrowed down the subject matter. 
But at the same time, I have also attempted to enforce the opposite trend, i.e. to 
discuss the subject as generally as possible – within the limitations stated 
above – I do not intend to narrow the subject to the Hungarian situation, alt-
hough most of the examples are naturally from Hungary. My work is more-or 
less generally applicable to pension systems that have mandatory individual 
accounts and mandatory annuity systems in place. Looking at it from this per-
spective, the above is primarily characteristic to the Eastern part of Europe and 
less to the Western part.  The major difference between Eastern and Western 
Europe is that the part of the pension scheme that operates according to a non-
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, which is (more or less) mandatory (or at least 
covers almost every employee) and is generally referred to as the funded sys-
tem, is extremely different. In Western Europe the occupational pension mod-
el, in which the pension is provided by institutions that are quite close to (or 
                                                          
4English literature uses only the term “adverse selection”. Hungarian terminology is 
more detailed, however, also applying the terms“ auto-“ and “anti-“ selection. The 
difference lies in the intentions of the insured (the annuitant). Contrary to anti-selection, 
in the case of auto-selection there are no bad intentions from the annuitant’s side. So in 
the case of annuity the correct Hungarian terminology is generally auto-selection, but in 
this English version of the book I will use the usual English term: adverse selection. 
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form part of) the employer from both an organisational and policy point of 
view is extremely widespread, while in Central and Eastern Europe these are 
financial providers separate from the employer. In Western Europe, occupa-
tional pensions are characteristically of Defined Benefit (DB) type (although 
Defined Contribution, DC-type pensions are quickly gaining ground), while in 
Eastern Europe these providers operate almost exclusively according to the DC 
system. Contrary to the DB system, in the case of DC systems the rules of 
annuity provision are not clear, so there is room for analysis, such as this book 
aims to provide. 
The aim of this publication is to present the possible types of annuity regu-
latory systems and models that are adequate from a technical point of view, i.e. 
are free from contradiction and serve the interests of clients within the context 
of widely applied conditions (individual account, mandatory conversion to 
annuity, prohibition of differentiation). 
The structure of the study is as follows: the first chapter provides an over-
view of the most important technical questions relating to annuities, the theo-
retical basis of annuity calculations and the theoretical relationship between 
certain types of annuities and other financial products (mainly life insurances). 
At the end of the first chapter, I will describe the theoretical suppositions on 
which annuity calculations are founded and the cases in which these are not 
fulfilled in the practice, meaning what problems may arise with relation to cash 
flow. The second and the third chapters deal with these problems, which are 
fundamentally the consequence of prohibiting differentiation, and with possi-
ble techniques for the management of these problems. Among the difficulties I 
highlight the problems of selection and choice, and these are detailed in a sepa-
rate chapter while attempting to quantify the negative impact of these problems 
on annuity cash-flow. Some of the techniques applied to treat various problems 
are synergistic, while others are mutually exclusive, and accordingly it is not 
possible to construct annuity models voluntarily by defining a few “Lego 
bricks” from which decision-makers can build arbitrary models. In view of this 
chapter four provides an overview of the consistent annuity model variants 
produced by the various possible elements. I find there are a total of six con-
sistent annuity models with inherent alternates for decision makers to choose 
from, but the various elements of separate models may not be arbitrarily com-
bined. In the final chapter I attempt to provide criteria for choosing between 
models and provide a brief overview of the regulatory problems. I consider the 
wider context of annuity models and the regulatory and institutional problems 
of fund accumulation and I write in general about the pension system frame-
work within which a system of individual, capitalised accounts work properly 
and which I personally prefer.  
1. ANNUITIES IN GENERAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Definition and types of annuity 
The terms5 annuity and life annuity may be used in a wider, technical, or in a 
narrower, regular sense. 
In a wider, technical sense an annuity is every form of regular, standardised 
cash-flow that was preceded by or will be succeeded by some kind of transfer 
of goods, capital or services as compensation with relation to such and in strict 
settlement; or some kind of prolonged payment obligation undertaken volun-
tarily and without compensation.  Standardisation means that the parts of the 
cash-flow (the “payments”) follow one another at regular intervals perpetually, 
for a non-defined or pre-defined period, and/or until the occurrence of a certain 
pre-determined event or events, and the magnitude of payments is either con-
stant or changes according to a defined pattern. In a narrower sense, I regard 
annuity only as those regular, standardised cash-flows that are paid by a finan-
cial institution (or perhaps directly by the state) to an individual (or to several 
private individuals within the framework of a contract). 
Life annuity is an annuity where the start and/or termination of payments 
and changes in the magnitude of payments and/or the intervals between annui-
ty payments depend on the death of one or more people (the annuitant or annu-
itants). The term annuity may also be used in a technical or everyday, i.e. nar-
rower sense. In a technical sense the annuity is the premium paid for life insur-
ance, but in a narrower sense only instances in which the service provided is in 
itself the annuity may be regarded as life insurance (i.e. the annuity is in itself 
                                                          
5In this book I discuss annuities formally, meaning according to their aim and struc-
ture, but it would be possible, and of course also very interesting, to discuss them ac-
cording to their history. Regrettably, there is very little literature available on the sub-
ject and I have not found any documents at all in Hungarian or discussing the Hungari-
an context. The first chapter of Poterba [1997] and of Mackenzie [2006] deals with 
early annuities (e.g. in antiquity and in modern times). Poterba [1997] primarily focuses 
on the American history of annuities, which are also included in the publications of the 
American “annuities association”, the Insured Retirement Institute (IRI Annuity Fact 
Book 2009, IRI [2009]).  
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a life insurance; this is why it is discussed in life insurance textbooks, e.g. 
Banyár [2003b].) 
Unless specifically indicated, later in the book I use the terms “annuity” and 
“life annuity” in a narrower, i.e. everyday sense, unless specifically speaking 
about the mathematics of annuities, since the technical sense is self-
explanatory in that context because at that level there is no difference between 
the narrower and wider meaning of the terms. As the subject of my study is life 
annuity, the term “annuity” is used as a synonym for “life annuity”, unless 
otherwise indicated. Since I regard life annuity as life insurance, I therefore 
also use the term “annuity insurance” in the sense of life annuity.  
Annuities – both in a narrow and even more so in a wider sense – could 
have a practically infinite number of forms, so it is extremely difficult to find a 
grouping in which all possible types are indicated. Consequently, I do not 
strive for completeness but instead try to provide as complete a description as 
possible of the various possible types.6 
The first and most important classification criterion is whether or not the 
disbursement of the annuity depends on coincidence, which fundamentally 
means the death of one or more policyholders. If the answer is yes, then we are 
talking about life annuities; if the answer is no, then we are talking about annu-
ities certain. 
Depending on their term, annuities certain may be further divided into annu-
ities of defined and non-defined term. An annuity certain with non-defined 
term  is basically phased withdrawal from the accumulated assets (principle), 
the duration of which is not pre-defined (although obviously limited by the 
assets available), but there is no intention to either consume the entire capital 
or for further accumulation at real value. Annuities certain of defined duration 
may be an everlasting “perpetuity”, or temporary “financial” annuities. In the 
case of perpetual annuity, the owner of the principal (assets) only consumes 
and receives as a regular benefit the interest, or return (or only a portion of 
that), so the principal is preserved forever (or may even increase). An example 
– among others – is ground rent. In the case of financial annuities the intention 
is to consume all assets within a pre-defined period of time (or to repay the 
entire debt, or accumulate the targeted assets).  
                                                          
6Some form of classification of annuities (different – although not fundamentally – 
from both each other and from the one applied here) can be found in every life insur-
ance textbook (e.g. Mehr-Gustavson [1987], Black-Skipper [1994], Banyár [2003b]). 
Of these, the Black-Skipper [1994] classification (and the book itself) is widely referred 
to and, for instance, is also used by Blake (Blake [1999]). Similarly to the majority of 
literature available, the recent Encyclopaedia of Actuarial Science (Teugles-Sundt (Ed.) 
[2004]) instead contains a kind of (not too detailed) annuity listing. For a practical 
approach to the issue see, e.g. Professional Training Services [1997].     
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Life annuities may be for one or for more people (meaning there may be 
one or more insured persons). There may be a great variety of joint life annui-
ties, but in general these may be further classified into groups depending on 
whether or not we distinguish between insured persons. The first type may be 
called asymmetric, the second symmetric. For the purposes of this book the 
most important symmetric, multi-person life annuity is joint life widow(er) 
annuity with two owners, where the disbursement continues until both insured 
persons (generally husband and wife) are deceased. According to one varia-
tion, the sum assured decreases following the first death (but to a higher 
amount than half of the sum assured). Multi-person asymmetric annuity insur-
ances may be conditional or unconditional, according to whether or not the 
start of annuity disbursement is linked to the death of one of the insured per-
sons.  
Single life annuities either begin immediately or are deferred, and often 
have a guaranteed period at the beginning (“front end”) or at the end (“back 
end”) of the term, although of course the majority have no guaranteed period at 
all. 
The table below includes the most important types of interest to this study, 
and perhaps also in general: 
 
Table 1: The most important annuity types 
 
 
 
So annuities may be distinguished according to the following criteria (in sup-
plementation to the above, to a certain extent): 
• Does it include haphazard elements (annuity certain versus life annuity) 
Annuities
Annuity certain
Fixed term
"Perpe-
tual" 
annuity
Tempo-
rary = 
financial 
annuity
Phased 
with-
drawal
Life annuities
Single life
Without a 
guaranteed 
period
Imme-
diate
Defer-
red
With 
guaranteed 
period
Front-
end
Back-
end
Joint life
Sym-metrical Asymmetrical
Condi-
tional
Uncon-
ditional
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• According to the length of term (defined or undefined term, temporary 
or life-long in case of life annuities ) 
• With respect to life annuities: 
o According to the number of insured persons (single life, multi- or 
joint-life) 
o In case of multi-life annuities according to the relative situation of 
the insured persons (symmetric and asymmetric annuities) 
o In the case of asymmetric annuities does the commencement of 
benefit payments depend on an insurance event or not (condition-
al or unconditional annuities) 
o Does it include guaranteed benefit or not (annuities with or with-
out a guaranteed period) 
o According to the start of the service/benefit (commencing imme-
diately or deferred) 
 
We must note with relation to Table 1 that it is incomplete, and that it does not 
contain all the possibilities within the types included, meaning the above list of 
criteria may be extended. Although multi-life annuities characteristically have 
no guaranteed period (as indicated in the table), theoretically these may be 
supplemented with a guaranteed period (although this is less logical consider-
ing that the usual reason for including a guaranteed period is that it converts a 
single annuity into a joint annuity, badly, but in a technically simpler manner). 
Both multi-person annuities and annuities that include a guaranteed period 
may be deferred, although they generally begin immediately, and having a 
guaranteed period at the beginning is not a particularly logical solution in the 
case of deferred annuities. In principle, symmetric life annuities may also be 
conditional, but it is much more difficult to find practical examples for such 
cases. The table might be continued, and in a certain sense I do continue it later 
in the book, although I fundamentally remain within the above framework.  
However, some important features that are strongly applied in the book are 
not included the table: 
• The frequency of the annuity. In theory any frequency could be de-
termined, though in practice two frequencies are applied most often: 
monthly and annual. Pension, widow(er), orphan, disabled, etc. benefits 
are almost exclusively monthly payments.7 
                                                          
7That is of course linked to the generally monthly schedule of wage and utility bill 
payments as a fundamental determinant. (Although it must be noted that it is a relative-
ly new phenomenon; until the middle of the last century weekly pay checks were more 
frequent, then later fortnightly payment was in place for a while, both of which clearly 
made it easier to budget smaller salaries than a rarer salary payment. Therefore, espe-
cially in the case of lower pensions, a more frequent than monthly pension payment rate 
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• Does the annuity payment happen at the beginning or the end of the an-
nuity period? Depending on these options one can speak about annui-
ties due and annuities payable in arrears. This aspect is a purely 
technical one.  
• Though in the case of annuities the default method is that annuity 
payments are the same magnitude, one can imagine a different situa-
tion. These days it is only natural that annual indexation of the portion 
of the yield beyond the computed one, credited based on the capital in-
vestment that provides the basis for annuity, is not considered a diver-
sion from annuity payments of identical magnitude. However it is pos-
sible that there is some sort of trend in annuities beyond that, e.g. an-
nuity payments increase (incidentally decrease) each year by a pre-
defined amount, or by a pre-defined ratio. It is also possible that this in-
crement is already continuous during the course of the year, or it could 
occur over a longer period of time than a year. On my part, only these 
changes are considered imaginable within annuities and I do think that 
the construction whereby a financial service provider pays the benefit 
otherwise payable as one sum in three, significantly decreasing instal-
ments, so that the “annuity payment” affords the policy holder a more 
favourable tax rating cannot be defined as an annuity.   
• Another default method is that this single sum (regularly decreasing, 
increasing) annuity due is denominated in Euro (EUR) (in general in 
some unit of currency), although internationally (not yet in Hungary) 
there exist investment unit linked “variable annuities” on the model of 
unit linked (UL) life insurance, where the benefit/sum assured is not de-
fined in currency, but in units of variable value (constant, decreasing, 
or sometimes increasing).  
• Although it does not affect the annuity constructions, it is nevertheless 
important to mention that contrary to the still valid centuries-old cus-
tom according to which only age and gender differentiations are applied 
to premiums (although differentiation according to gender has been 
banned in Europe since December 2012), health-differentiated, so-
called “impaired” annuity premiums have already appeared on certain 
markets (UK, USA). (Just as the regulator approach according to which 
certain types of differentiation, e.g. according to gender, must be pro-
hibited, has also appeared). 
• Although I will not be dealing with the subject in my book, It is also 
important to mention that the above definition of annuity is extended in 
                                                                                                                               
may be considered, against which the argument may be the higher related cost com-
pared to the “usual” schedule of utility bills.) 
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a certain sense by the annuity paid when receiving Long Term Care, 
because the commencement of “payment” is conditional, and this con-
dition is not the death of the policyholder, but a certain physical or 
mental condition (policyholders are unable to take adequate care of 
themselves due to old age). In a certain sense, the (internationally rare8) 
home purchase life annuity, the regulation of which has only recently 
begun in Hungary, is an extension of the traditional definition of annui-
ty because of the specific nature of the cash-flow, although, again, I 
will not be dealing with this topic further in my book.  
• It is also worth mentioning an early, historic form of annuity, the “Ton-
tina”, which in a certain sense provided the basis for contemporary an-
nuities. Its original form was suggested (according to some sources 
based on southern Italian examples) by an Italian doctor of medicine, 
Tonti, who served in the French royal court in the mid seventeenth cen-
tury. According to this, a group of rich men would collectively lend a 
larger amount, a hefty sum each, to the King for the long term, the in-
terest of which would be annually paid by the treasury. The interest 
payable to a deceased lender would be distributed among those still 
alive, so they would gradually receive ever increasing amounts of inter-
est and finally the last survivor would receive the full interest on the to-
tal amount lent. When this person also died, the principle would be-
come the property of the King (or in the commercial version would also 
become the property of the last survivor). So the solution merges annui-
ty and gambling. Tontinas quickly spread throughout the world and 
gradually the gambling element began to dominate, as a result of which 
they were eventually banned almost everywhere and today exist almost 
only in France, where they were originally introduced.   
• Finally let me mention an interesting hybrid, a cross-breed of annuity 
certain and life annuity: annually recalculated annuity certain. This is a 
kind of annuity certain, the term of which is the expected remaining 
lifespan of the annuitant. Since these changes annually, it is recalculat-
ed annually and the annuity payment is modified (diminished) accord-
ingly. 
 
In the next subsection of this book I will discuss the mathematics of annuities 
according to a somewhat innovative approach. The basic formulae can natural-
ly be found in literature (partly in my own books). The most frequently refer-
enced actuarial literature publications in English that also deal with the math-
ematics of annuities are the British Neill [1989] of 1977 (unchanged reprint of 
                                                          
8The reverse mortgage construction is much more common internationally. 
1. ANNUITIES IN GENERAL 21 
the 1977 issue) and the American Bowers-Gerber-Hickman-Jones-Nesbitt 
[1986]. One of the (Swiss) authors of the latter summarised very briefly and 
consistently at a very high level the mathematics of annuities in a frequently 
referenced book (Gerber [1995]). From the more recent literature the Canadian 
Milevsky’s book deals explicitly with annuities (Milevsky [2006]). 
Neil’s book includes the classic explanation of annuity mathematics (in-
cluding life annuities), the majority of which he presumably also took from 
tradition. This sort of explanation is also characteristic of the respective Hun-
garian literature (e.g. Krekó [1994], Michaletzky [1997], Banyár [1994] and 
[2003]). Neil’s book is complemented by Hungarian course textbooks from the 
early nineties, which are based on translated English actuarial training text-
books (McCutcheon [1991], Neill [1991a] and [1991b].) 
Two further elaborations are worthy of note from classical English life in-
surance literature: the work by Booth-Chadburn-Cooper-Haberman-James 
[1999], which aimed to be a new summary of English insurance mathematics 
and the huge, three-volume Actuarial Encyclopaedia (Teugels-Sundt (editor) 
[2004]).   
For Hungarians, the Hungarian literature has the advantage of enabling us to 
look back on a much longer period than in the case of English literature, since 
the older literature is more available in Hungarian language. A thick volume of 
“Political Mathematics” (Weninger [1869]) appeared in Hungarian as early as 
1869, attracting great attention and providing an overview of the mathematics 
of life insurances, including annuities. 
The first complete work of Hungarian insurance mathematics using stand-
ard notations, and which may be regarded as the fundamental writing on the 
subject is Political Mathematics Part 2 by Károly Bein, Samu Bogyó and Mik-
sa Havas, with the subtitle: The Theory and Practice of Life, Disability and 
Pension Insurance, published by the Franklin Association in Budapest in 1907 
(Bein-Bogyó-Havas [1907]).  
In more recent Hungarian insurance mathematics literature (beyond my own 
books – Banyár [1994] and [2003]), Béla Krekó (Krekó [1994]) and György 
Michaletzky (Michaletzky [1997]) wrote in general about the mathematics of 
life insurances, the latter focusing primarily on annuities. 
 
1.2. The mathematics of annuities 
Most books, including the abovementioned ones, usually present the mathe-
matics of annuities by explaining how certain types of annuity can be con-
structed out of smaller units (certain or conditional lump sum payments with 
differing conditions) and this is the basis for the various relationships between 
the premiums of concrete annuity types and other life insurances or financial 
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products. In this book I will follow a different, precisely opposite logic, that I 
have developed myself. I do this firstly because it makes the relationship be-
tween different types of annuity clearer and secondly because as a result I can 
present a “global”, “birds eye view” of annuities without concentrating on the 
technical details (which are presented well by the above-mentioned works). 
Following this logic, I begin with presenting the relationships between the 
premiums of various annuities. 
1.2.1. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE NET PREMIUMS OF VARIOUS ANNUITIES AND 
OTHER LIFE ASSURANCES 
It may be stated that just as the light of the sun can be split up into all the col-
ours of the rainbow, and just as white light contains all colours, so the simplest 
annuity, perpetuity, contains all possible annuity types and the other financial 
products related to annuities. Below, we will see how they form a part of it and 
how the various constructions are related to each other. I restrict my analysis 
(for the sake of simplicity and clarity) to annuities due, but with minor modifi-
cations this calculation can also be used for annuities payable in arrears.9 The 
appropriate, standardised notations will be introduced according to the order of 
explanation (and are listed at the end of the book). 
“In the beginning there was the perpetuity”, we might say. The simple, stand-
ardised form of perpetuity is when somebody receives i interest at the end of 
each year on his/her EUR 1 capital and spends it. In this way the magnitude of 
the principal remains (nominally)10 unchanged for eternity, as does the result-
ing income, which in view of its regularity we can regard as an annuity. The 
payments of this annuity are always due at the end of the year, so this is an 
                                                          
9The distinction between annuities-due and annuities payable in arrears is quite 
technical, and from the perspective of the formulae it is not particularly important. The 
point of the difference is that the particular payments are due at the beginning (annuity-
due) or at the end (payable in arrears) of the intervals between two payments. It is 
obvious that the two annuities differ from each other only in the first (and perhaps the 
last) payments, the rest of the payments are the same. From the point of view of calcu-
lations it is important to know the exact situation. We denote the net (without costs) 
single premium as „ä” in case of annuity-due and as „a” in the case of annuity payable 
in arrears. Our choice also means that in the following we use only the variation ä, 
instead of duplicating the (very similar) formulae.  
10Naturally, our analysis can be relatively easily extended to principal unchanged in 
real terms. In this case, we must split the nominal interest rate into two parts and the 
real interest rate will play the same role as the nominal interest rate in this analysis. In 
practice, land rent as a kind of annuity is the closest to perpetuity and represents a more 
or less unchanged principal in real terms.  
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annuity payable in arrears. How we can turn this EUR 1 principal and i interest 
rate into an annuity-due perpetuity? The question can be reformulated: what 
sum can we deduct from the EUR 1 capital at the beginning of the year, so that 
with an i rate of interest rate the principal will again amount to EUR 1 at the 
end of the year? If we denote (as is usual) this sum with d, then we receive the 
following equation: 
1 − d ∙ 1 + i = 1 
from which: 
d = 1 − 11 + i 
The usual practice is to denote the reciprocal (1+i) with v, the so-called dis-
count factor: 
v = 11 + i 
So: 
d = 1 − v 
from which firstly: 
v = 1 − d 
and secondly: 
d = 1 − 11 + i = i1 + i = i ∙ v 
So d is the discounted value of i, and this is indeed logical, because the ques-
tion could also have been formulated as follows: what rate of interest rate 
would we get instead of i, if we want to receive our payment a year earlier? 
The answer, naturally, is the discounted value of i, i.e. i	∙ . 
So we have our first standardised annuity-due, where the annual payment 
(in advance) on EUR 1 principal at an i interest rate is d. The notation of the 
single premium of the perpetuity (for annual EUR 1 payment in advance) is: 
ä| 
So, the equation of a perpetuity with annual payment d is 
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1 = d ∙ ä| 
This expresses the fact that for EUR 1 the client receives an eternal annual 
cash-flow of d magnitude always in advance at the beginning of the year. 
Below, when I write an equation with 1 on one side of it, it expresses what 
products the client can receive for EUR 1, which is logically equivalent to a 
single perpetuity part. 
Before we continue, it is instructive to express ä| from the above equation: 
ä| = 1 = 1 ∙  = 1 +  = 1 + 1  
where 

  is the well-known formula for a unit of perpetuity payable annually in 
arrears (a|). Annuity-due perpetuity to all intents and purposes differs from 
this only with respect to the EUR 1 paid right at the beginning of the annuity 
period. 
So perpetuity is a cash-flow that lasts for eternity. Naturally, we can “sever” 
this cash-flow in different places during its lifetime. What happens, for in-
stance, if we only wish to receive EUR d in advance annual annuity-due pay-
ments on our EUR 1 capital until the time our death? Then obviously immedi-
ately following our death (i.e. at the next payment due date) our heir11 will get 
back the EUR 1 principal (which he/she may again invest in a perpetuity if 
they so wish), because the point of perpetuity is that the whole original capital 
is always “restored” again and again one year after the interest payment. But 
from another perspective, this means that we have split our uniform perpetuity 
into two financial products:  
1. An annuity-due lasting until our death with annual payment d, i.e. a life 
annuity, and 
2. A life assurance with an assured sum of EUR 1 and payment due at the 
time of death (a whole life policy). 
 
We can purchase these two financial products for exactly EUR 1. The usual 
notation of the net single premium of an annuity-due life annuity with an an-
nual payment EUR 1 is ä, where x is the entry age of the annuitant (until 
whose death the annuity lasts) at the commencement of the contract, while the 
notation of the net single premium of a whole life assurance with EUR 1 sum 
                                                          
11I am consciously not dealing with the fact that the insurer pays the sum assured to 
the beneficiaries independently from the probate process, because legally, if there is a 
formal beneficiary then the sum assured does not become part of the inheritance. It 
nevertheless constitutes an inheritance to all intents and purposes. 
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assured is  . In both cases the implicit assumption is that the financial institu-
tion (in this case a life insurer) invests our capital at an annual interest rate of i 
and does not charge anything for its service.12 Using these notations we can 
write down this “segment” of the perpetuity, as:13 
1 =  ∙ ä +  
Naturally we can sever the cash-flow of the perpetuity at other places too. 
We also distinguish between two other important cases of standardised annui-
ty, and especially with reference to life annuities: 
1. The annuity lasts for a predetermined term (for the sake of simplicity 
for a certain number of whole years), after which the capital is paid out, 
and 
2. The annuity lasts for a predetermined term, but maximum until the time 
of our death, after which the capital is paid out (or transferred to our 
heir[s]). 
 
In the first case it must obviously be necessarily true that 
1 =  ∙ ä| +   
where I denote the (whole) number of years of the term with n, the net present 
value of an annuity certain with an annual premium of EUR 1 with ä| , and the 
present value of 1Ft due in n years with vn. 
While in the second case it is clearly true that 
 
1 =  ∙ ä:| + :| 
where ä:|  is the net present value of the EUR 1 annual life annuity-due until 
death, but maximum for n years, while A:|  is the net single premium of a life 
insurance for death and maturity (an “endowment”) with EUR 1 sum assured. 
Above, we first severed the perpetuity when someone died. This event can 
be logically extended to more than one (two in the simplest case) deaths. Then 
we get the following equation (with two clients insured): 
 
                                                          
12Or at least it makes to do with the “margin” between the interest it actually earned 
and the interest it pays to the client.  
13Most of the actuarial books include this equation. See e.g. Bein-Bogyó-Havas 
p182, Bowers et al. p131, Gerber p36, Krekó p30, Neill p63, but a significant number 
of the equations shown here are missing. 
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1 =  ∙ ä +   
where ä is the net single premium of a EUR 1 annual annuity-due for two 
insured persons that lasts until both are alive. (They are x and y years old, 
respectively, at entry, or below, for the sake of simplicity, annuitants x and y). 	A is the single net premium of a whole life insurance with two insured per-
sons, which pays EUR 1 when  either of annuitants x or y dies.  
Naturally, joint life annuities also have a temporary variant, in which case the 
equation 
1 =  ∙ ä:| + :| 
will be true, where A:|  is the net single premium of a joint life endowment 
that pays a EUR 1 sum assured when one of the insured persons dies or after a 
period of n years, while the ä:|  single premium joint life annuity lasts until 
both annuitants are alive and n years have not yet passed.  
A further extension is the addition of a guaranteed period (g years) to the annu-
ity. The following can be stated with regard to the practical reasoning behind 
these. In the case of the immediately commencing and non-conditional annui-
ties analysed so far it can happen that the annuitant dies not long after conclud-
ing the contract and the annuity payments cease immediately after the first is 
paid out (or in the case of conditional or deferred annuities might not begin at 
all). This inevitably scares off many potential annuity buyers from purchasing 
an annuity, who vacillate between spending their accumulated capital and 
leaving it to their children, and makes this largely dependent on their life ex-
pectancy, which they cannot know in advance. By guaranteeing payment of the 
(usually lifelong) life annuity for a number of years, providers can reduce this 
psychological barrier to the purchasing of annuities. The guaranteed period can 
be included at the beginning (front-end) or at the end (back-end) of the term. In 
case of an annuity with a guaranteed period at the beginning (which we will 
denote with ä| ), the annuitant (or their heir) is guaranteed to receive the 
payments due for the first g years of the annuity even if they die in the mean-
time. Naturally, this guarantee will have no effect if the annuitant dies after g 
years.  
An annuity with a guaranteed period of this kind obviously provides more 
than an annuity with no guaranteed period, so its premium is also higher. Ac-
cordingly, EUR 1 is no longer enough (above the annual d payment) to cover 
the previous whole life insurance, only a modified form of it. This modified 
form means that the EUR 1 benefit will certainly not be paid during the first g 
years, even if the insured party dies during this period. If the insured party dies 
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during the first g years, the beneficiary will also only receive the EUR 1 at the 
end of the g year period. This is as if the first g years represented a unit, and 
the annual consideration of mortalities only commences once this period has 
expired. Let us denote this with a g in the lower left hand corner (where g 
means the length of the first such period). Then we can write the following 
equation: 
1 =  ∙ ä|  +   
In the case of an annuity with a guaranteed period at the end (which we will 
denote with ä | ), the beneficiary will receive payments for g years following 
the death of the insured party. This obviously means that the sum assured of 
the whole life insurance will also be payable for g years following the death, 
i.e. we “prolong” payment of the death benefit for g years. This can be express 
by saying that in case of death beneficiaries are not yet due the EUR 1 unit, but 
only its value discounted by g years, so our equation will change as follows: 
1 =  ∙ ä |  +  ∙  
The parts of the above equations can be further segmented. The following 
equation is obviously true: 
ä = ä:| + ä|  
i.e. the lifetime annuity can be broken up into an n-year (n ‹ ω) temporary 
annuity-certain and a deferred (life) annuity with deferment period n. Accord-
ingly, the equation 1 = d ∙ ä + A can be also written in the following form: 
1 =  ∙ !ä:| + ä| " +  
(A deviation from the basic formula is that in this case not every insurance will 
necessarily result in the payment of benefits, because the deferred annuity 
ceases without payment if the insured individual dies within the n years.) 
Analogously to the annuities A can also be split into a “temporary” and a 
“deferred” sum assured. The “temporary” insurance is the classical term 
(death) insurance, and we traditionally denote deferred insurance with A#| ! 
(Remarks: 1. I must emphasize that I have denoted the period with m and not 
n, because the length of deferment does not necessarily have to be the same as 
in the case of annuities, and 2. A#|  should not be confused with the previous-
ly introduced A$ , which means something different. In the first, the vertical 
denotes a condition, i.e. a contingent benefit [if the insured person dies within 
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the first m years then no payment is due according to this insurance policy], 
while in the second case there is no condition, we have simply “combined” the 
first g years.) 
Accordingly, it is also true that 
 = :%| + %|  
where A:#|  is the traditional notation of the single premium of a term (death) 
insurance with EUR 1 sum assured and a term of m years. So we can break up 
our basic equation 1 = d ∙ ä + Afurther into the following form: 
1 =  ∙ !ä:| + ä| " + :%| + %|  
(In this formula either the classical term insurance or the deferred whole life 
insurance will definitely cease without paid benefit, but it is possible that the 
deferred annuity will also not involve the payment of benefit.)  
Although I do not deal with the topic, I must remark that 
1. Temporary annuities may also be broken up into the sum of a short 
temporary and a deferred temporary annuity,  
2. Joint life annuities with two or more insured persons can also be broken 
up similarly to single client annuities. 
 
Annuities with a guaranteed period are complex products so they may natural-
ly also be broken up. 
A front-end guaranteed period annuity is clearly the sum of an annuity-
certain and a deferred annuity, that is 
ä|  = ä | + ä |  
So the equation 1 = d ∙ ä|$  + A$  changes as follows: 
1 =  ∙ !ä | + ä | " +   
Back-end guaranteed annuities provide a greater guarantee than front-end 
guaranteed annuities, because: 
1. They include the guarantee provided as front-end guaranteed annuities, 
since annuity payments are also due during the first g years in this case, 
and 
2. In contrast to front-end guaranteed annuities, payments will definitely 
last longer in this case than without a guaranteed period. In the case of 
a front-end guaranteed annuity, the guarantee is not effective if the in-
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sured party dies after the guarantee period, but in the case of a back-end 
guaranteed annuity there is no such break. 
 
Back-end guaranteed annuities, as a complex product, may be interpreted in 
two ways: 
1. It is to all intents and purposes an annuity certain with a term of g 
years (because the insured party is certain to receive payments during 
the first g years, even if they die immediately after purchasing it) and 
a “normal” life annuity whose payments are all “shifted” by g years, 
meaning: 
ä |  = ä | +  ∙ ä 
This interpretation is totally compatible with the “shifted” whole life 
insurance in the equation 1 = d ∙ ä$|  + v$ ∙ A. In this case, the equa-
tion receives the following form: 
1 =  ∙ !ä | +  ∙ ä" +  ∙  
or 
1 =  ∙ ä | +  ∙  ∙ ä +  
2. It is naturally a normal lifelong annuity plus such a whole life insur-
ance, where the sum assured is paid as an immediately commencing 
annuity certain with a term of g years, so: 
ä |  = ä + ä | ∙  
In this case, the equation 1 = d ∙ ä$|  + v$ ∙ A takes on the following 
form: 
1 =  ∙ !ä + ä | ∙ " +  ∙  
It is taken for granted, that here the sub-total 	d ∙ ä$| ∙ A + v$ ∙ A is 
equal to A. 
 
Naturally these two forms are equivalent, because if we replace ä + ä$| ∙ A in 
the equation with 1-d ∙ ä, then we get 
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ä |  = ä + ä | ∙  = ä + ä | ∙ 1 −  ∙ ä = ä + ä | − ä | ∙  ∙ ä
= ä + ä | − 1 −  1 −  ∙ 1 −  ∙ ä= ä + ä | − 1 −   ∙ ä = ä | +  ∙ ä 
Naturally, it is in theory also possible to guarantee the temporary life annuity, 
although this solution seems less justified than in case of a lifetime annuity. 
Whatever the case, the equations are also extensions of the above equations in 
this case, i.e. 
ä| :| = ä | + ä:| |  
where g≤n, naturally. (We can see that if g=n then ä|$ :| = ä$|  and ä:|| =0.) This restriction is not necessary in the case of a temporary life annuity: 
ä | :| = ä | +  ∙ ä:| 
However, in this case it will also be true that: 
ä | :| = ä: + ä | ∙ :| 
Because the annuity-certain is in fact a guaranteed annuity, the guaranteed 
period can only be properly interpreted in the case of life annuities. It is also 
possible to apply a guaranteed period to joint life annuities, but again, it is 
probably less relevant to those in view of the fact that the intention of the in-
sured parties was intrinsically to leave their capital to the other party in the 
form of an annuity (we could in fact state that a single annuity with a guaran-
teed period is ultimately a [poor] simulation of a joint life annuity). Neverthe-
less, if it is also required for both temporary and joint annuities, then a guaran-
teed period may naturally be added to the annuity according to the above.  
There is a clear relationship between the orders of magnitude of the above-
mentioned annuities. It is clear that:  
ä| > ä:| > ä:| > ä*:| 
and that 
ä > ä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because (based on the relationships described in the first line above) in the case 
of ä|  we are sure to receive payments for n years, but in case of ä:|  for only 
a maximum of n years, in view of the fact that the insured individual currently 
aged x years could die sooner. If, however, the death of one out of two or more 
jointly insured individuals can also stop the flow of annuity payments, then the 
expected period of annuity payment will be even shorter in such cases. The 
same can be said in the case of lifelong single and joint life annuities.   
This also means that the differences between the above-mentioned premi-
ums will be higher than zero. Fortunately, their meanings are also easily inter-
preted: ä-ä: x receives EUR 1 per annum, but pays this back (negative annuity) 
while y is still alive, meaning x only receives payments after y has died. If x 
dies before y, no payment occurs at all. So, this is a conditional annuity: x 
begins receiving annuity payments once y has died. We can denote this with ä|or ä| = ä-ä. 
In this case, our equation will change as follows: 
1 =  ∙ !ä + ä|" +  
ä| may also be regarded as a kind of asymmetric widow annuity. In this case, 
the financial situation of the two insured parties is different, and client y wish-
es to assure an income for the other insured party, who is their dependent (cli-
ent x) following their own death. The death of x does not affect y financially. ä| -ä:| : the annuity is payable for those years of the n-year term during which 
x is no longer alive. If x survives to age x+n, then annuity payments do not 
commence at all. So this is also a conditional annuity, which we shall denote 
with ä| . 
The meaning of this is clear: the beneficiary receives annuity payments (e.g. 
an “orphan” annuity) until a certain age (symbolised by the n-year term), but 
only if the insured party dies before the beneficiary reaches that age, otherwise 
annuity payments do not begin at all because the conditions are not met.  
In this case, our basic equation will alter as follows: 
1 =  ∙ !ä:| + ä|" +   
Of course, this also makes sense if the life annuity is a joint one: 
ä| = ä| − ä:| 
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In this case, payment of the “orphan’s annuity” also commences if either of the 
parents (i.e. not just the pre-determined one) dies before the child reaches a 
certain age. 
In these cases it is generally not important to take into account the fact that 
there is also a chance, although a slim one, of the child dying, but if we do take 
this into account then we can create a three-person joint life annuity: 
ä:|* = ä:| − ä*:| 
According to this, there will be no annuity payments while all three of the in-
sured persons are alive, and if all of them survive until the end of the n-year term 
then no annuity payment will occur at all. If z or y dies, than x will begin receiv-
ing annuity payments for a maximum period of n years (i.e. the end of the prede-
termined age: x+n years), or until the time of his/her death prior to the end of the 
term. If x dies first, annuity payments do not beg  in at all. (In this example the 
parents were y and z, while in the previous one they were x and y!) 
In these cases, our basic equation change as follows: 
1 =  ∙ !ä:| + ä|" +  
and 
1 =  ∙ !ä*:| + ä:|*" + :| 
It is also worth examining in general a whole group of joint life annuities and 
the relationships between their premiums. Remember that ä is an annuity 
that immediately ceases if one of the insured persons dies. In practice, howev-
er, it is difficult to find a situation (aside from life insurance premiums or loan 
instalments, which are technically also annuities) in which two people only 
need an annuity while both of them are alive. The two following two cases are 
much more probable: 
1. An annuity is only needed at all after one of the annuitants dies (and 
naturally only while the other insured party is still alive), or 
2. An annuity is needed while any of the insured persons is alive. 
 
In view of what we already know, however, in both cases we can assemble the 
required annuity from the ones we have already examined: 
1. If we buy two single life annuities for insured persons x and y, but pay 
back both premiums to the insurer while both of the annuitants are alive 
(“negative annuity”), we get precisely the annuity that commences 
when only one of the insured persons is alive, and lasts until their 
death. So the net single premium of this is: ä + ä-2 ∙ ä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2. This case differs from the previous one in that only one of the two an-
nuity payments are returned to the provider while both of the insured 
parties are alive, so the net single premium will be: ä + ä-ä 
 
Further generalising these two cases we can arrive at a single general formula, 
from which almost all two-person joint life annuities can be originated (includ-
ing the two discussed above). If we want client x to receive an A annuity fol-
lowing the death of the other insured party, and for client y to receive B annui-
ty following the death of x for the remainder of their lifetime, and C is the joint 
annual payment received while both are still alive, then we can describe this 
situation with the help of the following formula: 
 ∙ ä + , ∙ ä −  + , − - ∙ ä 
The previously discussed two annuities are in fact special cases of this general 
equation, in which 
In Case 1: A=B=1 and C=0 
In Case 2: A=B=C=1 
The formula can be standardised by choosing one of the (not zero) parameters 
(e.g. A) to be 1, as I do below. 
Giving different values to the parameters A, B and C results in many differ-
ent joint life annuities. These can be classified into two main groups according 
to whether or not A=B=1. In the former case the situation of the two insured 
individuals is symmetrical, because if either dies the other receives exactly the 
same annuity, while the second case, when A and B are different, is asymmet-
rical. 
In case of symmetrical annuities, the most logical solution would be for the 
joint annuity (C) to decreased following the death one of the annuitants, alt-
hough not by half, but by a somewhat lesser degree. (If it were to decrease by 
half, then we would be talking about two single life annuities rather than a 
joint life annuity, because if A=B=0,5, and C=1, then 0,5 ∙ ä + 0,5 ∙ ä −0,5 + 0,5 − 1 ∙ ä = 0,5 ∙ ä + 0,5 ∙ ä). So the most appropriate parame-
ters are the following: 0,5 < A = B < 1 and C=1, in which case the single pre-
mium will be: 
 ∙ ä +  ∙ ä − 2 ∙  − 1 ∙ ä 
The aim and the function of these annuities will be absolutely clear if we call 
them “widow’s” annuity insurance. 
34  1. ANNUITIES IN GENERAL 
1.2.2. A POSSIBLE CALCULATION OF THE NET PREMIUM OF LIFE ANNUITIES  
(AND OTHER LIFE ASSURANCES) 
In case of life annuities, contrary to the annuities-certain, (almost) all payments 
occur by chance, depending on whether or not the insured party is alive when 
the payment is due. Accordingly, the calculation of net premiums requires 
death and survival probabilities. The usual notation of these probabilities is q 
(in case of death) and p (for survival). More specifically: 0 is the probability that a person aged x years will die within one year, p is the probability of the opposite: that a person aged x years will still be 
alive after one year. 
It is obviously true, that 
0 + 2 = 1 
We require survival probabilities not just for one year, but also for a longer 
period, so we introduce a generalization of 2: p3| : the probability, that a person now aged x years will also be alive after t 
years. It will be also true, that p3|  ∙ p4 53 = p354| . 
From these it is easy to calculate the probability that a person who is x years 
old now will die sometime between the age of x+t and x+t+1: p3|  ∙ q53. 
These probabilities can be calculated from a mortality table. Its main col-
umn is a series of l called the “life table”, which shows for the whole integers 
x=0, 1, …, ω, what proportion of a standardised (usually 100,000= l8) group of 
new-born children (aged 0) will still be alive at age 1, 2, … In practice, there is 
nobody still alive at ages ω+1 or higher (ω is usually 100 years in Hungarian 
tables). d denotes how many people out of this population will die between their x 
and x+1 birthdays. Clearly 
 = 9 − 95 
From these, the necessary probabilities can be calculated in the following way: 
0 = 9  
2 = 959  
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2:|  = 95:9  
2:|  ∙ 2* 5: = 95:9 ∙
95:5*95: =
95:5*9 = 2:5*|  
2:|  ∙ 05: = 95:9 ∙
5:95: =
5:9  
Since people who survive until age t will either also survive until age t+1 or 
die before reaching it, it is obviously true that 
2:|  = 2:5|  + 2:|  ∙ 05: 
because 
95:9 = 2:|  = 2:5|  + 2:|  ∙ 05: =
95:59 +
5:9 =
95:9  
Before discussing the calculation of life annuities let us recall the formula of 
the annuity-certain. The net single premium of a temporary annuity-due annui-
ty-certain with annual EUR 1 is: 
ä| = 1 +  + ; +⋯+ = 
This is the sum of a series with n members. Each member is the expected dis-
counted value of a payment. The calculation of the expected value is simple 
here, because the probability of the payment of each member is 1 (the payment 
is “certain”).  The principle of the calculation of the life annuity is the same, 
but a difference is that only the first member of the series is certain. The prob-
ability of the payment of the remaining members is the probability that the 
insured will be alive at that age:  
ä = 1 + 2|  ∙  + 2;|  ∙ ; +⋯+ 2>=|  ∙ >= 
where ω is the statistically relevant highest possible age. 
The formula of the temporary (annuity-due) life annuity is simply: 
ä:| = 1 + 2|  ∙  + 2;|  ∙ ; +⋯+ 2=|  ∙ = 
The deferred annuity’s formula is: 
ä|  = 2|  ∙  + 25|  ∙ 5 +⋯+ 2>=|  ∙ >= 
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We can construct the formulae for life annuities with guaranteed periods at the 
beginning and at the end (front-end and back-end) from the formulae for annu-
ities certain and non-guaranteed annuities. 
If we introduce the survival probability for two lives: p3| , which means 
both a person currently aged x years and another currently aged y years will 
still be alive in t years, we can produce the formula for the single net premium 
of a two-person joint life annuity. 
ä = 1 + 2|  ∙  + 2;|  ∙ ; +⋯+ 2%?>=;>=|  ∙ %?>=;>= 
If we suppose that the life span of the two persons is independent from each 
other, then these probabilities can be derived from the survival probabilities for 
single lives:  
2:|  = 2:|  ∙ 2:|  
This is a classical actuarial assumption, but it is not necessarily true in practice 
in view of the fact that joint life annuities are generally bought by spouses 
whose habits (nutrition, sport, leisure, etc.) are harmonised during their long 
years together, so because of this, and because of their emotional connection, 
their deaths are quite often also synchronized (“broken heart syndrome”). 
Some actuaries have constructed complex mathematical models to handle this 
phenomenon, the discussion of which goes beyond the scope of this book. 
The calculation of joint life annuities with more than two persons and all the 
other annuities discussed earlier can be made analogously.  
The principle for calculating the reserve of the annuities is quite simple in 
the case of single premium annuities (practically all annuities are single premi-
um): the reserve must contain a sum as if the annuity insurance was concluded 
now with the present parameters (the age is the present age of the insured, the 
term is the remaining term). That is, the reserve is equal to the single premium 
of that annuity. An example for the reserve of a life annuity at the beginning of 
year t of its term: 
A: = ä5: 
and in case of a temporary life annuity: 
A: = ä5::=:| 
where V3 is the usual notation of the reserve at year t. 
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1.3. Possible problems of annuity cash-flow 
The following implicit conditions are (and to a certain extent are necessarily) 
used when writing down the cash-flow formula of an annuity: 
• The actual mortality of the annuitants is identical to the value assumed 
during calculation, i.e. to the “projected” mortality; this can be split up 
into four “sub-assumptions”: 
o The composition of different sub-groups of annuitants with di-
verse risk profiles does not vary from the one used in the calcula-
tion. 
o There are no unforeseen trends (and especially no greater de-
crease than calculated) that were not included in the calculation of 
the mortality table. 
o There is no fluctuation in mortality compared to the one assumed, 
beyond the annual fluctuation resulting from having a small num-
ber of annuitants, (a small number of annuitants, which is not big 
enough with respect to the following point). 
o The number of annuitants is high enough to enable the whole 
number of deceased annuitants to exactly generate the necessary 
fraction of reserves. 
• Everybody purchases annuity insurance of identical amount, i.e. the 
portfolio of annuitants is homogenous. 
• Annuity payments are constant in time, they do not change. 
Naturally all the above conditions must be allowed for in practice and the 
resulting problems must be handled either in the formulae, or in calculation or 
reserve management practices. Hereafter, I attempt to elaborate on problems 
resulting from allowing for the above conditions, and on the possible methods 
of treatment. Above I have listed the following problems: 
• Differentiating between annuitants (insured individuals), 
• Annuitant selection, treatment of selections effects, 
• The applied mortality table, 
• The treatment of longevity and mortality risk in general, 
• Problems caused by having a small number of annuitants, 
• Homogeneity of the annuitants’ risk profile, 
• The issue of indexing the annuity, which is strictly related to the ques-
tion of what technical interest rate to apply in the annuity formula and 
to investment return. 
Hereafter, I analyse these problems with special emphasis on selection-related 
problems, in view of their importance, after which I move on to other im-
portant questions that arise with relation to annuities, to all intents and purpos-
es a discussion of regulatory problems. 
2. THE TREATMENT OF ANNUITY 
CASH-FLOW RELATED PROBLEMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Differentiation (and homogenisation) of the insured 
One of the most important methods through which the insurer succeeds in 
making sure that the calculated premium of the insurance is sufficient to cover 
benefits is by setting markedly different premiums for different segments of 
the risk community; in other words the insured are differentiated according to 
their risk. In the case of life insurances – not including annuity insurance – this 
is traditionally done by determining two premium tables14 for each product, 
one for men and one for women. The different premium is set according to the 
age of entry, and accordingly the default is differentiation by age and gender.15 
Beyond this, risk assessment (or underwriting) is generally (but not always) 
carried out, where efforts are made to quantify risks resulting from individual 
health status and behaviours such as drinking, smoking, consumption of drugs, 
etc. In addition, occupation (e.g. dangerous vocation – miner, policeman, etc.), 
sports and hobbies (e.g. extreme sports) are taken into account and it is decided 
whether it is necessary to increase the premium based on age and gender calcu-
lations.  In other words, the insured are further differentiated by risk.  
The essence of differentiation may also be expressed in a way that it enables 
the splitting of the risk community, which is inhomogeneous from the point of 
risk, into homogeneous parts (or at least more homogeneous segments com-
                                                          
14In the EU we have to use past tense in this respect, because of the Gender Di-
rective. The rationale of this directive is questionable and we only hope that the coming 
Age Directive will not prohibit  differentiation according to age, which could lead to 
the end of life insurance as we know it. Later I will discuss the topic of prohibiting 
gender-differentiation (which is – mistakenly – considered as discrimination in the 
Directive). 
15Naturally the premium depends (typically in a linear manner) on the sum insured, 
and the term of the insurance (if there is any difference in this respect at all, e.g. in the 
case of life-long annuities we may assume that they have only one type of term), but 
this difference is not due to the risk of the insured. 
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pared to the entire risk community).  Consequently, differentiation also means 
homogenisation at the level of segments of the risk community.  
Nevertheless, differentiation cannot always be carried out for various rea-
sons, or it is not always possible to create an adequately high number of risk 
“sub-communities” with a sufficient number of members. In such cases, ho-
mogenisation of the risk community may be an independent solution, which is 
the opposite of differentiation in a certain sense, (though from another point of 
view, these assume or complement each other). In the course of homogenisa-
tion, risks deemed to be unmanageable, or individuals deemed to be unman-
ageable risks, are (temporarily or permanently) excluded from the insurance 
and from the risk community (waiting-time, exclusion, exemption, refusal). 
Eventually lower and upper limits are defined for the possible sum assured, 
where attempts are made to remove extreme risks. (I will also detail this type 
of method in relation to annuities). 
Although differentiation and homogenisation are generally applied in paral-
lel, they can replace each other to a certain extent. If there is less differentia-
tion (e.g. due to business or cost considerations, to simplify underwriting an 
insurance policy), the importance of homogenisation increases. By applying a 
greater degree of differentiation, risks that would otherwise be excluded, or 
insured persons who constitute an extreme risk, can also be insured by the 
insurer. 
2.1.1. DIFFERENTIATION IN THE CASE OF VOLUNTARY ANNUITY INSURANCE 
The significant difference between the above cases and the case of voluntary 
annuity insurance is that traditionally no risk assessment is applied (neither 
exclusion, nor refusal). A different premium is applied based on age and gen-
der (and possibly a lower and/or upper limit is set for the possible insurance 
amount – see below), but state of health, occupation, drinking, smoking etc. 
are not assessed. Instead, the basic supposition is that annuity insurance is by 
definition purchased by those who have the best life expectancy and whose 
expected remaining life is longer than the average. Therefore, mortality is not 
calculated from the public mortality table, but rather from the annuitant select 
mortality table that indicates significantly lower mortality. 
The reason for the above practice is that the risk of annuity insurance is pre-
cisely contrary to that of all other, traditional life insurances (term, endow-
ment, fixed term, whole life); that is the risk to be managed is not that the 
insured individual dies much sooner than the average, but on the contrary, that 
the insured party dies at an older age than average. Therefore, traditional risk 
assessment methods and their whole approach cannot be applied in this case, 
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since in the case of annuity insurances the best client is the client who poses 
the greatest danger in other forms of insurance. (Therefore no exclusion or 
refusal of the client is applied). 
The consequence of the above practice is that buying annuity insurance is 
mainly worthwhile for those who have reasonable cause to expect a long life. 
Consequently, on the one hand this practice strictly constrains the potential 
range of clients, and on the other hand it justifies the insurer’s preliminary 
assumption of the client’s long life. Naturally this does not apply in the case of 
mandatory annuity insurances, since people have no choice with regard to 
concluding an insurance contract.  
Recently, some insurers became disturbed by the consequences of tradition-
al practice since it constrained their client base, so the so-called impaired annu-
ity, with premium differentiated according to state of health, emerged on the 
British and American markets. The logic is that clients suffering from certain 
sicknesses and damaged health are offered a preferential tariff, i.e. their state 
of health is also taken into consideration in the premium (in addition to age 
and gender). Naturally this already presupposes a certain risk assessment, the 
logic of which is precisely the opposite of the traditional method: those who 
“simulate” illness/disability must be weeded out and not those who claim to be 
healthy. The phenomenon may also be interpreted so that, similarly to other 
sectors of voluntary insurance, competition in the annuities market has led to 
differentiation of the insured.16 
We must realise that while traditional risk-assessment penalizes attitudes 
and behaviour that is generally regarded as negative (unhealthy lifestyle, ad-
dictions), in the case of impaired annuities these proven negative habits may 
provide the basis for a preferential premium.17 
                                                          
16Pre-empting later sections of this book to a certain extent, the question may be 
raised: why, in the case of voluntary annuity insurances, is differentiation made accord-
ing to state of health and not according to level of education, which is precisely contra-
ry to what is raised with respect to mandatory annuities in the latter part of this work. 
The probable reason for differentiation according to educational attainment not occur-
ring in the case of free market annuities is that annuity insurance is voluntarily conclud-
ed almost exclusively by people who have completed some form of higher education, 
while in the mandatory system this is also obligatory for those with a lower level of 
education.  Naturally, the possibility of differentiation according to educational attain-
ment could gradually decrease in future if college certificates become universal. 
17Though no impaired annuity is necessarily needed for this, as indicated by a piece 
of news that was published in the Hungarian tabloids and caused quite a stir. According 
to these reports: “The Dutch Paerel Leven voluntary supplementary pension insurance 
fund has proposed charging higher premiums to heavy smokers based on the fact that 
their life expectancy is shorter.” See: http://www.stop.hu/articles/article.php? 
id=284988, 1 March, 2008 Source: MTI 
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In summary, differentiation in the case of annuities may be envisaged accord-
ing to those important factors which have a high impact on remaining life 
expectancy – and therefore on the premium of the annuity. These factors in-
clude: 
• Place of residence, housing conditions 
• Workplace and nature of work (e.g. physical, intellectual, etc.) 
• Level of education 
• State of health (e.g. disability, sickness)  
• Lifestyle, drinking, smoking, etc., sports 
• Marital status 
• Income (and via this, the magnitude of the expected annuity) 
• Adverse selection – provided the insured party has a choice 
 
It is important to note that these factors are not independent from each other; 
for example, state of health is related to lifestyle, and probably also to housing 
conditions and level of education, and vice versa, etc. This must be taken into 
consideration at the final determination of differentiation factors. Below, I 
examine and rank the possible use of these factors (with the exception of ad-
verse selection, which I detail in the coming chapter). 
2.1.2. OPTIONS FOR THE DIFFERENTIATION OF MANDATORY ANNUITIES 
According to the above, the pure actuarial approach would require a deeper 
differentiation in groups of diverse risk, since the calculation becomes increas-
ingly stable by further deepening differentiation. In addition, the stochastic 
equivalence between the service received and the premium paid becomes valid 
for increasingly narrow groups, in other words; the deeper the differentiation, the 
more equitable the annuity. On the other hand, reference made to the stability of 
the calculation also naturally means that the less differentiated the annuity, the 
less stable the calculation, and especially in the case of several, competing ser-
vice providers, and some mechanism is required to manage this instability. 
At this time no-one doubts that annuity benefits provided for identical assets 
must be differentiated according to age. This is particularly fortunate from a 
regulatory point of view, because the lack of this differentiation would either 
make a mandatory annuity system unmanageable, or would require drastic 
measures (basically necessitating a uniform age of retirement) that both the 
theory and practice of the Hungarian pension system has already left behind. 
As regards any other differentiation, the various opinions are totally divergent.  
Looking at this issue from the point of view of differentiation possibilities 
as regards annuities, the major obstacles to differentiation (apart from age) are 
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not independent from each other. There is some overlap between them and 
therefore these might theoretically be listed separately. Primarily due to the 
overlapping, I do not highlight the general problem of differentiation by gen-
der as a special obstacle, although the list below covers this issue. 
1. Connection to the annuity of Pillar I 
2. EU regulations 
3. Equity problems – relation to other social welfare systems 
4. Incentives for undesired trends 
5. Available data, assessability of the given parameter 
 
Let us analyse these in the above order. 
 
Connection to the annuity of Pillar I. Private pension funds in Hungary were 
established with the aim of enabling the annuity purchased from accumulated 
assets to complement the annuity received from Pillar I, where the latter re-
mains the larger component within the total pension. Although it was not spec-
ified that the annuity of Pillar II must operate according to the same principle 
as the Pillar I annuity (and in fact several factors such as enabling a choice 
between different kinds of annuity suggested precisely the opposite), it is 
(would have been) a logical requirement that the two parts of an individual’s 
pension match each other, i.e. that major parameters like differentiation must 
be in harmony within the two pillars. 
Looking at the annuity of Pillar I from the perspective of differentiation, we 
may say that it includes a differentiation by age, although not in a perfectly 
correct way actuarially, but it exists nevertheless. However, as differentiation 
by gender is becoming increasingly less common18, we may practically assume 
that is does not exist. There exists differentiation according to the level of 
accumulated entitlements (income), i.e. the digressive scale, but this is also 
going out of fashion. There is no differentiation according to place of resi-
dence, level of education, state of health, marital status, lifestyle, drinking, 
smoking, etc., but there exists differentiation according to job and workplace 
to the extent that a preferential retirement age is determined for certain occupa-
tions (miners, ballet dancers, members of the armed forces).19 Although this 
preferential age of retirement is not calculated based on lifetime being different 
from the average, but to a certain extent on an arbitrary basis and while con-
                                                          
18Becoming less prevalent because the lower retirement age of women may be con-
sidered as a form of differentiation by gender, even though this makes the annuity even 
less correct from an actuarial perspective.  
19In 2011 the majority of these were cancelled for new entrants. One of the excep-
tions are ballet dancers. 
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sidering other factors (e.g. in the case of ballet dancers the opportunity to carry 
on the given vocation20).  
So it may be assumed that (using wording that takes into account the char-
acteristics of Pillar II) in Pillar I there is no (current or later) differentiation by 
gender, or according to the magnitude of accumulated assets, or any other kind 
of differentiation with the exception of differentiation by workplace and the 
nature of the work performed, but differentiation does not happen in an actuar-
ially correct manner in this case either. 
So, in contrast to Pillar II annuities, Pillar I represents (would have repre-
sented) the requirement that it should include no form of differentiation except 
by age and certain occupation groups. This issue is especially sharply raised 
when it comes to differentiation by gender, as annuities were differentiated 
according to this criterion by Hungarian insurers until 21 December 2012. This 
(i.e. to immediately ensure that this general practice of private insurance com-
panies should not be applied to mandatory annuities) is probably the reason 
why the Private Pension Funds Act has always stipulated that the mandatory 
annuity must be calculated using the unisex mortality table.  
Though the requirement posed by Pillar I is clear, it is still not necessary to 
restrict options for differentiation in Pillar II. However, the use of the unisex 
mortality table is such a strong requirement that no divergence is possible from 
this perspective. 
 
The EU regulations characteristically do not concern themselves with what 
options member states allow or prohibit for differentiation in the case of insur-
ance products and annuities, with one important exception: differentiation by 
gender. The so-called Gender Directive adopted in 2004 (“COUNCIL DI-
RECTIVE 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods 
and services”) prohibits the application of different premium calculations ac-
cording to gender, although not with immediate effect and while taking into 
account the specific regulatory frameworks of member states. The provision is 
justified according to items (18) and (19) of the Preamble as follows: 
“(18) The use of actuarial factors related to gender is widespread in the pro-
vision of insurance and other related financial services. In order to ensure 
equal treatment between men and women, the use of gender as an actuarial 
factor should not result in differences in individuals' premiums and benefits. 
To avoid a sudden readjustment of the market, the implementation of this rule 
should apply only to new contracts concluded after the date of transposition of 
this Directive. 
                                                          
20Combined with the arbitrary assumption that the individual will not be able to 
conduct any other occupation to earn a living and consequently must retire.   
44  2. THE TREATMENT OF ANNUITY CASH-FLOW RELATED PROBLEMS 
(19) Certain categories of risk may vary between the genders. In some cases, 
gender is one but not necessarily the only determining factor in the assessment of 
risks insured. For contracts ensuring those types of risks, Member States may 
decide to permit exemptions from the rule of unisex premiums and benefits, as 
long as they can ensure that underlying actuarial and statistical data on which the 
calculations are based, are reliable, regularly up-dated and available to the pub-
lic. Exemptions are allowed only where national legislation has not already ap-
plied the unisex rule. Five years after transposition of this Directive, Member 
States should re-examine the justification for these exemptions, taking into ac-
count the most recent actuarial and statistical data and a report by the Commis-
sion three years after the date of transposition of this Directive.“ 
In Article 5 of the Directive (“Actuarial factors”) it specifically states: 
(1)  Member States shall ensure that in all new contracts concluded after 21 
December 2007 at the latest, the use of gender as a factor in the calculation of 
premiums and benefits for the purposes of insurance and related financial 
services shall not result in differences in individuals' premiums and benefits. 
(2) Notwithstanding Paragraph 1, Member States (including Hungary) may 
decide before 21 December 2007 to permit proportionate differences in indi-
viduals' premiums and benefits where the use of gender is a determining factor 
in the assessment of risk based on relevant and accurate actuarial and statistical 
data. The Member States concerned shall inform the Commission and ensure 
that accurate data relevant to the use of gender as a determining actuarial factor 
are compiled, published and regularly updated. These Member States shall 
review their decision five years after 21 December 2007, taking into account 
the Commission report referred to in Article 16, and shall forward the results 
of this review to the Commission”. 
So in summary: whilst member states must prohibit differentiation by gen-
der in premium calculation, they are free to temporarily decide not to imple-
ment it in the case of certain types of insurance. This temporary exemption 
may theoretically be endlessly extended, but should they fail to do so this ex-
emption will terminate and the unisex tables must be applied. 
This was the situation until 1 March 2011, when the Court of Justice of the 
European Union made this Article invalid with effect from 21 December 
2012. This means that in future, differentiation according to gender is not an 
option in the case of insurance products (Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion [2011]). However, in theory this rule is not valid for mandatory annuities 
because they fall under the sphere of authority of a different Directive to the one 
governing employer pension funds, but it is valid for mandatory annuities pro-
vided by insurance companies. Although it seems that independently from the 
Gender Directive, and especially because of the reasons explained in the previ-
ous chapter, a unisex rate must also be applied in the case of mandatory annuity. 
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Equity problems – relation to other social welfare systems. Although some 
of the above-listed aspects of differentiation may be justified and correct, 
mainly taking into consideration life style, drinking, smoking, sports etc., and 
accordingly with regard to state of health, they may nevertheless lead to ine-
qualities under the existing social insurance systems. In the case of annuity, 
people with no unhealthy habits and who lead a healthy lifestyle and partici-
pate in sports would be expected to have a longer lifetime, meaning they will 
have to pay a higher premium for the same annuity. This is fair if this same 
factor is also taken into consideration (with an opposite effect) in other sys-
tems, because a healthy person probably requires less healthcare, so it would 
be justifiable to decrease their level of healthcare contributions, while people 
who lead an unhealthy lifestyle should have to pay more21. So taking the annu-
itant’s state of health into account is equitable provided it is also taken into 
consideration by the healthcare system.  
 
Incentives for undesired trends. In strict relation to the above, state of health 
considerations may appear in the annuity premium of an individual if the annu-
ity provider penalises healthy lifestyles and rewards unhealthy lifestyles and 
harmful habits such as smoking, drinking alcohol and taking drugs. This in 
itself may be an incentive for the development of such habits, or at the very 
least may provide a good excuse for not changing existing bad habits. This 
undesired incentive may have a milder, but equally dangerous impact from an 
annuity point of view in that it motivates certain individuals to prove harmful 
behaviours in order to receive a more favourable annuity. In fact, both effects 
should be avoided, on the one hand because they are directly harmful, on the 
other hand because filtering out potential fraud may increase the cost of the 
annuity determination process. 
 
Available data and the assessability of the given parameter. When insurers 
traditionally differentiate annuities according to age and gender, it is the result 
of considerate evaluation and emphasises those factors that have the most 
important impact on lifespan, such as: 
                                                          
21As a curiosity, I mention that many experts question whether prevention diminish-
es healthcare expenditure. It is possible that the National Health Service spends more 
on those who have a healthy lifestyle, because they are more likely to show up at 
screenings and receive treatment at an early stage of illness, etc. By contrast, an un-
healthy lifestyle is often related to people who don’t participate in screenings, do not 
request treatment and only go to the doctor when there is already nothing to be done, so 
there are fewer costs for the healthcare fund. If this is true, then although differentiation 
according to state of health may be justified within the annuity system, it would also 
generate incentives for undesired trends.   
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• It can be easily and reliably assessed at no additional cost 
• Reliable data is available on the correlation between the parameter and 
life expectancy 
• It is a clear and stable (calculably variable) characteristic of the insured 
party 
 
From this perspective, age and gender are incomparably more useful parame-
ters than the following from among the previously listed possible differentia-
tion factors: 
• Accommodation, housing conditions 
• Workplace, nature of work (e.g. physical, intellectual, etc.) 
• State of health(disability, illness) 
• Lifestyle, drinking, smoking, etc., sports 
• Marital status 
 
Accommodation, workplace, nature of work, customs, habits, marital status 
and state of health all change and so it is difficult to characterise them by a 
single parameter in order to compare different individual situations. It is even 
more difficult to assess them objectively (except for marital status perhaps) 
and there is a great opportunity for concealment or misrepresentation of the 
situation, so this data may only be acquired by the insurer in a costly and unre-
liable manner (although to different extents). Furthermore, we generally do not 
possess good statistics on the impact of these factors on life expectancy (an in 
fact they are not independent of each other). 
From among the above-listed factors, income (and through this the expected 
annuity payment) and adverse selection can clearly be easily and reliably as-
sessed at no additional cost to the insurer, but it is also true with relation to 
these (at least in Hungary), that we do not possess good statistics on the impact 
of these factors on life expectancy.  Although the (highest) level of educational 
attainment may change during the course of an annuitant’s lifetime, we can 
generally expect it to be a stable and relatively easily identified factor well 
before retirement, and there are already statistics concerning its correlation to 
life expectancy. (This is also true with relation to marital status.) 
Despite the above-listed obstacles, there are not only actuarial but also “so-
cial policy” arguments in favour of differentiation according to certain parame-
ters. In this context, it is important that the regulator takes into account that in 
the case of a mandatory insurance – for example the mandatory annuity – the 
prohibition of applying differentiation to premium calculations also means that 
the regulator creates a forced financial solidarity among certain risk groups 
within the population; in other words, it forces groups of people to financially 
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support other groups.22 This type of redistribution is well known in other fields 
of social life, but it is important to repeatedly call attention to the fact that the 
usual ideology of annuities – according to which the state takes from the rela-
tively better off and gives to the less wealthy, or that the common social cost is 
borne by the rich rather than the poor – does not fully work and to a certain 
extent the truth is just the opposite. The relatively poor have a shorter life 
expectancy, so they support the rich who have a higher life expectancy. Only 
the lack of differentiation between male and female partially contradicts this 
and regular arguments in favour of redistribution are still valid. This phenome-
non is often referred to (in a rather telling way) in literature as “pervert redis-
tribution”.  
In the context of pervert redistribution we must mention that the prohibition 
of differentiation between male and female with regard to annuities (generally) 
works against this (while it maximally effects a “non-pervert” or what we 
might call a “usual” redistribution) since women, who are generally in a less 
favourable position on the labour market, find themselves in a more favourable 
situation during the annuity. But if we also cannot differentiate, for example, 
according to level of education, then high income earners will be in a better 
position compared to people with lower incomes, and accordingly in the case 
of mandatory annuity the extension of the prohibition of differentiation to 
every other factor beyond age may not necessarily be easily justified. Let me 
mention here a factor to be detailed later in the book that suggests that the 
lower the technical interest rate, the more favourable the annuity for the higher 
income layers of society (because of longer lifetime) than for the lower income 
layers (with a relatively shorter life expectancy). Similarly, the guaranteed 
period is more favourable for people with lower incomes. In summary, pervert 
redistribution may be diminished if annuities are differentiated according to 
factors (e.g.: educational attainment) that correlate well to income, or if we 
apply a fixed, but variable technical interest rate, as will be discussed later, or 
if we apply a buffer-type death benefit, as will also be discussed in a later 
chapter. 
 
                                                          
22Adopting the view generally accepted in the actuarial profession, I in fact do not 
consider insurance itself, or the financial transfer necessarily taking place among the 
insured via insurance, as constituting solidarity. I consider this characteristic of insur-
ance to be natural, and in itself it includes neither force nor solidarity. However, soli-
darity does appear in insurance, and in the form of forced solidarity, if groups of evi-
dently different risk and with a balanced premium are classified into the same risk 
community. The magnitude of the forced solidarity is also precisely as much as the 
amount of money transferred by one risk group to the other due to the prohibition of 
differentiation.  
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2.1.3. OPTIONS FOR LEGISLATORS 
To avoid fraud, I would suggest we calculate only those of the above-
mentioned factors that can be assessed relatively reliably and cheaply, and 
accordingly we may consider the following differentiation options: 
• According to gender 
• According to the magnitude of pension assets 
• According to state of health 
• According to certain occupations 
• According to level of education 
 
In addition, adverse selections due to clients having a choice between different 
types of annuity with different mortality tables (i.e. differentiation according to 
the choice made by the annuitant) is also a possibility, the theoretical impossi-
bility of which I will prove in the following chapter. 
Differentiation according to gender, based primarily on political and not 
technical arguments, may not be considered as a possibility with regard to 
mandatory annuities for the time being. This raises significant technical issues 
that may possibly be facilitated by other measures, for example by the manda-
tory joint-life annuity that will be discussed later. Nevertheless, there may be 
techniques that can be used to neutralise arguments against differentiation 
according to gender (if this was not banned), and this is the regrouping of 
funds between individual accounts, the impact of which on the magnitude of 
the annuities of women and men is identical to that calculated on the basis of a 
unisex table, while the actual calculation is made on the basis of tables that are 
differentiated for men and women. The mechanism of the solution and related 
arguments has already been detailed in a previous article of mine (Banyár 
[2002]). Among others I explained that the unisex mortality table, which clear-
ly favours women more than men, compensates for certain inequities against 
women, but despite this, I do not approve of its implementation. In the very 
same study I said that even if we stick to the idea that women and men of simi-
lar age should receive the same annuity for the same savings, it would be more 
correct to directly regroup the assets from the pension accounts of men to those 
of women to the extent that it simulates the application of the unisex table, 
than to actually apply the unisex table. 
If regulations do not homogenise the size of possible annuities, differentia-
tion according to the magnitude of pension assets presents itself as a strong 
possibility. This, to a certain extent, handles the differences between accom-
modation, physical and intellectual work, level of education and lifestyle. 
Although we must note that we have no data about the level of positive corre-
lation between life expectancy and the magnitude of accumulated assets as-
sumed by many, including myself, to exist in the case of private pension funds. 
2. THE TREATMENT OF ANNUITY CASH-FLOW RELATED PROBLEMS 49 
This data should be systematically collected (allowing for the fact, although 
not assuming, that this data does not indicate a correlation between the two 
factors, as is supposed by some experts, or that they might possibly indicate a 
negative correlation).   
In the long term, the introduction of differentiation according to state of 
health is also worthy of consideration, although for the foreseeable future 
(until it is also taken into consideration within the healthcare system) it is ex-
pedient to avoid enabling characteristics that are widely considered as nega-
tive, primarily meaning harmful behaviour such as smoking and alcoholism, to 
represent an advantage with regard to annuities (even if this may be justified 
from a risk perspective). However, the level of detail of differentiation accord-
ing to state of health may be very different; practically speaking we are dealing 
with a group of factors that may be taken into consideration gradually as we 
learn more about their impact on life expectancy. Perhaps the first fact that 
may be taken into consideration is disability, which is well-documented; it is 
important to note that the structure of disability pension and its adjustment to 
the system of private pension benefits is an important problem that I do not 
deal with in this book.  
Consideration of the impact on life expectancy of spending many years in a 
certain occupation, e.g. a miner, may also be raised. However, two important 
issues need to be mentioned in relation to this factor:  
1. The trend of technical development is clear; occupations requiring 
higher than average physical effort are gradually disappearing, so this 
differentiation factor is losing importance in the long term. 
2. In Hungary the pension system significantly abused this factor for a 
long time (until 2011) because it defined a number of occupations 
(armed forces, ballet dancers) with regard to which many years of early 
retirement were assured in a way that is totally unjustified based on the 
actual physical stress and can only be interpreted as having remained in 
the system as a political heritage. For this reason, the gradual elimina-
tion of existing methods of differentiation is on the agenda rather than 
taking into account differentiation according to occupation. In Hungary 
these kinds of differentiation only officially exist within the pension 
system in Pillar I and the Act does not provide for whether these must 
also be taken into account in Pillar II and if so, how. This obviously 
generates tension between the two systems when the annuity phase 
commences.  
 
Differentiation according to educational attainment meets most of the nec-
essary requirements: it is easy and cheap to assess, “politically correct” in that 
it favours the poor as opposed to the well-to-do; statistics are available about 
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its impact on age, which indicate that according to this factor the life expectan-
cy of the Hungarian population is extremely diffuse. The application of this 
factor should be among the first to be examined, especially if differentiation by 
gender cannot be implemented by any method. Naturally, technical questions 
such as when should a change in the level of educational attainment be taken 
into consideration as a factor during the course of calculation (i.e. until the 
annuity commences or perhaps until a certain pre-determined age?), must be 
answered first. 
Similarly to differentiation according to occupation, although perhaps more 
in the long-term, the same concern may be raised here; namely that this factor 
would also “run out” in the coming decades. There seems to be a trend nowa-
days that higher education is becoming increasingly general. This emphasises 
the requirement of differentiation in that we must leave possibilities for differ-
entiation according to other factors open for the future.   
Above I discussed differentiation as differentiation according to premium. 
Clearly, differentiation according to reserve follows from differentiation by 
premium, but it may also be logical for differentiation according to reserve to 
be more advanced (according to several factors) than differentiation by premi-
um. This may be specifically raised when the regulation – due to different, 
non-technical considerations – basically prohibits differentiation (e.g. by gen-
der, age and other factors). This may lead to the perception that two annuity 
portfolios of strictly different composition from a risk point of view appear to 
be identical and the same provision is created for them, which however would 
not be a good idea from a prudential perspective.  
Theoretically, any parameter may be used for differentiation by reserve; no 
considerations are raised against it such as in the case of premium differentia-
tion according to gender. Accordingly, it is logical that even when using the 
unisex premium table the gender of the insured should be taken into account 
during the course of reserving, and a larger reserve should be accumulated for 
portfolios containing more women even if the same amount of premium was 
collected with respect to them as for portfolios that include more men.  
During the course of reserving, differentiation according to other factors 
beyond the above would be useful with respect to prudential aspects. The 
highest education level attained (for example, classifying the population into 2 
or 3 groups according to their level of education) is perhaps the most useful of 
the above factors. 
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2.1.4. DIFFERENTIATION IN LITERATURE 
Blake [1999] mentions adverse selection and mortality risk as major problems 
of annuity for providers and annuitants. On the basis of asymmetric infor-
mation, only people who expect a long life are prepared to voluntarily pur-
chase an annuity. According to Blake, the insurer is unable to differentiate 
among annuitants of diverse risk. Therefore the annuity is calculated on the 
basis of the mortality of a select group, so for those with worse mortality, an-
nuity would be a bad deal.  
Blake’s statement contradicts what I stated above, because in my view the 
insurer is able to differentiate, as indicated by the recent developments on the 
annuity market which were not yet obvious back in 1999. As I have written, I 
agree with Blake to the extent that insurers have not differentiated among the 
annuitants until quite recently, which is probably the consequence of the small 
voluntary annuity market, which is unattractive to the service providers. Annu-
itants were offered a high premium as a consequence of the above, which fur-
ther restricted the market. So this phenomenon existed, but in my view Blake 
explained it incorrectly and not everybody agrees with it in the literature either 
because, in a competitive market, a better premium is offered to those of better 
risk according to the World Bank [1994]. Finkelstein-Poterba [2002] traces the 
phenomenon back to the decisions taken by insurers; according to them, insur-
ers do not collect data on social-financial status and accordingly they do not 
differentiate in premium, which causes losses for insured persons of low status 
who purchase annuities. They thought this statement needed explanation, and 
according to them the plausible explanation is that verification of such data is 
expensive. Based on their survey, when information on annuity premiums was 
collected from many annuity brokers, it turned out that providers do not differ-
entiate much among clients. In addition, they have not specifically prepared to 
differentiate in the future because to set the premium they have only been 
interested in age, gender, type of annuity, market type (voluntary, mandatory), 
assets, frequency of annuity payment, duration of guaranteed period and the 
benefit payable to possible survivors. There were only a few companies that 
offer specific premiums for clients in a state of bad health, e.g. smokers. 
The World Bank [1994] also believes that adverse selection is the primary 
problem with regard to private annuities. As with Finkelstein-Poterba, the 
World Bank also mentions that for insurers, the price of the annuity is actuari-
ally unfair in respect of the good risks (i.e. for people with a shorter than aver-
age life expectancy), so these products are only bought by the rich. In other 
words; annuities are a luxury. The World Bank only mentions but does not 
explain the phenomenon, although it calls attention to the consequences of 
redistribution among annuitants. This already appears on the voluntary annuity 
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market where, in principle, there is no obstacle to providing an annuity with a 
preferential premium for those of higher mortality. However, this redistribu-
tion may pose a special problem if prices cannot be differentiated, especially if 
annuity purchase is mandatory at these prices. According to the World Bank 
[1994], such uniform prices mean an ex ante transfer from low risk to high risk 
and it is particularly unfavourable for low income workers. This means it is not 
a usual redistribution because the money flows from the lower income (i.e. 
shorter than average life expectancy) people to the higher income (i.e. longer 
than average life expectancy) people. Consequently this sort of redistribution is 
generally called “pervert” in the literature. 
Redistribution as a result of prohibiting differentiation was also examined 
by others. Brown [2003] came to the conclusion that even if a large redistribu-
tion item occurs in the mandatory annuity because of uniform premiums it may 
still be worthwhile for people with higher mortality rates based on utility, if the 
cost of annuity administration is low. It seems that Brown got these results 
disregarding the bequest motive because at the end of the study he called atten-
tion to the fact that in future researches this impact should be taken into ac-
count despite the fact that there is no consensus among economists as regards 
the significance and modelling of this motive.  
In the Hungarian literature, the issue of redistribution was raised in the con-
text of private pension annuity, the conclusion being that efforts should be 
made to avoid it. In the study by Augusztinovics-Gál-Máté-Matits-Simonovits-
Stahl [2002] it interestingly does not appear with relation to demands for dif-
ferentiation, but with relation to the refusal of a Guarantee Fund and the yield-
balancing provision as redistributive measures, which is contradictory to the 
often-quoted basic philosophy of the private pension system that includes self-
care, individual savings, etc. (page 486) (I do agree with this, as I will elabo-
rate on later). The study focuses on the non-transparent character of these 
redistributions as a further negative element. Michaletzky (Michaletzky 
[1999]) also agrees with the avoidance of redistribution and on this basis he 
finds the implementation of the unisex table to be problematic (page 103). 
“The most painful point in setting up the service is the implementation of an 
adequate mortality table. …. [the unisex table] is clearly an item of the Act, the 
application of which compromises the principle of the fully funded pension 
fund and, understandably, gives rise to social criteria.” 
In the literature, the issue of differentiation appears primarily in the context of 
mandatory annuities. The World Bank [1994] says that if the annuity is mandato-
ry then the question of what factors premium differentiation should happen ac-
cording to becomes an important public policy issue concern. Can we differenti-
ate according to income, gender, race or other factors? They mention that, for 
example, in the United States of America race and gender are prohibited differ-
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entiation factors in occupational pensions and in life insurance. (In the United 
States race is an important factor, in Hungary race would not even be considered 
as a factor since the population is largely homogeneous.) 
Neither English nor Hungarian literature provides orientation regarding the is-
sue of differentiation, nor does it tell us what criteria should be applied. The 
issue is a problem, and regulations are unclear about the allowed factors (e.g. 
Michaletzky [1999] and Réti [1999]). They use a special wording stating that “it 
is not clear who compose a risk community”. This wording confuses the prob-
lem of differentiation and mortality profit distribution. (E.g. when Michaletzky 
[1999] lists the options of risk community, he mentions the following: according 
to type of annuity, investment portfolio and age cohorts. He says it is not clear 
whether the fund is entitled to define who belongs to a certain risk community or 
if it is defined by law.) Réti [1999] believes that the risk community should 
mean every member of the fund collectively, including active and inactive mem-
bers, which would indicate the distribution of mortality profit rather than differ-
entiation. There is only one negative statement with regard to differentiation that 
can more of less be regarded as a majority opinion: there should be no differenti-
ation according to gender, although as we can see in the case of Michaletzky 
above, there are those who find this problematic. Ágoston-Kovács [2007] calls 
attention to certain pieces of research in Hungarian demographic literature (not 
necessarily relating to annuities) that could also be used as criteria for differen-
tiation. According to this (Kovács [2007] page 7): “We have known for a long 
time that widows and divorced people have a higher mortality and a worse state 
of health than their married peers. With a few notable exceptions, similar pat-
terns are also true for single men and women”. 
Winkler-Mattar [1999] also believe that the solution to the problem of ad-
verse selection in annuities is the differentiation of annuitants, although they 
mention as a new perspective that if we differentiate the annuitant portfolio, 
e.g. offer a more favourable premium to people with higher mortality, it would 
in principle aggravate the problem of selection in the remaining population. 
Fundamentally this is the problem of the old providers, but is also a possibility 
for new market players as mentioned by Ainslie [2000] in respect of impaired 
annuities provided for people with a damaged state of health, which allow the 
new entrants to ”cherry-pick” the clients of existing providers. According to 
his data the first such annuity (the so called nursing care annuity) was sold by 
Eagle Star in 1991. 
While in the case of a voluntary annuity this “cherry-picking” is a part op-
portunity, part danger, depending on whether we are talking about a new or old 
service provider, in the case of a mandatory annuity it clearly represents a 
danger for the regulator. The World Bank [1994] has already called attention 
to this. According to the World Bank, if risk categories are created then annui-
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ty providers will attempt to skim the best risks in every category. Accordingly, 
they take a clear stand that if annuity purchase is mandatory then service pro-
viders must be prohibited from selecting among annuitants, or a specific fund 
must be created to provide cover for “bad risks” (i.e. people who are very 
healthy). This must be subsidised by either the annuity providers or by the 
state. For my part I think that this second solution is not the way to go, because 
it makes the system unnecessarily complicated or obviously transforms tax-
payer money to profit in the case of certain providers. 
2.2. The issue of the applied mortality table 
There is one certainty about mortality tables used in annuity premium calcula-
tion and reserving: we must use a projected mortality table that takes into ac-
count the foreseeable change in mortality, as tables based on historical data 
may not be satisfactory. The above differentiation factors should also be con-
sidered via the use of mortality tables. However, other issues, including for 
example whether we should apply a central mortality table or use different 
ones for each provider, depend on other elements of the annuity system. 
2.2.1. THE PREPARATION OF THE MORTALITY TABLE, MORTALITY PROJECTION 
One question that needs to be answered is who should prepare the (unisex and 
differentiated, but definitely projected) mortality tables for annuity premium 
calculation and for reserve calculation. There are diverse possibilities, the 
more important ones being: 
• A state institute established for expressly this purpose, or an existing 
institute (such as the Central Statistical Office’s Institute of De-
mographics), which is entrusted with this task, 
• The providers involved (life insurers and funds), or an institute estab-
lished by some of these providers (or possibly several groups of pro-
viders), 
• Each provider prepares these tables themselves. 
 
In Hungary at present, the Central Statistical Office’s Institute of De-
mographics prepares mortality tables (e.g. broken down according to geo-
graphical area, place of residence, level of education), but the composition of 
the population that participates in a relatively new voluntary private pension 
system (which is possibly increased according to changing state preferences 
and then reduced to a minimum, and therefore strongly selected) is clearly a 
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special case. There is good reason to assume that the life expectancy of private 
pension fund membership is different to that of the entire population of Hunga-
ry, but in the early phase of a scheme this difference is difficult to estimate, 
and in case of a low number of annuitants this difference can be extremely 
high. Later, with the growing number of pensioners taking part in this scheme, 
the difference between participant mortality and the entire public mortality 
table will probably decrease gradually. 
A single provider can only prepare mortality tables for itself with sufficient 
precision if it has a large enough, stable enough and old enough portfolio of 
annuitants. But in the initial phase of a scheme no company provide such an-
nuities, so nobody has a sufficiently old portfolio. The portfolio may only 
really be regarded as stable if the members of the private pension fund system 
do not have the opportunity to change providers, but this can only be achieved 
if the whole system was launched with these conditions. If (as is the case in 
Hungary) people’s right to choose between providers was declared when the 
system was first launched, it would constitute such a big step backwards for 
schemes that such a step is practically impossible. In a free market many pro-
viders have sufficiently large portfolios, but not all of them. Due to all these 
factors, in a newly launched private pension system we can generally not as-
sume that any of the providers are capable of producing their own mortality 
tables, so the regulator should reject this possibility at the launch of the system.  
In summary we either have an existing or a new institute which is run by ei-
ther the state or the providers involved. Either way is feasible, but it is expedi-
ent for the state to take on the role of initiator via regulation, either by estab-
lishing or designating such an institute, or by assigning responsibility to the 
providers and setting them a deadline. In other words, mortality tables and 
mortality projections should under all circumstances be prepared centrally (and 
projections should be regularly checked and recalculated by the state), for 
which it is expedient to use the mortality data of private pension fund members 
that has already been collected (which in Hungary, for example, the Central 
Registry of Pension Funds did indeed collect until 2011). 
2.2.2. CENTRAL MORTALITY TABLE OR INDIVIDUAL PROVIDER MORTALITY TABLES? 
The next question if whether or not the centrally prepared mortality table must 
be used obligatorily by every provider (if there are multiple providers at all). 
The following major possibilities arise: 
• Everybody must apply the centrally prepared mortality tables in un-
changed form, 
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• The centrally prepared tables must be applied, but a certain, pre-
determined level of deviation is permitted, 
• Any degree of deviation from the central tables is allowed, but the pro-
vider must justify the reasons for deviating from the table, 
• The central table is merely provided as an aid for the provider, which is 
free to deviate from them in any manner without having to provide jus-
tification. 
 
The question may also be raised whether the above possibilities apply for both 
premium calculation and reserving. To cite just one example: should everyone 
apply the same central table in unchanged form for both premium calculation 
and for reserving, or should use of the central table only be mandatory for 
reserving, while diversion from the central table is permitted with respect to 
premium calculation?  
There is no free choice between these possibilities; the choice depends on 
the other elements of the system. For example, the last option assumes that 
service providers take all responsibility for calculation and provisioning, if 
they make a bad decision nobody will come to their aid. This also represents a 
risk for the clients. This may only be expected from service providers if they 
can count on a stable range of annuitants, i.e. if clients cannot move freely 
from one provider to another.23 If according to the annuity regulations the 
insured may also move from one provider to another in the annuitant phase it 
is important to clearly set the magnitude of the reserve that they may take with 
them, and this is only possible if the mortality tables used to calculate reserv-
ing are centrally defined.  
When prescribing the mandatory application of the centrally defined table it 
is important to take into consideration that such a requirement makes the state 
responsible if the application of this table places the service provider (which is 
not owned by the state) in a difficult situation. However, the state may not 
necessarily avoid such responsibility by not making the application of such a 
                                                          
23This is the reason why I find the regulation of the Hungarian private pension funds 
concerning this option, which has been in force throughout the existence of the system, 
deeply problematic. As Article 6 (1) of Government Decree 170/1997 provides: “…the 
mortality tables defined in Article 32 (1) of the Pensions Act as well the ones to be used 
in Article 16 (2) shall be selected or prepared from the mortality tables published by the 
Central Statistical Office by the fund actuary with respect to the demographic condi-
tions of the fund membership receiving the service”. This places the burden of all re-
sponsibility concerning the premium calculation and reserving on the fund and its 
actuary, but without helping them to stabilise the portfolio of insured at the fund. So 
this regulation was contradictory in itself and it should have been changed.  
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table mandatory, if the state does not create other conditions adequate for the 
provision of calculable annuity for the providers.  
Making the application of the central table mandatory for reserving has sig-
nificance for consumer protection too, since it protects clients from irresponsi-
ble service providers who intentionally charge a low premium but have low 
reserves, and who after a certain period of time are unable to provide the un-
dertaken service. 
If we look at whether the application of central tables should be made man-
datory at reserving or at calculation of the premium, we can state that it is not 
expedient to require mandatory application of the central table at reserving, but 
not with regard to premium calculation, because this would provide premium 
calculation with a kind of illusionary freedom.   
If the central table is also required at premium calculation, this explicitly 
emphasises the responsibility of the state for the adequacy of the calculation, 
which only works if the state operates a premium offset mechanism in parallel 
with imposing the mandatory application of the central table. The imposition 
of the central table at premium calculation (and here we only mean the calcula-
tion of net premium), if  coupled with the centrally defined technical interest 
rate, gives an advantage to the client in that they can easily compare the pre-
miums set by different providers. Although this is basically also the case if the 
central table (and the technical interest rate) is imposed only for reserving, 
since this in itself strongly determines premium calculation.  
Transitory solutions between the application of a mandatory table and a free 
choice of tables are not clear enough solutions and it is difficult to put forward 
good arguments in favour of them. These transitory solutions may be applied 
in cases where the state wants to regulate, but at the same time wants to rid 
itself of the responsibility in such a way, for example, that it does not provide 
tables differentiated by an adequate number of parameters for reserving, so 
adapting to the concrete composition of the given risk community is ultimately 
left to the provider, together with the risk.  
Based on the above, the possibilities are reduced to the following: 
1. For reserving, every provider is obliged to apply the central mortality 
tables (differentiated according to several factors, primarily by gender 
and educational attainment), but are free to deviate from the central 
(unisex) tables with respect to premium calculation.  
2. The central mortality tables must be used for calculating both reserves 
and net premium. 
 
Method 1 seemingly provides a certain level of illusionary freedom with re-
gard to premium calculation, and at the same time it allows providers to adapt 
to the expected risk composition of the risk community. It also signals that 
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responsibility for the bad composition of the risk community is transferred by 
the state to the provider, which is not necessarily an equitable method if differ-
entiation according to the above-mentioned important aspects is prohibited.24 
In the case of method 2, the state must also explicitly recognise what is im-
plicitly recognised by the imposition of the rule: that it takes responsibility for 
the adequacy of the calculation. In other words – as I have written above – we 
explicitly recognise the responsibility of the state for the adequacy of the cal-
culation, and parallel with the imposition the state operates a premium-offset 
mechanism. Prohibiting differentiation gives strong arguments to support the 
operation of a premium-offset mechanism, since in this case the failure of a 
provider is not necessarily the provider’s fault, but may have been caused by 
the regulations (because of the prohibition of differentiation).   
If the state imposes the application of tables differentiated by an adequately 
high number of parameters for both premium calculation and reserving, it 
automatically solves the problem of funds with special composition (which are 
characteristically closed); these do not require separate regulation. If the tables 
are not adequately differentiated, it is possible that closed funds must be man-
aged separately, although in this case they must be closed from every aspect, 
i.e. members must not be allowed to change providers.  
The groups of specific management in Pillar I, (policemen, prison guards, 
soldiers, ballet dancers, etc.) pose a separate problem, but I will return to this 
issue later. 
2.2.3. THE MORTALITY TABLE IN LITERATURE, THE UNISEX TABLE 
Literature identifies mortality table problems related to the fact that no reliable 
mortality data is available in many countries; fortunately Hungary is not one of 
them. This however is a major obstacle in annuity market development (e.g. 
Rocha-Thorburn [2007]). Nevertheless not all the necessary mortality-related 
data is available in Hungary either, as mentioned in papers written by Stahl 
and Michaletzky when speaking about the development methods of unisex 
mortality tables. They also provide details of what further factors should be 
taken into account in an adequate annuity mortality table. 
It is with relation to the already mentioned adverse selection that the possi-
bility of using different mortality tables for annuities than the ones applied in 
                                                          
24Because in this way the composition of the risk community does indeed become 
unpredictable, because if, for instance, a provider expects a lot of male clients and so 
sets a relatively low premium, then this will attract many women from other providers, 
who were counting on having more female clients and the calculation will no longer be 
valid, meaning the provider will experience an immediate loss.   
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the case of other life insurances arises (e.g. Hylands-Gray [1992]). They say 
that the use of a single basic table is justified for mandatory pension annuities, 
meaning we should experience no selection effects in this case. Mehr-
Gustavson [1987] states (page 533) that in the case of annuities, mortality 
tables different from the ones applied at other life insurances must be used due 
to three reasons: “(1) Safety factors built into life insurance mortality tables 
would have the opposite effect if the table were used for annuity rates. An 
unsafe rate would result in projecting a lower survival rate than indicated by 
the basic data. (2) Mortality rates have been decreasing. While this trend is a 
safety factor for life insurance rates, the effect is a table that is unsafe for annu-
ities. For every year that annuitants live longer than predicted, the insurer suf-
fers a survival loss. (3) Because people in bad physical condition are unlikely 
to purchase annuities, mortality among annuitants is usually lower than among 
life insurance buyers. Annuity mortality tables therefore will show fewer 
deaths and a greater life expectancy at any given age than will mortality tables 
used for life insurance”. 
The unisex table of mortality is dealt with by the Hungarian and English 
language literature in many instances. According to the previously quoted 
Mehr-Gustavson ([1997] pages 533-534) there is an increasing demand for a 
unisex table in society, especially in the case of occupational pensions. In the 
case of individual annuities – as women buy other individual life insurances 
cheaper – it would be logical for annuities to be more expensive in their case. 
Despite this, there are increasingly frequent requests for the use of unisex 
tables. According to the authors it seems that actuarial considerations are ig-
nored in heated social disputes and the actuarial equity is replaced by social 
equity, so it is possible that unisex tables will also be implemented in the case 
of individual annuities.  
According to more recent literature (Curry-O’Connell [2004]) every annuity 
is differentiated by gender in England, but this book examines the possibilities 
and impacts of pricing mandatory annuities using unisex tables.  
In their opinion the arguments in favour of the unisex table are as follows: 
• Unequal annuities with respect to identical pension asset payments con-
stitutes discrimination, 
• The observed difference in life expectancy between men and women is 
irrelevant, because there is an extremely significant correlation at those 
ages when the majority of people die, 
• Unisex annuities would increase the pension income of women, 
• Gender is becoming an increasingly less relevant factor in annuity pric-
ing. 
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Arguments against are as follows: 
• Annuities differentiated according to gender cannot be considered dis-
criminatory in view of the fact that women live longer than men and so 
the expected income is equal in both cases, 
• In any given year insurers are more likely to pay annuity to a woman 
than to a man who purchased the annuity at the same age, so correlation 
according to age is irrelevant, 
• The unisex annuity would decrease pension income and increase costs. 
 
According to Curry-O’Connell [2004] a further argument in favour of unisex 
annuities (and this is also the most important argument), is that no differentia-
tion can be made between men and women in labour law. In the USA and in 
Canada the occupational DB pension is unisex by mandate. Unisex occupa-
tional pensions exist in the UK and constitute one third of the market. We 
should also consider that unisex annuity is provided within the state-run pen-
sion system in both the UK and Sweden. They say that if unisex annuities were 
mandatory, unisex premiums would be better than under the current, voluntary 
system. They think that despite the fact that a unisex premium would not have 
a significant impact on pension income they also had not found any argument 
against mandatory unisex annuities. 
Hungarian literature deals extensively with unisex mortality tables and uni-
sex annuities. Réti [1999] believes that the unisex annuity does not mean uni-
form unisex annuity on the entire market, only within each separate fund, and 
therefore premiums may be very different at funds with a majority of men and 
a majority of women. According to Stahl [2000] the two weak points of the 
private pension system are the normative annuity (which was abolished while 
this book was being written) and unisex annuity. In respect of the latter, the 
major problem according to Stahl is that regulations state that premiums must 
be determined in a unisex manner, while reserving must be differentiated by 
gender. This leads, according to him, to the problem that not all funds may 
succeed in balancing income and expenditure. Because in fact, the balanced 
unisex premium will be the average of the premium of men and women 
weighted by assets, a value that in fact depends on the fund, i.e. the unisex 
premium will still be different at each fund even if men and women die ac-
cording to the national average at every fund.  Moreover, this value is uncer-
tain because members can switch from one fund to another. According to Réti, 
a solution to the problem of unisex annuities is only possible if this problem 
caused by having different providers is eliminated. He provides two different 
solutions:  
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1. Annuity is purchased by every man from insurers, while the fund pro-
vides annuities to all women. In this case, the unisex mortality table 
corresponds exactly to the female mortality table. 
2. There is a single risk community with a single state-run provider. The 
premium may be defined by using a software-based linear program-
ming application. The consequence of the solution is that there is no 
need for a separate Guarantee Fund. 
 
The study by Augusztinovics-Gál-Máté-Matits-Simonovits-Stahl [2002] re-
peated that the provision of the law, according to which the premium must be 
determined on a unisex basis, while reserves must be determined in a differen-
tiated manner, represents a problem. According to the study, the problem can-
not be solved by the usual principle of equivalence stipulated by the Act. Why 
it poses a problem is not detailed in this paper, but rather in the next study 
written by Stahl [2005]. Here, he restates that the problem may be partly man-
aged by a central provider and partly by solving a mathematical programming 
task, which according to Stahl is a completely different method than the appli-
cation of the equivalence principle, but the difference between the two meth-
ods is not detailed. Therefore we must depend on guesswork concerning the 
difference: perhaps according to Stahl the equivalence principle is not correct 
because by calculating using some kind of unisex table it is not clear that the 
total premium collected would be sufficient for the requirements of a reserve 
that is calculated using differentiated mortality tables. Therefore, he wants to 
take into account the composition of the annuitants by gender when calculating 
the premium, in addition to having them weighted according to their assets. In 
my view, Stahl’s solution is problematic because: 
• Unfortunately, there is no guarantee of any kind that the actuary has 
preliminary information about the gender composition of the annui-
tants. If there are competing providers, then he will certainly not have 
the information available; if there is a central provider, then even 
though he may have a fairly good approximation, he will still not know 
the exact composition because the decision to retire is made by the in-
dividual, and the central provider will certainly not know about it in 
advance. 
• Moreover, people do not retire at the same time, and certainly not in 
large groups, while, although Stahl formally ignores time, his solution 
can only be interpreted if he assumes that this is what they do. Since 
this is not the case, it is an illusion to believe that this programming 
task can be defined at all. So we are left with the equivalence principle. 
• Approaching the problem from another angle: if, using Stahl’s assump-
tion, we possess all the data required for the mathematical program-
62  2. THE TREATMENT OF ANNUITY CASH-FLOW RELATED PROBLEMS 
ming, then there is in fact no need for programming, since this infor-
mation may be incorporated into the structure of the unisex mortality 
table, and the equivalence principle would provide a perfectly good re-
sult. 
• For my part, I in fact suspect that since Stahl was never a practising ac-
tuary and  was not completely familiar with actuarial methodology, he 
chose instead to apply a method that he knew well (mathematical pro-
gramming) for classic actuarial tasks too.  
 
Stahl [2005] stimulated debate among experts and basically the only public 
debate on private pension annuities in Hungary. Stahl’s statements were dis-
puted by Miklós Arató in two articles, and György Németh also commented on 
them, to which Stahl responded in turn. From a mortality table aspect only 
Arató [2006a] is important here. He thinks that the prohibition of differentiat-
ing between men and women is overemphasised, since there are similar differ-
ences on the basis of smoking and non-smoking people, obesity and non-
obesity, but nobody wants to differentiate according to these criteria. In fact, 
his argument is a little surprising, as he does not say what an average actuary 
would do, according to which the more criteria used for differentiation the 
more stable the calculation, but instead finds the existing differentiation exces-
sive on the grounds that no other criteria for differentiation are applied. Ac-
cording to Arató (page 272), “It is completely irrelevant whether or not we 
have prepared a good mathematical programming model for determining uni-
sex annuities if we are in error by 20-30 percent when determining life expec-
tancy”. Ágoston-Kovács [2007] later said that the Stahl-Arató-Németh debate 
centred on problems caused by differences between the unisex table and the 
life expectancy of the two genders. They also state (page 562) that “…there is 
still no solution for the definition of private fund annuities and there is not 
even a generally accepted proposal. The range of ‘solidarity’ between men and 
women is not defined; we do not know whether the difference present among 
genders with respect to life expectancy should be equalised nationally or with-
in each individual fund. If within each fund, it would generate unpredictable 
transfers among funds, as everyone would try to get into a fund that has more 
young men. Or possibly efforts would be made to exclude women from the 
fund, for example by the establishment of closed, occupation-based (e.g. ‘min-
ers’) funds”. 
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2.3. Longevity and mortality risk in general 
When I provided the individual reserving formulae for life annuities above, I 
implicitly assumed that the actual mortality of the insured is identical to the 
presupposed mortality (the one in the tables used for calculation). In practice, 
the actual mortality will be different from the presupposed figures, and there-
fore mortality loss or gain is generated at the providers. The difference can 
have two causes: 
1. Fluctuation of mortality from year to year (random deviation), 
2. Mortality changes according to a different trend compared to the one 
projected (systematic change). 
 
If there is a systematic reduction in mortality, the trend is referred to as the 
longevity problem, which can again be divided into two types: 
1. A trend within the whole portfolio of insured persons, or 
2. At trend at a certain service provider. 
 
The entire portfolio of the insured, independently from the type of differentia-
tion prescribed by regulations and purely from a technical point of view, must 
be differentiated from a risk aspect, and different mortality tables must be 
established for the different groups, and naturally, trends of varying magnitude 
will manifest themselves within these groups. (For example, within a given 
period the life expectancy of women with university degrees increases at a 
much higher rate than that of men who left school at 14, etc.) In other words, 
the projected and actual mortality trends of the entire portfolio’s various dif-
ferentiated groups will differ in different ways. 
The mortality trend of the differentiated groups of various providers may differ 
from the trend observed within corresponding groups of the whole insured 
portfolio, again for two reasons: 
1. The given differentiated group at a certain provider is very small, and 
therefore the actual trend of this small sub-group differs randomly from 
the “big” trend, 
2. The composition of the insured at a certain provider is not random ac-
cording to the characteristics ignored at differentiation in that it does 
not reflect the composition of the entire population, but systematically 
differs from that (e.g. alcoholics or people who lead healthy lifestyles 
are especially highly represented at a given provider).  
 
Naturally, the trend or the systematic change first appears as a random diver-
sion (fluctuation), so these two effects can only be separated from each other 
in the long term. We do know, however, that the smaller the insured portfolio, 
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the higher the fluctuation will be, and in fact with an adequately small portfo-
lio of insured parties the fluctuation will certainly take place, since the number 
of insured and the number of deceased is an integer and not every mortality 
probability fraction can be generated as a quotient of an arbitrarily small inte-
ger. So vice versa, the fluctuation of mortality from one year to another de-
creases in proportion to the increase of the portfolio. And as the portfolio 
grows there is an increasing probability that the reason for the deviation be-
tween the theoretical and actual mortality is a trend rather than a fluctuation. 
So the bigger the portfolio, the higher the probability that this trend can be 
recognised and quantified within the shorter term.  
I assume that the trend of the entire portfolio and of differentiated groups of 
the insured will be identified and quantified by a central institute based on 
collected mortality data. I can see a small possibility that trends manifesting at 
different providers can be separated from accidental fluctuations, and therefore 
below I begin with the assumption that there is only one kind of trend; the 
trend of (differentiated groups of) the entire portfolio of insured, and deviation 
from this at individual service providers is listed among random fluctuations. 
However, we must take into account the possibility that the cause of different 
trends at individual providers may ultimately be the regulations and the re-
striction of differentiation.  
Before discussing the management of mortality risk, the question arises of 
who ultimately has the right to the eventual mortality profit that results from 
the difference between the theoretical and actual mortality. I include the word 
“ultimately” because without it, it would be easy to provide the bogus reply: 
nobody, we will set it aside to cover later mortality losses. This is a bogus 
reply because if we do so, mortality losses and profits accumulate on a longer 
term, but we must eventually still raise the same question with regard to this 
accumulated result: who should be credited (or bear the burden)?  So I reject 
this answer and I only regard the accumulation of profit or loss as a possible 
method of problem management. 
So who receives the profit that accrues from the death of more insured indi-
viduals than was initially calculated? It is easy to answer the question by say-
ing that naturally it belongs to the insured, since the annuity is fully generated 
from their assets and the provider simply redistributes this and the yield 
amongst them. This is a completely legitimate answer, but the question was 
somewhat misleading because I did not ask about the mortality result or the 
mortality loss, but about mortality profit. If I had asked who bears the mortali-
ty loss, the same people who replied “the insured!” to the previous question 
would most probably have said that it is the responsibility of the provider. It is 
obvious that these two answers are contradictory, since why should the provid-
er only bear the loss but not receive a share of the profit? Clearly the consistent 
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solution is that the mortality loss should be borne by whoever is entitled to the 
mortality profit. We must of course recognise that according to current trends 
(in the developed world, and since the second half of the 90s in Hungary), 
there is a greater chance of mortality loss rather than mortality profit (although 
this ultimately depends on the projection; if we project too rapid an improve-
ment in mortality then the mortality result could show a systematic profit).  
The mortality profit/loss may ultimately25 be credited or debited to three mar-
ket players: 
1. The state (i.e. the taxpayers), 
2. Annuity providers, 
3. The insured. 
 
The first item may be raised because the state plays a role in generating mor-
tality results partly by prohibiting certain differentiation and partly by prepar-
ing and imposing central mortality tables for reserving, and mortality outcome 
may be the result of both of these. Though we must also consider that if the 
state is allowed to become involved in the financial matters of an annuity even 
to a small extent, such state intervention may increase unpredictably, which 
suggests that it is useful to keep the state away from the annuity issue in finan-
cial terms. Furthermore, no matter how long a term we examine, loss and prof-
it will have a balance that is probably not equal to zero. If it is positive, mean-
ing the state profits as a result, we might raise the question of why the state is 
withdrawing the money of the insured for other purposes. If it is negative, one 
might raise the question of why annuitants should be supported with taxpayer 
money. So this solution is best avoided, although whether this can in fact be 
done depends on the implemented annuity model. If the regulator opts for the 
central service provider model, an intervention of this nature may occur more 
easily – and to a certain extent is much more justified – than if the providers 
are market players who are independent from the state. Nevertheless, even in 
the central provider model, it is expedient to endeavour to keep the state neu-
tral in financial terms with regard to the annuity system. 
If the annuity provider is a profit-oriented enterprise of which the insured is 
a client, it may be logical to expect that it protects the client from possible 
decreases in annuity caused by mortality loss; and if it is expected to assume 
the mortality loss, then it is only natural that it will also be entitled to the prof-
it. However, an expectation with relation to this may be that providers should 
not accumulate too large a mortality profit in the long term, meaning it should 
not withdraw too much from the capital of the insured for its own profit (keep-
ing the long-term accumulated mortality loss low is in the interests of the pro-
vider and it is the provider’s responsibility to monitor it). If the annuity pro-
                                                          
25So if it is carried over in the form of a mortality reserve, then in the long term. 
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vider is a non-profit enterprise (fund) owned by the insured, there is no-one 
other than the insured to take the loss, so in this case the possibility of the 
provider bearing the loss does not arise at all, since the burden of the loss falls 
back onto the insured via the provider under all circumstances and the profit 
also belongs to the insured.  Although it is possible to imagine a solution 
whereby the mortality loss is borne by a group of fund members that differs 
from those who “generated” it (and vice versa in the case of profit), but this is 
clearly inequitable and should be avoided.  So, for instance, passing the burden 
of mortality loss onto members who are still in the asset accumulation phase of 
the annuity should be avoided (as should passing them the mortality profit). 
The asymmetric and therefore inequitable solution of debiting the mortality 
loss to members who are still in the asset accumulation phase, but allowing 
annuitants to retain the mortality profit is to be especially avoided. One of the 
reasons this solution should be avoided is because an inequitable regrouping of 
this nature makes the membership unstable and provides them with arguments 
for switching to funds with a more favourable demographic status. Therefore, 
treatment of this problem might also result in the abolishment of the right to 
choose between funds, meaning it could give rise to a kind of “vicious circle” 
(a “regulatory spiral”).   
Based on the above, the mortality outcome may be borne by the insured or a 
profit-oriented provider (if the provider is an institution of this nature), or the 
outcome must be somehow shared between the two of them. To a certain ex-
tent, the “purest” solution is if the insured person bears the full mortality out-
come, or at least part of it, because in this case the question raised with regard 
to the state and profit-oriented providers, that too much accumulated mortality 
loss or profit is problematic, does not arise, since both are owned by the in-
sured. Whomever it belongs to, an effort must be made (i.e. mechanisms must 
be operated) to assure that the mortality outcome tends towards zero in the 
long term, otherwise it will result in the systematic regrouping of capital be-
tween the insured and the provider, or between different groups of the insured, 
which should be avoided as an inequitable practice.  
Due to the above arguments, below I suggest a number of solutions for the 
management of problems concerning mortality outcomes that are valid if the 
mortality outcomes fundamentally belong to the insured. 
2.4. Managing mortality risk 
Mortality risk may be managed by the following methods: 
1. Attempts to take into account in advance potential mortality changes 
(trends) for each differentiated sub-group (taking into account the fact 
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that several factors may be considered when calculating the reserve), 
i.e. to project mortality, 
2. The mortality loss of the given year decreases the investment yield of 
the given year (at a 0% technical interest rate; at a higher technical in-
terest rate, the additional investment yield), while mortality profit in-
creases this yield, meaning the mortality outcome becomes part of the 
indexation, 
3. Reserving to smooth out fluctuations and longer lifetimes compared to 
the projected life expectancy, 
4. Making solvency capital compulsory for providers (that have actual 
owners), 
5. In addition, the risk is adjusted to the financial power of the different 
providers by splitting the mortality risk into parts and separating nor-
mal and peak risks. 
 
Homogenisation – to be discussed later – contributes to the management of 
mortality risk, so that one differentiation factor (the size of the annuity capital) 
is cancelled (or at least its potential impact is significantly decreased). 
Let us take a more detailed look at these methods. 
2.4.1. FORECASTING MORTALITY 
I have already dealt with the issue, although certainly not in sufficient detail, 
and I am not going to engage in details here either. Projecting mortality is a 
complex issue with a large body of literature, which I shall not detail here. 
However, as part of the “infrastructure” of private pension annuity, a new or an 
existing institute must routinely deal with mortality projection. As I mentioned 
earlier, projection aims to identify long term mortality trends rather than ran-
dom annual fluctuations. 
Feedback is an unavoidable part of the process, i.e. mortality projections 
must be regularly controlled and updated according to current data. Projections 
must be prepared for the entire portfolio of insured people as well as for the 
various risk groups. In harmony with the above, initially it is expedient to 
differentiate according to the following breakdown (while data must also be 
gathered according to other aspects to enable the later breaking down of the 
population into further risk sub-groups): 
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• By gender and for both genders in the following breakdown, 
• According to level of education (at least with three groups: elementary 
education as a maximum, secondary school graduates and higher edu-
cation graduates), 
• According to the magnitude of pension assets. 
 
We may also raise the question of how often the projection should be correct-
ed. I think that even in the long term correction should not occur more often 
than on an annual basis, since no significant change is likely to occur within a 
shorter period and a more frequent projection could be misleading because of 
possible cyclical annual fluctuations in mortality. 
2.4.2. MORTALITY OUTCOME AS PART OF INDEXATION 
If the mortality outcome, or a part of it, becomes part of indexation, it means 
that it is either transferred directly back to the insured or charged to them (i.e. 
credited or debited) on an annual basis. This solution may be more or less 
forced (as in the case of an annuity model where providers are institutions 
without capital, like Hungarian private pension funds), or it may be a voluntary 
option. I have already elaborated on arguments in favour of the voluntary op-
tion. However, the choice also depends on the foreseeable magnitude of fluc-
tuations in mortality, in other words on the expected size of the mortality out-
come. This in turn depends on the size of the risk community. If there is a 
small risk community (e.g. at a small provider, or at any provider at the launch 
of the system), this should not be used, because the fluctuations are very big. 
In the case of the biggest possible risk community that includes the whole 
country, for example in the case of a central annuity provider or in the case of 
an annuity model with a central annuity pool, its use is almost mandatory, or at 
least there are few arguments against its use.  
The joint treatment of the investment surplus yield and the mortality out-
come attempts to smooth out annual mortality fluctuations, which are partly 
random (or are the result of a small portfolio of insured) and partly the result of 
deviation from the trend, which, however, can only be separated from random 
fluctuations over a longer period.  
The mortality outcome may be either profit or loss. It seems that there is no 
specific problem if the mortality profit must be distributed back to the insured. 
However, the mortality loss is a different issue and the treatment of profit and 
loss is not necessarily symmetrical. We may raise the question of to what ex-
tent the investment surplus yield should bear the mortality loss, or in other 
terms: what portion of the loss should be debited immediately and directly to 
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the insured. The issue usually arises if we ask whether the annuity may de-
crease from one year to the next due to mortality loss if no adequate (surplus) 
yield is generated to cover the mortality loss in the given year. (Naturally the 
question is raised not only in this form, but also with regard to whether annuity 
can decrease as a result of possible negative investment yield – I will deal with 
this in relation to indexing).  
The majority of insured people would probably prefer not to have any nom-
inal decrease in annuity for any reason, for example due to mortality loss. In 
such cases the corresponding part of the loss is either carried over (hoping that 
the situation will improve and the current loss can be recovered from invest-
ment and/or later mortality profit), or it is absorbed by some sort of reserve. 
One may ask whether this reserve is created from the capital of the insured 
persons or whether it should come from the solvency capital of the provider. In 
the event of carry-over, two questions are raised: how should the loss be fund-
ed until such time as it is recovered, and if the loss is not recovered, who 
should bear the loss ultimately, the insured or the provider? In summary, the 
problem can to all intents and purposes be treated as if mortality outcome was 
not a part of indexation at all, with the reserving and the solvency capital dis-
cussed below. This also means that making the mortality outcome part of in-
dexation is in itself not sufficient without (one of) the two other methods, so 
the method must be complemented by one of the two. 
Making mortality outcome part of indexation does not mean that it is super-
fluous to present the investment and mortality outcomes separately, and to 
indicate what factors add up to produce the indexation. This prevents the even-
tual mortality profits from hiding bad performance of the provider in the area 
of investment yield.  
In fact, indexation based on the combined investment and mortality out-
come diffuses the mortality outcome. It is, however, not self-evident in what 
groups this should be applied. The major possibilities are:  
1. Among the annuitants of all the providers, 
2. Among all the annuitants of each provider, 
3. Among annuitants in the same risk group at each provider, 
4. Among annuitants of identical age at each provider, 
5. Solutions 3 and 4 together. 
 
The application or applicability of solution 1 depends on the annuity system. 
The major possibilities are: 
• If there is only one central provider, then this is the obvious solution, 
although diffusion via the other possibilities may also be considered in 
this case. 
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• The whole point of the central pool model, which I will present later, is 
that the mortality outcome is centrally managed, so it is dispersed with-
in the entire insured portfolio. In this case, the entire combined invest-
ment and mortality outcome is not dispersed but rather only and exclu-
sively the mortality outcome. The central pool can be organised so that 
certain elements of the entire annuity system (e.g. annuity payment, 
etc.) are centralised, and also in such a way that it operates only as a 
kind of risk balancing system. Both are complicated systems, but exam-
ining them is made easier if several things are centralised, so if it is a 
solution operated only as a risk balancing system, it is probably not eas-
ier but in fact more complicated. 
• The pool may also be organised on a voluntary basis, and naturally this 
also aims to disperse the mortality outcome. 
 
The justification behind a central pool is that is compensates providers with a 
bad composition of insured persons (and their annuitants) for losses resulting 
from this bad composition, which they cannot manage through differentiation 
because of the regulations. One argument against it is its complexity.  
Solution 2 is almost self-evident if the range of insured people is fairly restrict-
ed, i.e. if it cannot be split further. We might say that in such a situation the 
provider has no choice but to opt for this solution. However, in the case of a 
larger portfolio of insured people (beyond a certain threshold) it is more cor-
rect to break down the portfolio further, i.e. to opt for solution 3. If the portfo-
lio is even larger (so beyond another threshold) it is worthwhile distinguishing 
between cohorts (i.e. to apply solutions 3 and 4 together), since a generational 
impact can also be observed with regard to mortality, and it is justified to say 
that each cohort should bear its own risk.  
A special version of solution 4 may also arise, a dispersion among annui-
tants who began receiving annuity payments in the same year, but usually only 
if the annuity model is a version of the central provider model that only per-
mits contracts to be concluded with a single provider (the one that won the 
tender for that particular year) in one year, and with another provider the next 
year. Accordingly, in this case the risk community at each individual provider 
is intrinsically split according to year of retirement as well as corresponding to 
grouping by provider, i.e. solutions 4 and 2 overlap.  
Theoretically, another (totally incorrect and therefore indefensible) solution 
would be to transfer these losses to later annuitants by increasing the premium. 
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2.4.3. RESERVING FOR INCREASED LONGEVITY AND TO SMOOTH OUT FLUCTUATIONS 
If we allow the entire mortality loss for a given year to cover the mortality loss 
at the expense of investment yield, irrespective of the fact that this may lead to 
a decrease in the annuity in the following year, then there is no need for a 
separate reserve to smooth out fluctuations. But if we want to restrict fluctua-
tion (either by not allowing annuities to decrease from one year to the next, or 
by not allowing the rate of increase of the annuity to decrease below a certain 
level, e.g. half the rate of inflation), then a  reserve or solvency capital must be 
set aside. Reserving and/or solvency capital may not only complement but may 
also replace the need to cover mortality profit at the expense of surplus profit, 
but this of course comes at a price.  
The reserve may have two sources: 
1. A portion of the premium paid for the annuity, 
2. A part of the regular surplus investment yield. 
 
Source 1 above will probably not be enough, or too much is generated simply 
because at the beginning of the insurance it is difficult to calculate how much 
will be required during the term of the annuity. Accordingly, this source may 
not be used independently from source 2.  On the other hand, source 2 must be 
applied as mortality losses occur, so this solution indirectly leads back to the 
solution whereby the mortality result is treated together with indexation, and 
therefore it should be considered whether the application of the direct method 
would, in fact, be better.  
As regards reserving, the question arises whether all kinds of fluctuation 
should be smoothed or only some of them. The possibilities are as follows: 
1. Only those that are the consequence of mortality fluctuation, although 
this is too abstract a solution for the insured. 
2. Those that result from the joint fluctuation of mortality and investment 
yields. The essence here is that in years of “good yield” the annuity is 
intentionally increased at a lower rate, by which means we can save for 
the years of “bad yield”, allowing annuities to be raised by a higher ex-
tent than the yield. The danger of this solution is that it introduces an 
arbitrary element into the system, because we can never be certain 
when we are experiencing a “good year” or a “bad year”; these are rela-
tive terms that we can only judge for certain in hindsight, when it is too 
late. It is easy to imagine a situation in which bad years accumulate, 
and after the “bad year” in which we use up our reserve there follows 
an even worse year. 
3. Only if the mortality outcome and the yield together would bring the 
annuity below a certain level (e.g. below the previous year’s annuity 
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level). The advantage of this solution is that the strict and clear rule 
prohibits arbitrary “smoothing”. Naturally, unfortunate circumstances 
may continuously evolve even using this solution, and the reserve may 
become exhausted at some point as a result (despite the fact that it is 
expedient to construct the system such that the reserve is topped-up at 
the earliest opportunity). In this case, as I have already indicated, there 
are two options: either the clients take the loss (i.e. the annuity decreas-
es) or the service provider (if it has actual owners) takes the loss against 
its solvency capital. 
 
There can be two types of reserve: 
1. A safety component generated within the individual reserve of each in-
sured individual. 
2. A “demography” or “demography and yield balancing” reserve that is 
handled separately from the individual reserve (and from all other re-
serves), which, in comparison to the other possibility, we might also 
describe as a “collective” reserve. 
 
Below I will explain the essence of both solutions, and also why I clearly pre-
fer the first. But first, we must note that although Hungarian regulations in-
cluded the “yield-balancing” reserve for a long time, criticism of this provi-
sion, including my own, appeared very soon after the regulations were adopt-
ed. For example, the paper by Augusztinovics-Gál-Máté-Matits-Simonovits-
Stahl [2002] says (page 486-487): “However, reserves diminish the magnitude 
of the service and the redistribution that results from reserving is contradictory 
to the so-often cited basic philosophy of the private pension fund system, i.e. 
self-sufficiency, individual saving, etc. The yield-balancing provision perfectly 
illustrates non-transparent and unnecessary regrouping. The wish to have a 
roughly even yield rate for a prolonged period is a questionable objective, as 
the real target should be to have the largest possible balance in the individual 
accounts at any point of time. The yield-balancing provision is certainly con-
tradictory to such a target. … The only consequence of the existence of reserv-
ing is redistribution, which is a complicated procedure from an implementation 
point of view”. 
The essence of the solution within individual reserves is that the client is 
promised a conditional extra benefit in advance. The condition is that due to 
unfavourable yield and/or mortality loss there was no need to use the collateral 
for the extra service to maintain the annuity level prior to the maturity of the 
service. If the collateral for the extra service partially decreases because of the 
above events (which we may regard as a kind of “calculation surplus” or “safe-
ty supplement” or “safety valve”, or “buffer”), then the service itself propor-
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tionally decreases before its maturity. If the collateral runs out completely 
prior to the maturity of the extra service and there was no possibility for top-
ping-up before the extra service was due, then the service is not provided at all. 
If the collateral for the extra service diminishes in a given year as a result of 
use, then in the first year in which the total yield and mortality outcome is 
positive this result must be used to top up the individual reserve to the level 
necessary to assure the extra service (meaning the indexation of the given year 
can only be this much lower). The total yield and mortality profit, and even the 
profit of the consecutive years, must be entirely used for this top-up if neces-
sary, until the extra service is completely covered (until the entire collateral is 
available for equalisation). If this reserve within the individual reserve runs out 
completely and is again followed by a bad year, then (depending on regula-
tions) this must either be absorbed by the insured (in other words the annuity 
of the insured person decreases, which may only happen in the case of a pro-
vider that has no solvency capital, such as the Hungarian-type pension fund), 
or by the for-profit provider, who can cover it against its solvency capital. In 
summary, contrary to the method of collective reserve, in this method clients 
does not lose the right to their own money and therefore it is they who receive 
extra service and not somebody else. 
The extra service itself may be payable during the insured individual’s life-
time or may be payable after their death, i.e. it may be of two fundamental 
types: 
1. The extra service may take the form of a mandatory periodical annui-
ty increase, payable during the lifetime of the annuitant. In this case, 
the basic annuity must be set in such a manner that it achieves a certain 
increase (e.g. 5% beyond indexation) at certain regular periods (e.g. 
every 5 years), but only if mortality (and yield) does not change for the 
worse. If it does, then this increase serves to balance the worse mortali-
ty (or yield). The advantage of this solution is that the entire capital of 
the insured individual is used for what it was meant to be used for, i.e. 
for the annuity. However, a disadvantage is that the “buffer” is con-
stantly being used to cover the promised extra services, meaning it con-
tinuously diminishes, while it may easily happen that the bad years, for 
which this buffer was established, occur sometime during a later phase 
of the term. This is a strong argument for having the payment of extra 
services begin as late as possible, i.e. after the death of the insured in-
dividual. 
2. Service due following the death of the insured individual may also be 
one of two types: annuity or a lump sum service. The first solution is a 
mandatory back-end guaranteed period, while the other is a type of 
supplementary whole life insurance. It is true for both solutions that 
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their advantages and disadvantages exactly mirror those of a service 
payable during the lifetime of the insured individual. An advantage of 
both types of service payable after death is that the service is rendered 
at the very end of the duration, when we can already be certain that the 
premium was calculated in an adequate manner and the remaining re-
serve of the extra service may be utilised without consequence. An ad-
ditional advantage is that if the buffer is emptied, it may in theory be 
completely topped-up several times during the term of the annuity, 
providing the yields develop accordingly. However, the disadvantage is 
that it is not the insured individual who enjoys this extra service (unless 
it is used to pay for the funeral of the deceased, although this is also a 
relative exception). However, a further important, but technical ad-
vantage of payment following death is that the environment of the in-
sured individual is motivated to report their death, and in this way the 
insurer avoids paying the annuity after death.  
       Let us examine these two solutions in detail: 
2.1. Mandatory, 1-2 year back-end guaranteed period: In this case, 
it is compulsory to include a 1 or 2-year back-end guaranteed peri-
od in every annuity. If the mortality projection proves correct and 
there is no negative yield, the service of the guaranteed period is 
transferred to the client (or to the beneficiary assigned by the cli-
ent). If not, this extra service may be used to cover the loss that is 
the result of incorrect projection, in which case the duration of the 
guaranteed period will decrease, possibly to zero. The advantage of 
the solution is that the nature of the post-death payment is identical 
to the one before death, although a disadvantage is that it is hard to 
find arguments for extending payment of the buffer in such a case, 
especially if the aim is to use it for the funeral of the deceased. 
Therefore, the other solution is more logical in this case, which is  
2.2. Mandatory supplementary whole life benefit, which is a lump-
sum payment. From a technical point of view it is advantageous if 
this whole life service is not defined as a fixed lump-sum or in rela-
tion to the last annuity amount, but instead as a certain proportion 
of the reserve. This helps the buffer fit into the environment in 
which it is topped-up from the investment and mortality profit that 
is divided and used in proportion to this reserve. The rule of thumb 
for the size of the buffer can be based on what expected lifetime in-
crease it must compensate. For example, using 5% of the reserve as 
a buffer might compensate a roughly 1-year increase in life expec-
tancy (or more by topping-up multiple times, if the increase is “dis-
2. THE TREATMENT OF ANNUITY CASH-FLOW RELATED PROBLEMS 75 
tributed well” over time).26 A non-technical problem with relation 
to the solution is that it is not certain if every insured person has an 
heir or is able to assign a beneficiary, although this problem may 
be bridged if it is used as default for funeral expenses (or for a pro-
portion of them). 
 
In summary, if we use a buffer then most of the arguments support solution 
2.2. However, this may also be applied in a somewhat modified form: 
1. The buffer is not necessarily used for extra service after the death of a 
given insured party, but in theory the buffer of the deceased may be 
distributed among the surviving insured parties. The advantage of the 
solution is that through this method the entire capital is used for annuity 
benefit; the disadvantage is that it is a less equitable solution with re-
gard to the insured individual. 
2. The buffer may be applicable to a certain extent for smoothing out yield 
fluctuations, although this requires a somewhat more complicated oper-
ational mechanism than the one above. In this case, the buffer is not on-
ly topped-up (if some of it was used earlier), but it is topped-up to an 
even higher level (e.g. up to double the original value). This may occur 
if the combined mortality and investment outcome results in the annuity 
                                                          
26The buffer so defined may be calculated as follows: 
If we use a technical interest rate of 0%, then the premium and the reserve of the an-
nuity insurance can be calculated with the help of the remaining lifetime (usually de-
noted at age x as: ex). In this case, an insured individual aged x years may receive the 
following monthly (advance) annuity from start-up assets of „Ko” magnitude (disre-
garding possible differentiation factors such as the volume of capital for the time be-
ing): 
 
 
where represents a whole unit of , and λ represents the expense part 
of the annuity (in proportion to the net premium). 
With the incorporation of the buffer this formula changes to the following: 
 
 
where p is the buffer defined in proportion to the reserve, and where partial costs are 
not charged for the buffer, which wouldn’t be justified either. 
In the case of a technical interest rate other than 0%, similar, but somewhat more 
complicated ideas may elaborated, but the following statements remain valid. Although 
in this case there is a good chance that we will not succeed in topping-up the buffer, or 
that it can only be topped up on fewer occasions.  
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increasing above a certain level (e.g. the previous year’s rate of infla-
tion) and the buffer has not yet reached its maximum value. In this 
case, one could say that part of the extra profit is used as a reserve for 
worse years. The buffer could be used if it were in an over topped-up 
status (that is beyond the initial, normal value), and the annuity increase 
is below a certain level (e.g. the previous year’s rate of inflation), up to 
a maximum of the rate of inflation or normal value of the buffer. This is 
a non-biased method for smoothing out fluctuations, so if it is important 
to operate such a smoothing mechanism due to various (political) con-
siderations, it should be done using this kind of a more or less objective 
method. The disadvantage of the solution is that it potentially with-
draws much higher reserves from the benefit of a given annuitant than 
if the buffer were not used for smoothing.  
 
I have not found international examples of the application of buffers, so as far 
as I know this is my own, original idea. 
Interestingly, according to my experience pension fund experts do not intend 
to apply the above individual provision for smoothing, but are planning to use a 
collective “demographic and/or return equalizing” reserve that is kept separate 
from the reserve of the individual insured persons, despite the fact that it has 
serious faults compared to the individual reserve. The essence of the idea (simi-
larly to the individual reserve) is that at the very beginning (when the insurance 
policy is taken out), the reserve that is put aside from a part of the premium is 
used should the annuity decrease, and it is supplemented at the very first oppor-
tunity when this can be done without any decrease in the annuity. The supple-
mentation occurs from the return (and from the eventual mortality profit), up to a 
certain predefined level (so potentially during several years, when as a result of 
this supplementation the annuity does not increase), as in the case of the above-
mentioned individual reserve. Although the collective reserve belongs entirely to 
the whole risk community, it is not denominated – this is the difference com-
pared to the one generated in individual reserves. Therefore a serious problem of 
equity emerges with regard to this kind of reserve, especially if the reserve is 
accumulated for too long, or is not used for a time, since in this instance it would 
primarily be used in favour of insured individuals who did not contribute, or did 
not contribute to an adequate extent, to the generation of this reserve (since some 
of them have died in the meantime). In other words, in the case of this solution, 
the client loses the right to their own money, and therefore the problem is better 
managed by the similar, but more equitably operating individual reserve method 
(if the idea that the mortality loss should be borne by the insured individual 
emerges at all, because there is nobody else to bear it). 
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2.4.4. SOLVENCY CAPITAL 
The use of solvency capital differs from the reserve-type solutions above in 
that the financial consequences of fluctuations must be borne directly by the 
provider, not by the insured. Naturally, the word “directly” is important here 
because the provider may include the potential use of solvency capital in this 
manner (i.e. the costs of calculating the fluctuation) into the insurance premi-
um, so it will be ultimately paid by the insured.  
In the case of annuities, this kind of use of solvency capital is really its most 
important function. However it is useful to first review why the law usually 
prescribes the use of solvency capital for assurances, to help us understand 
when the use of solvency capital instead of the above-mentioned reserves can 
arise at all.  
The function of solvency capital in general, is that it enables the insurer to 
perform its undertaken services for the client with a high level of probability, 
even if various obstacles arise that might otherwise prevent this. These obsta-
cles may be of the following types: 
• Insurance technical risk – the payments made by the insurer are high-
er than calculated either due to transitory risk fluctuation or a long-term 
risk increase. In the case of annuities this means that as a result of 
changes in mortality (which are favourable for the insured and unfa-
vourable from the service provider’s perspective) the annuity would 
decrease from one year to the next and the excess yield (if permitted by 
regulations), or the reserve generated for this purpose, would not be 
sufficient to balance the fluctuation. 
• Investment risk – the insurer does not achieve the yield promised to 
the client. This, in the case of life insurances (including annuity insur-
ances), means the yield adequate to the guaranteed technical interest 
rate and possibly to the guaranteed increase in benefit (if such exists), 
so the risk means the risk of a smaller yield than the sum of the tech-
nical interest rate and the guaranteed increase in annuity. At a 0% tech-
nical interest rate without a guaranteed increase of service this means 
the risk of a negative yield – if this is not balanced by positive mortality 
outcome (provided the regulations manage the two together).  
• Risk due to the options and guarantees undertaken. To a certain ex-
tent the above two risks are similar, but there may also be other guaran-
tees. For example surrender (which generally does not exist in life an-
nuities). In the case of life annuities it is generally difficult to identify 
such a risk, but to a certain degree the possibility that the client will 
transfer their reserve to another provider (if the regulation opts for an 
annuity model that includes this possibility) may be regarded as a risk. 
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Technically this is a risk of surrender and the problem is that a portion 
of the reserve must be liquidated, which generates a loss. 
• Operational risk, i.e. if some problem occurs in the operation of the 
insurer (including a natural disaster, human intervention, damage to the 
insurer’s database as a result of theft, operation becomes difficult or 
impossible, resources must be channelled to unforeseen places, etc.). 
This is a risk faced by all financial service providers. 
 
I must also mention that the level of the first insurance technical risk men-
tioned above, i.e. the size of fluctuation in payments, gradually decreases as 
the number of insured increases, so the smaller the portfolio of insured the 
higher the fluctuation. This is why, although regulations usually require sol-
vency capital to increase in proportion to the size of the portfolio, it also sets 
an absolute minimum to enable the management of fluctuations in small port-
folios. I will elaborate on this topic later.  
In view of the special nature of Hungarian institutions that provide private 
pension services and their regulation, we must also mention the relationship 
between solvency capital and ownership. These funds are unique both inter-
nationally and with regard to other Hungarian financial providers. What makes 
them unique is that contrary to other providers (and to a certain extent to 
common sense), they are alone in not having any capital, including solvency 
capital! Looking at the above functions of solvency capital, it is obvious that of 
the abovementioned risks only the operational risks could arise during the asset 
accumulation phase (this is the phase in which all of the private pension funds 
and most of the voluntary pension funds in Hungary were when this book was 
written and until the closure of most private pension funds), meaning that a 
lack of capital is much less of a problem27 than it would be for other financial 
service providers. However, all this changes in the annuity payment phase, as 
all of the above risks may manifest themselves. On other words, the actual 
solvency capital regime (regarding the lack of solvency capital as such) of the 
Hungarian funds is exclusively and solely designed for the asset accumulation 
phase without any regard for the annuity payment phase (perhaps because at 
the time of elaboration of the regulations the 15 years after which the annuity 
payment was due to start seemed incalculably far off in the future). 
However unusual the lack of solvency capital at the funds, it must be said 
that this is entirely in harmony with the ownership conditions of the private 
and voluntary pension funds, i.e. with the fact that they have no actual owners, 
only “quasi-owners”. The formal owners of the pension funds are the actual 
                                                          
27It seems that in Hungary the lack of solvency capital to cover operational risks has 
been bridged at a system level and with stricter and more detailed regulation and super-
vision compared to other financial service providers.  
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members, but equal rights are afforded to those who contributed a hundred 
million Hungarian Forints to the establishment of the fund as to those who paid 
the first thousand Forints in premiums yesterday. In such a situation any capi-
tal accumulation (which, in practice, is unavoidable to a certain extent, because 
operation requires equipment, computers, etc. which constitutes capital) would 
be unfair, since the person from whom it is generated cannot expect any yield 
or more voting rights28.  If the pension funds had capital, it would be accumu-
lated from the contribution of the starting generation, and the next generation 
would possibly not contribute to that, but if the fund is liquidated, then the 
capital would be distributed among members of the next generation who did 
not accumulate it. This would be unfair and deeply problematic, compared to 
which the system chosen by the regulations, i.e. the lack of formal capital, is a 
much more equitable solution. In summary, the actual ownership structure and 
the regime of solvency capital are in a good logical relationship with each 
other.29  In the capital accumulation phase, this system indeed works (worked!) 
satisfactorily, with strong supervision. However, this logically coherent system 
cannot (could not have) manage(d) every problem, e.g.it could have only han-
dled the problem of annuity with certain restrictions. 
Solvency capital is needed if we want to avoid the client (member) having 
to bear certain risks, primarily the risk of eventual bad investment outcome and 
serial mortality losses which may lead to a decreasing annuity. Based on the 
above, a financial institution with “quasi-owners” cannot even theoretically 
have solvency capital. If Hungarian-type pension funds are allowed to provide 
annuities, we must take into account the fact that all the risks are directly borne 
by the annuitants (and can only be diminished using the above buffer-
technique).  
This problem appears particularly sharply when an annuity commences and 
the annuitant risk community is small, so the mortality fluctuation is necessari-
ly high. Solvency capital has an especially big role to play at that time (see the 
section on management small portfolios).  
                                                          
28At least formally and legally. In reality, the majority of Hungarian pension funds 
are de facto (but not de jure!) multinational financial service providers, who do have a 
strong voice in how the fund operates, but this can be traced back to organisational 
culture rather than legal reasons. 
29Out of interest, let me note that from this aspect the Hungarian regulation is incon-
sistent, since the regulation of institutions very similar to pension funds is not as fair as 
this, and according to the above is therefore deeply problematic. At insurance associa-
tions solvency capital is required, but they have no real (only formal) owners. Never-
theless, this inconsistency would be difficult to correct by cancelling the solvency 
capital requirement at associations, because insurance risk could not be undertaken at 
all without solvency capital. It may be remedied only by the elimination of the associa-
tion form (in the case of insurers).  See Banyár [2010]. 
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In reaction to the above arguments, it would be highly problematic if the 
regulator had ordered that funds may provide annuity but to do so they must 
accumulate solvency capital from the contributions of members. On the one 
hand, it would be problematic because of the equity-related reasons explained 
above and on the other hand because this would not solve the problem. Be-
cause risk fluctuations are highest when a provider puts an annuity on the 
market, and this is when a high level of solvency capital must be available, i.e. 
there is no time to wait for it to accumulate slowly.  
It would also be problematic if funds started to accumulate solvency capital 
for the annuity payment phase in the capital accumulation phase, since the 
right to choose between funds does not include allowing people to take the 
capital accumulated via their contributions to another fund. In addition, there is 
another significant problem.  
An important and deeper connection between solvency capital and owner-
ship is that solvency capital must always be available in its totality, i.e. even 
immediately after the majority of it was used for the purpose for which it was 
established.30 In such a case the owner must immediately top-up the solvency 
capital to the adequate level and this is indeed what happens31, because there 
are owners. At Hungarian-type pension funds without a real owner, it may 
happen that during a long period the solvency capital is topped-up once to an 
adequate level, but once it is used the fund may lack sufficient solvency capital 
for a prolonged period, which in turn endangers the provision of annuities. 
Without owners, nobody has an interest in putting the missing solvency capital 
back into the fund, since this is not coupled with any advantage. If the existing 
members, as owners, were forced to do so, then they would be better off “de-
fecting” from the fund and joining another fund that does not have a lack of 
solvency capital and where they are not asked to deal with such problems. The 
only option in such a case is that the supervisory authority prohibits the con-
tinued operation of a pension fund that has no solvency capital, so if the regu-
lator required solvency capital for funds with no owners, it would program a 
high probability of bankruptcy into the system.  
Therefore it can be stated that solvency capital is only a characteristic of 
profit-oriented financial institutions (such as insurance companies), so it is 
only they who can solve problems concerning solvency capital and not the 
funds. Institutions without real owners should either not be allowed to provide 
life annuities or must be transformed into organisations with actual owners. 
                                                          
30Gábor Borza drew my attention to this issue (Borza [2010]). 
31Should they fail to do so, the consequence is a supervisory intervention. Within 
this framework, the provider is possibly liquidated and clients are transferred to another 
provider. Solvency capital allows for the seamless management of the portfolio transfer 
without any damage to clients.  
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The other possibility is to recognise that risks in respect of annuities are direct-
ly borne by the annuitants (in practice this means that in the case of unfavour-
able mortality outcome the annuity may even decrease nominally from one 
year to the next – with the use of a buffer this can only happen after several 
consecutive “bad years”). 
Based on the above, solvency capital in respect of annuities may and must 
be required from insurance companies and possibly from other providers that 
operate in corporate form, and only in the case of annuities provided by such 
providers may it be required that the annuity does not decrease from one year 
to the next and/or in the case of bad mortality outcome. The current European, 
and accordingly the Hungarian, regulations on insurers already prescribes 
compulsory solvency capital for insurance companies. If the regulation simul-
taneously permits insurers and pension funds to provide annuity, this requires 
the operation of two different systems from a solvency capital point of view. 
(Here, of course, the general question arises as to whether two different sys-
tems should be operated in parallel and whether the clients sufficiently under-
stand how the system works). 
Accordingly, in the case of annuity the solvency capital on the one hand 
provides protection to the insured against mortality loss, or in the case of using 
a buffer against overspill of the accumulated effect of consecutive unfavoura-
ble mortality, and on the other hand, with relation to the former, in the event of 
an extremely unfavourable investment outcome. Beyond this, in the case of a 
small insured portfolio, where solvency capital must be available if the collect-
ed premium is not enough to provide the initial reserve (due to the insured 
having a different risk composition than originally projected). These can all be 
regarded as a kind of option, which the insured party purchases from the insur-
er and in respect of which they must pay an option premium. This option pre-
mium may be partly built into the premium of the annuity or into the yield of 
the annuity reserve. The higher the probability of utilisation, or the uncertainty 
of utilisation, the higher the option premium. From this perspective it is pri-
marily the technical interest rate that serves as a kind of regulatory parameter. 
The higher the technical interest rate, i.e. the annual expected yield, the higher 
the probability that it cannot be achieved in a given year, so the higher the 
probability that the option will be drawn down and the more expensive the 
option itself will be, and vice versa. This is an argument for it being compulso-
ry to apply the lowest possible technical interest rate of 0%32, which at the 
                                                          
32Naturally the technical interest rate may in theory be negative too, so 0% is not the 
smallest possible value and no “natural” low limit can be set for negative interest rate, 
not even -100%, since for short periods an interest rate below an annual -100% can be 
imagined, although the annuity is fundamentally set for a longer period than one year. 
However, a negative interest rate must be regarded as a curiosity and very strong and 
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same time also means that the option premium is restricted to a minimum, 
since with such a low interest rate there is a minimum of risk that the yield of 
the investment will not reach it.33 
In the case of annuities, the necessary magnitude of the solvency capital de-
pends on several factors, and therefore legislation must also differentiate ac-
cording to several factors. The major factors influencing the solvency capital 
requirement: 
• Annuities with a guaranteed period require lower solvency capital than 
annuities with no guaranteed period, since front-end guaranteed periods 
decrease the risk of the insurer and the use of a back-end guaranteed 
period is nothing other than the contemporary sale of two insurances 
(life annuity and whole life) that have opposing risks and partly cancel 
each other out, 
• With regard to annuities with front-end guaranteed periods, a minimum 
level of solvency capital is sufficient during the guaranteed period 
(since it involves no insurance risk), if the regulations allow this part of 
the annuity to be provided by another provider, 
• If the annuity can be split over time between two different providers, 
then a smaller solvency capital is required for the temporary annuity 
paid at the beginning of the term, while a larger solvency capital is re-
quired for the whole life part of the annuity (which may be regarded as 
the peak risk), 
• The solvency capital requirement is increased if the premium of the an-
nuity is officially maximised, 
• In the case of unisex annuity requirements, a smaller solvency capital is 
satisfactory for joint life annuity than for single life annuity, since the 
uncertainty ceases to exist as a result of unisex annuity requirements. 
                                                                                                                               
specific reasons are required for its application, therefore I maintain that 0% is the 
smallest possible interest rate, even if this is more of a physical limit than a theoretical 
one. 
33This is strongly dependent on the investment strategy, which in turn is related to 
the interest rate. The lower the interest rate, the more daring the investment strategy 
may be, i.e. it may be a strategy that brings higher yield in the long term, but increases 
yield volatility in the short term. So in a certain sense, the 0% technical interest rate not 
only decreases the probability of a negative yield, but also increases it to a certain 
extent.  
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2.4.5. SEPARATION OF NORMAL AND PEAK RISK – COMMON TREATMENT OF PEAK RISKS 
In respect of annuities, extended lifetime (longevity risk) may be regarded as 
the peak risk for the insurer. It is primarily institutions that provide immediate, 
lifelong annuities that are exposed to this; annuity providers that provide de-
ferred annuities are less exposed (the longer the deferral the lower the expo-
sure)34, temporary annuity providers are even less at risk and providers of 
annuities certain are not exposed at all. As the immediate lifelong annuity may 
be split into the sum of temporary and deferred annuity, this method enables 
the normal and the peak risk of the annuity to be separated, while the peak risk 
may also be diminished. So practically: an upper age limit may be determined 
(e.g. 80 or 85 years) and the immediate life annuity (and its single premium) 
may be split into these two parts: a temporary annuity until this pre-determined 
age, and a deferred annuity beginning from this age. The premium of an im-
mediately commencing lifelong annuity can be split up in a similar manner. 
Since these days it is difficult to imagine an annuity with an unchanged sum 
assured, i.e. a non-indexed annuity, special care should be taken that the ser-
vice provided in these two different phases does not “slide apart” during the 
first phase because of the different indexation applied. There are two ways to 
protect against this sliding apart: 
1. In the first phase, the provider of the first phase manages the reserve of 
both parts and invests them in the same way until the client reaches the 
age limit. Accordingly, the indexation of the two parts will be parallel 
during the first phase and the sum assured runs smoothly into the sec-
ond phase, and the reserve of the deferred annuity is only transferred to 
the provider that assumes the peak risk at the beginning of the second 
phase.  
2. The reserve of the deferred annuity is already transferred at the very 
beginning to the other provider, but investment may be made exclusive-
ly into fixed yield (e.g. inflation-linked) bonds at both providers, and so 
the indexation of the reserves remain parallel to one another. 
 
The deferred annuity provider may be of three types: 
1. The same provider that provides the temporary part of the annuity. The 
provider may do this if it has generated the solvency capital for the en-
tire life annuity, i.e. including for peak risks, 
                                                          
34This is only true if we compare the deferred annuity with an immediate annuity in 
which the entry age of the insured persons is identical. But if we compare, for example, 
two cases where someone enters into an annuity that commences immediately at the 
age of 62 or enters into a 12-year deferred annuity at the age of 50, then it is not clear in 
which annuity the longevity risk is higher.   
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2. A second provider with bigger financial muscle than the first one, a 
kind of annuity re-insurer, 
3. A central provider established or selected by the state (to all intents and 
purposes an “official” re-insurer). 
 
In cases 2 and 3 the need for solvency capital is smaller at the temporary annu-
ity provider than if it held the entire risk. What is more, if the temporary annui-
ty is an annuity certain, then this service may be provided with a minimum of 
solvency capital, and practically speaking the Hungarian-type pension funds 
are also adequate for this.  
The longevity risk in case 1 is undertaken by the original provider (who is 
capable of doing so because it possesses an adequate level of solvency capital), 
but in cases 2 and 3 it is undertaken by the re-insurer, which in case 3 ultimate-
ly means the state. This encourages the state to issue as accurate as possible 
mortality projections, because this enables the state to avoid peak risks becom-
ing a great burden.35 (If the projection is correct, there is no extra burden). 
With an adequately selected upper age limit it is achievable that the central 
provider remains a smaller provider (with respect to the reserve), so the major 
part of the annuity risk remains with the market and is not transferred to the 
state. However, due to the upper limit of the service, the temporary annuity 
means a more calculable situation for market players, i.e. it is easier for them 
to calculate the length of time during which they must bear the extra burdens if 
they make a miscalculation. 
2.4.6. MORTALITY PROJECTION AND MANAGING LONGEVITY RISK IN LITERATURE 
According to Mehr-Gustavson [1987: p. 527-528], different mortality tables 
are already used for annuitants in America, and since 1949 improvements in 
mortality have also been taken into account. This means that the projection of 
mortality in the annuity calculation began at that time. 
According to an English textbook, which has also been translated into Hun-
garian (Hylands-Gray [1992]), the calculation of future improvements in mor-
tality must be assessed prudently. The textbook also states that in England a 
survey of the annuitants’ mortality was conducted in 1967-70 and now forms 
the basis for the applied standard mortality tables. These were not adequate for 
premium calculation, only for comparison, because the future improvement of 
                                                          
35According to some experts it is worrisome that the state influences several im-
portant parameters at the same time. Therefore it is possible that it is expedient for 
mortality projections and the central provider to be clearly separated, if a suitable model 
is introduced.  
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mortality was not taken into account. Therefore, an adjustment was applied by 
setting out from the 1968 table and then deducting 1/20th of the year from the 
age each year (with regard to the relevant generation), and this is how they 
calculate the premium. In addition, when setting prices they take into account 
the annuitant mortality experience of the given insurance company. According 
to Hylands-Gray [1992], the projections retrospectively reflect a mixed image. 
Based on the figures from 1975-1982, the predicted male mortality was close 
to the actual level, but in the case of women it was highly underestimated.  
Blake [1999] also cited the underestimation of mortality improvement as 
being one of the major problems for annuity providers, because mortality gen-
erally improves over time. This is also backed up by Davis [2003], who cites 
the 2002 conclusions of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), and who 
states that the most important risk is that providers underestimate the lifetime 
of annuitants.  
Winkler-Mattar [1999], who aimed to provide advice to the insurers on how 
to handle risks relating to annuities, see two ways of managing the risk caused 
by improving mortality: 
1. Insurers give clients the option to switch to an annuity, but do not guar-
antee the price and instead allow clients to move to another provider, 
2. The use of generational mortality tables (I assume they mean projected 
mortality tables according to cohorts!). 
 
Booth-Chadburn-Cooper-Haberman-James [1999] (page 226-7) call attention 
to mortality improvement in developed countries, meaning annuity calcula-
tions must also take into account anticipated future improvements in mortality 
(but they do not provide details about how this should occur!). This is done by 
Antolin [2007], according to whom mainly stochastic methods should be used 
for mortality projection, the basis of which was laid down by Lee and Carter in 
1992 (see Lee-Carter [1992]). 
Winkler-Mattar [1992] present the method by which projections were con-
ducted before Lee-Carter, and state that since experience indicates that mortality 
is decreasing, the values of q must be decreased when performing projections. 
However, it is not expedient to do so in a linear manner, because the probability 
would eventually become negative. This is why the formula 	qx, t 	= 	 q ∙e	-FG∙3-3H is widely used, where λ is the age-specific annual improvement trend 
and t8 is the year for which q was originally valid. This is a simple model, but 
according to Winkler-Mattar there is no empirical proof of its correctness. There-
fore, other methods are also applied, e.g. the “frailty” model, where the popula-
tion is split into stronger and weaker sub-populations with the presumption that 
the evolution of medical science has a higher impact on weaker populations. 
However, it seems that even the total eradication of various illnesses would not 
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radically prolong lifespan, and in fact nothing of this kind has ever happened as a 
result of developments in medical science; the increase in lifespan is more the 
result of other factors. 
However, until now none of the methods applied for projection succeeded 
in properly reflecting the actual trends (as also stated by OECD [2008g]). 
Barnshaw-Laster-Steinmann [2008, page 11] quotes Chris Shaw’s analysis 
(Fifty Years of United Kingdom National Population Projection – Shaw 
[2007]), according to which in 1977 a boy born in 2010 was predicted to live 
for 71 years, but by 2000 this figure had already been modified to 77 years. 
This shows that it is only possible to indicate mortality with a great deal of 
uncertainty (i.e. the uncertainty with regard to projections still existed even 
two decades after Hylands-Gray). Retrospectively all we can state is that ac-
cording to the 2007 OECD data, life expectancy at birth and at the age of 65 
increased by on average 0.6 and 2.6 years, respectively, every 10 years be-
tween 1960 and 2000 in the OECD countries (OECD [2008g]). 
We may state that in the case of annuities the projection of mortality is ob-
vious in the international literature. Despite that, at least with regard to annui-
ties, it is practically non-existent in the Hungarian literature. For instance, 
Michaletzky [1999] writes with regard to private pension fund annuities (page 
106): “…it would be important to precisely define which mortality tables 
may/must be used during the evaluation of services; the tables (by gender) that 
are valid when the annuity service is determined, or the table of the actual 
year”. We can interpret this as meaning that the possible need to use projected 
mortality tables didn’t even cross his mind. Arató [2006a] only states that 
“…we are 20-30% wrong when determining life expectancy”, but he does not 
mention the importance of projection (although we can imagine that his 
thoughts also include this fact).  
It is no surprise that the phenomenon that makes projection necessary is on-
ly mentioned in detail in the international literature, but not in the Hungarian 
literature. This is the phenomenon of increased life expectancy and the related 
risk, the so-called longevity risk. 
The term “longevity risk” has had a rapid rise to fame. In the book by Mehr-
Gustavson [1987], the word longevity doesn’t even appear in the index. In the 
following decade Black-Skipper [1994] was already using the word longevity 
on pages 427-428, but only in the context that extended lifetimes are making it 
more important to plan pension schemes for workers.  
In 1999, Winkler and Mattar already demonstrate the phenomenon with a 
number of tables from Swiss Re on the expected increases in life expectancy at 
birth at and at age 65. The reasons include: better health care, changes in nutri-
tion habits and other changes in lifestyle (e.g. a decrease in smoking). Accord-
ing to the Harvard Medical School, women who also give birth in their 40s live 
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longer. The self-employed also live longer than others. However, they relativ-
ize the longevity phenomenon because they think that in the case of a hetero-
geneous portfolio the swings in mortality caused by heterogeneity are higher 
than the changes in longevity, so the longevity risk may not be separated in the 
case of such a portfolio. However, 8 years later a Swiss Re publication dealing 
with the problem (Scotti-Effenberger [2007]) already includes a sub-chapter 
entitled “Demography challenge and longevity risk”. According to this, life 
expectancy at birth in the second half of the 20th century increased by on aver-
age 4.5 months annually. This may be primarily, but not only, due to the de-
crease in infant mortality, and this is gradually decreasing in significance these 
days. According to the study, the demographic trends will have the following 
consequences: 
• A decrease in state-funded pensions and an increasing shift from DB 
systems to DC systems, 
• Increased mobility will break previous family ties and therefore the 
young will take increasingly less care of the old, 
• In general, we can increasingly count only on ourselves! 
 
According to Antolin [2008a] and the OECD [2008a], pension systems are 
mainly affected by uncertainties relating to increased life expectancy, and must 
manage two important risks: the risk of annuitisation timing and the risk of 
longevity. 
This management of longevity risk and how to cover it (hedging) is often 
discussed in the English language literature. In 1999, Blake (Blake [1999]) 
spoke only about the “natural” hedging of the annuity longevity risk, which 
had been well known for a long time in literature, i.e. that the provider should 
not only sell annuities, but also life insurances with an opposite risk, so the 
risks would partly balance each other. This is also mentioned by Davis [2003]. 
We must add that two years later Blake expressed a completely different idea 
about longevity coverage which has since become very popular in the literature 
(Blake – Burrows [2001]). Winkler-Mattar [1999] also mention that whole life 
insurance and annuities compensate each other’s risks, but they also note that 
there is much less possibility here than conventional wisdom believes, because 
this would only be entirely true if the same person concluded the two insurance 
contracts. However, according to experience, the clientele of the two insuranc-
es is different even at the same provider. Beyond this, Winkler-Mattar [1999] 
mention that for many years insurers assumed that the increase in longevity is 
overcompensated by the investment yield (although for instance in Germany 
the regulations restricted the direct transfer of the yield for this purpose). This 
may also be interpreted as meaning that my proposal for treating mortality and 
investment yield together was already a well-known and widespread practice. 
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According to Winkler-Mattar’s calculations [1999] in Switzerland, for in-
stance, in the case of entry at the ages of 60 and 75 an average excess yield of 
between 0.31% and 0.43% was required to compensate for longevity, meaning 
that in their opinion the mortality risk is significant compared to the potential 
investment return used to compensate it.  
In a certain sense, Wadsworth [2002] puts forward a radically different pro-
posal (and from another perspective provides a new approach to risk manage-
ment at the expense of excess yield), according to which the longevity risk, or 
at least part of it, should be transferred to the client via the providers undertak-
ing fewer longevity guarantees. In his opinion, this risk is already not priced 
correctly today. 
Wadsworth also prepared a report commissioned by the Association of Brit-
ish Insurers (ABI) in September 2003 entitled “The Future of the Pension 
Annuity Market” (Wadsworth [2005]), in which he determines that longevity 
risk has a very restricted secondary market and there is little chance for the 
development36 of a wholesale market. He also finds the supply of long-term 
bonds to be generally important with respect to annuities, and can see prob-
lems and reasons for action in this regard.  
According to Scotti-Effenberger [2007] there is an extremely high and gen-
erally unrecognised risk of systematic lifetime increase in relation to annuities 
in the entire population. According to them, the longevity phenomenon is well 
understood from a demographic and macroeconomic point of view, but it was 
not examined in detail from an insurer’s risk management perspective. Since 
this is a systemic risk, it cannot be diversified, that is the traditional techniques 
of risk management (e.g. reinsurance, portfolio unification) do not work. For 
this reason, governments are the best equipped to help with risk management 
and play a key role. Their main tasks include: raising awareness, educating 
people, issuing the necessary instruments needed to hedge longevity risk, re-
ducing adverse selection and encouraging self-care via tax incentives. One of 
the reasons governments may assume longevity risk from providers is that they 
are already exposed to it anyway because of the pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tems. Along with governments, this risk may also be traded on financial mar-
kets where mortality indices are used as benchmarks. So far very little such 
securitisation has taken place, but Swiss Re has already issued some of these 
instruments. The market methods for hedging may include: interest rate swap, 
participation in business deals that have opposite mortality dynamics, investing 
in businesses with different mortality dynamics, buying longevity bonds and 
                                                          
36It appears that the time for the development of such a market arrived in the United 
Kingdom in 2010. The IPE reported on 31 January 2010 that 8 banks, insurers and 
reinsurers had established a Life and Longevity Markets Association (LLMA) to pro-
mote coverage for longevity risk and trading. (IPE [2010], The Economist [2010]) 
2. THE TREATMENT OF ANNUITY CASH-FLOW RELATED PROBLEMS 89 
the synthetic proxy hedge. The latter two are still in an experimental phase and 
no such instruments are yet available. It is mainly pharmaceutical companies, 
old-age homes and biotechnology companies that profit from increased life 
expectancy. Investing in these may be regarded as a “natural hedge”. However, 
the problem with longevity bonds is that longevity risk is replaced by credit 
risk, which is not necessarily desirable except if the state issues such bonds. 
All in all, according to Scotti-Effenberger [2007], the task of insurers with 
relation to annuities is to work towards better pricing and the minimising of 
administrative and marketing expenses, as well as cleansing the basic product 
from unnecessary “frills”. They see many more tasks on the part of the state: 
• Issuing better mortality tables thus enforcing transparency in longevity, 
• Raising awareness of higher life expectancy (according to a UK survey 
people tend to underestimate their lifetime by about 5 years. According 
to another survey, if a longer life is expected people are more inclined 
to take out private pension insurance), 
• Making information available about the financial situation of retired 
people, see the Swedish “Personalregister”, 
• Improving the financial education of citizens, 
• Issuing financial instruments for hedging – unfortunately only a few 
countries have 30-year government bonds and 50-year bonds are prac-
tically non-existent, 
• To increase the volume of business and decrease adverse selection by 
making annuity mandatory, 
• To develop and establish a supervisory framework, 
• To introduce harmonised and motivating taxation – within an EET37 
system. 
 
According to Barnshaw-Laster-Steinmann [2008], longevity risk, i.e. uncer-
tainty with regard to how long we will live, is made up of two components: an 
individual and an aggregate component. The individual element may be man-
aged by organising the risk into a pool (which is nothing less than purchasing 
an annuity), however the aggregate part cannot be diversified and at the mo-
ment it is also difficult to hedge. Managing annuity risks (and in DB systems 
in general) may happen via so-called liability-driven investing (LDI), which 
means trying to match assets to liabilities so that investments are mainly made 
in long term bonds. (So LDI is the same strategy that we call ALM in insur-
ance, an interesting question is why this needed to be rediscovered and given a 
new name? – According to the OECD [2008g], ALM requirements have al-
                                                          
37“Exempt, Exempt, Taxed”, meaning the premium and yield are exempt from taxa-
tion, but the benefit is taxed. 
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ready been implemented in many countries, so matching assets and liabilities 
has become a stronger requirement.) Given a lack of suitable long-term bonds, 
an LDI strategy and the implementation of inflation-swaps and swaptions 
allow the matching of term and convexity without investing everything into 
bonds. In the case of derivatives, the “basis risk”, i.e. that they do not precisely 
match assets, must also be taken into account. From the point of view of an 
institution, adequate risk management may be “white labelling”, when the 
product of a professional insurer (manufacturer) is sold by another institution 
(distributor) in its own name. Additionally, this is often also developed jointly. 
However, for the moment the transfer of longevity risk is not really working, 
there are unfortunately not as many vendors (longevity bonds) as potential 
buyers and although a market does exist, it is very restricted and sluggish. One 
solution could be the secondary market of life insurances, the “life settlements 
market”, which has been used for a long time mainly with relation to risk in-
surances, but it is not transparent enough and too specialised to be a mass 
solution. However, the existence of the longevity risk market is indicated by 
the fact that the Financial Times has published a list of available longevity 
indices.  
Antolin [2008a] (and the very similar OECD report [2008a]) mentions the 
difficulties of market hedging longevity risk because in his opinion longevity 
swap options have ceased to exist and consequently instruments to hedge lon-
gevity are absent. The experiments of the private market have failed – so far. 
The planned EIB bond issue also failed in 2004 (see also OECD [2008g], 
which adds that it would have been too expensive anyway). Antolin [2008a] 
and OECD [2008a] find that one of the reasons for this is that nobody would 
really profit from the unforeseen increase in age, so there are not enough issu-
ers (see also OECD [2008g]. Moreover the issuer cannot really exit from such 
bonds, making them even less attractive for potential issuers. Therefore he 
suggests, similarly to Blake or Scotti-Effenberger, that the government should 
issue such instruments. However, an argument against this is that the govern-
ment already assumes more than enough longevity risk (so in contrast to Scot-
ti-Effenberger [2007]), in his view this factor represent an obstacle). Swaps are 
not really being considered as a result of the financial crisis.  
However, both Antolin [2008a] and the OECD [2008a] note that in addition 
to longevity bonds, simple long-term government bonds are also missing. So it is 
the government that should issue such bonds, and as for longevity risk manage-
ment, it may at least stimulate the market by publishing a longevity index (that 
the market regards as reliable). (This is repeated by OECD [2008h] and OECD 
[2008g]). These are all necessary for the market to voluntarily sell annuity prod-
ucts (Antolin calls them “decumulative” products), since the major obstacle is 
that the stakeholders think they would be unable to cover the risk. 
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2.5. Managing a small portfolio 
The annuity formulae described at the beginning of the book implicitly assume 
that the portfolio of insured is adequately large, since mortality according to 
the original presumptions is only possible in this case. Because any kind of 
mortality or survival probability can only be generated as a quotient of whole 
integers (the ratio of deceased compared to the number of people at the begin-
ning of the period) in the case of an adequately large number of integers (port-
folio). 
If the mortality result is included in indexation, it adjusts the reserve via the 
indexation mechanism. However, in the case of a small portfolio it could occur 
that no insured people die in a certain year or, by contrast, a large mortality 
loss occurs that may even surpass the entire surplus yield on the investment; 
although if at least one insured individual dies then large mortality profits may 
arise in that particular year (in proportion to the reserve of the whole portfo-
lio). Therefore there may be extreme fluctuations in the annuity of insured 
individuals belonging to a small portfolio from one year to the next. There are 
two fundamental methods of protecting against these fluctuations: 
1. Using a pool, i.e. via the unification of portfolios. In such a case, the 
portfolios of different providers are unified and organised into a bigger 
pool, where these fluctuations will necessarily become smaller, 
2. Using solvency capital.  
 
If the regulations allow institutions without solvency capital (like Hungarian-
type pension funds) to also provide life annuities, only the first option is avail-
able for them (which it is worth making mandatory irrespective of the magni-
tude of the portfolio). However, at the launch of the annuity system the entire 
risk community is small, so the problem of a small portfolio will necessarily 
emerge even if there is a pool, and accordingly pension fund providers may 
even require government assistance. While the pool is almost unavoidable for 
Hungarian-type pension fund providers, it may also be useful for providers that 
have their own capital (insurers), so it is expedient if the regulator allows the 
formation of pools on a voluntary basis. What is more, it may even become 
mandatory, so the pool may work as a supplementary risk-equalisation mecha-
nism that adjusts haphazard compositions of the risk community at the differ-
ent providers. This could not be managed with their natural tools, as differenti-
ation (e.g. according to gender) is not permitted. Naturally it may happen, 
mainly at the beginning, that even a portfolio which is organised into a pool is 
not sufficiently large, and therefore the implementation of the second solution 
(in the case of providers with own capital) may occur in parallel with the first 
one.  
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Services provided at the expense of solvency capital (in this instance the 
smoothing out of fluctuations caused by the mortality result) may be regarded 
as an option provided to the client, the price (premium) of which is paid by the 
client either in the cost part of the annuity premium or as extra yield to the 
insurer. In the case of a large portfolio, and if the technique that mortality 
results are taken into account during indexation is implemented, and especially 
if the technical interest rate is 0%, there is a small likelihood of solvency capi-
tal being used. But if the portfolio is small, there is a higher chance of it being 
used due to balance fluctuating mortality results. Differentiating a small port-
folio (for instance during reserving) would split the portfolio into even smaller 
portfolios. 
According to the regulations, even if the mortality result is treated as part of 
the indexation in normal cases and the providers have own capital, in the case 
of a small portfolio (presumably at launch) it would be expedient to suspend 
this indexation rule based on the above-mentioned reasons and to instead im-
plement the following approach (regardless of whether the given portfolio is 
the portfolio of a provider or a pool): 
1. Until the entire pool reaches a certain threshold, the entire mortality re-
sult belongs to the provider (or in the case of a pool: the providers) and 
is not included in indexation. In this case, indexation takes place exclu-
sively on the basis of the investment result. Transitory mortality losses 
are financed from solvency capital by the provider(s) and the mortality 
profit will be one of the sources for topping up the solvency capital. As 
long as this takes place, although the reserve calculation may occur by 
differentiation according to risk groups, the mortality result of the dif-
ferent risk groups are not treated separately.  
2. If the average for the entire portfolio reaches the threshold but there are 
risk sub-groups that don’t, then in that given year the risk groups shall 
be consolidated starting from the smallest group until the number of 
people in the consolidated group reaches the threshold. The mortality 
result is accounted for in the consolidated group exactly as below, but 
not according to the risk groups within that. 
3. If every risk sub-group reaches the threshold, the mortality result is in-
cluded in indexation, the mortality result is handled separately for every 
risk group and the indexation of that particular group occurs separately 
from the other groups.  
 
This initial use of solvency capital may be seen as the initial investment of a for-
profit capitalised provider, the return of which is the option premium collected 
for the purpose of providing solvency capital for a future, larger portfolio.  
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Calculation is needed to determine the abovementioned threshold. The prin-
ciple of the calculation may be that the portfolio of insured should be large 
enough to prevent the probable fluctuation of mortality from exceeding a yield 
level that is sustainable on a longer term. 
2.6. Homogenising the annuitants’ portfolio 
From a risk point of view the homogeneity of the annuitants’ portfolio may be 
examined according to several aspects: e.g. homogeneity by gender (the in-
sured are only women/men), by year of birth (the insured belong to the same 
cohort), etc. These are very interesting problems, but it is probably impossible 
to achieve homogeneity by gender (or only by illegal means). In addition, 
homogeneity according to cohorts can be achieved by differentiation (because 
no legislator can expect pension savings to be exchanged for annuities in 50 
years’ time based on a tariff that was set in stone today). Accordingly, from 
among the possible problems of homogeneity, below I highlight the question 
of homogeneity according to the size of the annuity and this is what I will be 
discussing hereafter. This issue is particularly important because of the possi-
ble (probable?!) correlation between the magnitude of the annuity and the 
expected remaining lifetime.  
Above, by writing down the various formulae for the premiums and the re-
serves of life annuities uniformly for an annual annuity of 1 EUR, I implicitly 
assumed that the annuities are of equal magnitude. Naturally the actual size of 
annuities would probably indicate a relatively large deviation, which would not 
cause a problem if we assume that there is no correlation between the size of 
the annuity and remaining life expectancy. If we differentiate the portfolio of 
insured according to several different parameters (usually: state of health, 
smoking/drinking etc. and lifestyle), this would probably be the case within the 
different subgroups and naturally within the entire portfolio of insured. In 
addition, it is also possible that the level of annuities would become homoge-
neous to a certain extent within the different sub-groups (even if there is a 
strong possibility that the average annuity of the various differentiated sub-
groups might differ significantly from one other). In view of the fact that it 
would seem that in most countries (including Hungary) this kind of multi-
faceted differentiation is not possible for non-technical reasons in the case of 
mandatory annuities, it is still possible that there will be a correlation between 
the amount of the annuity and remaining life expectancy as a result of differen-
tiating factors that we do not take into account.  
For the time being there is no data (at least in Hungary) for the correlation 
itself or for its rate, but in my personal view there is a strong likelihood of a 
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large, positive correlation (so the bigger the annuity, the longer the lifespan of 
the insured). I maintain this opinion despite the fact that many experts have 
doubts on the basis that concealment of income is prevalent in Hungary, so in 
reality those entitled to a small annuity will also include many very rich peo-
ple. I believe that we could of course have clearer data if we did not have to 
deal with this phenomenon, but a positive correlation can be assumed never-
theless because there are relatively fewer rich people, so having rich among the 
poor may distort the picture somewhat (mitigate the positive correlation), but 
would not change it. In addition, this may change as the economy becomes 
progressively whiter (which may be significantly facilitated by a more equita-
ble tax system introduced by Hungary’s competitors and which Hungary is 
thereby forced to follow). 
Given the lack of data, it is of course pure speculation to claim a positive 
correlation or a lack of one, but the problem is nevertheless worth dealing with 
and formulating calculations for. 
In addition to data collection and the resulting digressive annuity table, 
there is of course another way of handling the problem, i.e. by eliminating it a 
priori, or at least significantly diminishing its magnitude. This is the homoge-
nisation indicated in the title.  
Homogenisation means restricting the possible difference between the 
sizes of annuities, i.e. converting peak annuities to average annuities (in other 
words: setting a cap for annuities). The justification of such a regulation can of 
course not be that we use it to create an actuarially more favourable or more 
easily calculable position, because a situation that is more favourable actuarial-
ly can only arise as a consequence of another suitable reason for homogenisa-
tion. Such a reason can be found easily if we look at why the law obliges citi-
zens to accumulate savings to cover their financial needs in old age. Why 
doesn’t the state leave people to do this for themselves without making it man-
datory38 and intervene only by providing them with precise information about 
to what extent they should set aside from their current income? The answer is 
that people’s time preference is generally not adequate, meaning too many 
people prefer to consume in the present rather than in the future and are there-
                                                          
38It seems to be an enterprise that is not totally impossible. China is proud of having 
one of the highest savings rates in the world, having achieved such a situation by 
launching a campaign to make saving a “patriotic obligation” (see: Akerlof-Shiller 
[2009]). Obviously we cannot predict what sort of campaign would lead to success in a 
society that is more individualistic than Chinese society, such as Hungarian society, but 
even if such a campaign were a success it would take decades to actually change the 
current pension system to reflect this. In addition to which it is unclear whether the 
campaign played an important role at all, or people simply obeyed the government’s 
orders.   
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fore not inclined to save enough money on their own, which in turn would 
mean the appearance of masses of unsupported old people within the state 
social system, causing its eventual financial collapse. In order to avoid this, the 
state obliges citizens to accumulate savings in advance.  
However, the necessary pre-savings have an upper limit, beyond which the 
above-mentioned problem does not arise, and so beyond that limit there is no 
need for any obligation, the state can be satisfied with the common sense of 
citizens, without which old people who once had a good level of income may 
have to radically diminish their consumption but will not be destitute and will 
therefore not have to rely on central redistribution. Forward-thinking individu-
als should not be obliged by the state to make savings beyond a certain level 
within such a system (private pension funds), beyond which they may accumu-
late savings with a better yield (e.g. purchasing and/or renting out real estate, 
starting up their own business etc.). There are serious arguments in favour of 
setting an upper limit to private pension fund savings and accordingly on man-
datory contributions, thus making the possible annuities more homogeneous.  
Homogenisation may have different methods: 
1. The system does not allow the generation of such annuities form the 
word go, and also sets a strong upper limit for total contributions (per-
haps even by prohibiting the payment of further monies into the private 
pension system once a certain level of capital has been accumulated). 
This is a better solution than the one currently used in Hungary where-
by the maximum is linked to the actual income, because it manages the 
problem of a possible drastic drop in income. 
2. Regulation would set the same upper limit for (let’s say) monthly annu-
ities, but with regard to annuitisation rather than contributions. The as-
sets beyond the upper limit would be paid to the fund member in a 
lump sum. Compared to the previous solution, this is better because it 
manages the problem of uncertainty with respect to the rate of capital 
exchange into annuities.  
3. Another option is that the regulations allow an annuity to exceed the 
upper limit but exclude the possibility of significant differences in an-
nuities at different providers. This can be achieved by requiring annui-
tants to split their capital between several providers so that the benefits 
provided by each provider is smaller than a pre-determined limit (but 
only as many providers may be chosen as are necessary to achieve this, 
meaning the annuity cannot be intentionally fragmented). This solution 
is different from the previous two because it splits the longevity risk be-
tween providers while still keeping it within the system. 
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Homogenisation naturally not only means the exclusion of annuities that are 
too high, but also those that are too low. Part of it is that the regulations should 
not permit too low a level of savings to be converted into an annuity. I deal 
with this aspect separately below. We might refer to this as the question of an 
“absolute” annuity minimum.  
The other aspect (the question of a “relative” annuity minimum) only comes 
into the picture if – from among various annuity types – the client may also opt 
for an annuity that has a guaranteed period. If a guaranteed period is possible, 
the guarantee has its price, which manifests itself in a reduction in the monthly 
annuity that can be provided in exchange for the accumulated capital. There-
fore it is justified that if the regulations permit a guaranteed period then it 
should set a certain limit (according to capital or annuity) below which the 
insured individual may only purchase a single annuity without a guaranteed 
period. This also serves the homogenisation of the risk community, but from a 
different perspective.  
In the literature I have only found reference to homogenisation in Winkler-
Mattar [1999], who used it in the same sense as I do. They say that in the case of 
a heterogeneous portfolio the mortality swings caused by heterogeneity are high-
er than the ones caused by a long life, meaning longevity risk cannot be evi-
denced in such a portfolio. They also note that, in contrast to other life insuranc-
es, heterogeneity is generally not diminished by reinsurance. However, they 
suggest the same solution as I do to the problems caused by heterogeneity, i.e. 
they recommend that the level of annuity payments should be restricted and that 
in general the insurance company should restrict the level of annuity within its 
total business, for instance via a suitable commission structure.  
The Hungarian literature does not use the expression homogeneity, although 
Michaletzky [1999] already proposes (with a reference to Stahl, and without 
indicating the source!) that there might be a correlation between mortality and 
magnitude of capital; he suggests solving this by preparing a suitable mortality 
table. 
2.7. Indexation 
2.7.1. POSSIBLE FORMS OF ANNUITY RESERVE INVESTMENT AND ANNUITY INDEXING 
The traditional annuity-formulae assume that the insured person nominally 
receives the same annuity payments from the start until the end of their life. 
From another perspective it supposes that the yield on the annuity provision is 
precisely identical to the expected yield or rather to the technical interest rate, 
and that it moves neither up nor down with respect to it. In other words, the 
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annuity does not have to be increased as a consequence of the reimbursement 
of yield above the technical interest rate (excess yield) and does not have to be 
decreased with respect to losses resulting from a lower yield than the technical 
interest rate.  
However it is obvious that the technical interest rate will be surpassed by the 
actual yield from time to time during the course of the term, and therefore the 
annuity will have to be indexed – and especially if the technical interest rate 
was set to ensure a great probability of this happening,39 and if indexation 
itself is an expectation from a certain perspective. 
In reality, the possibilities (and in fact the need) for indexation depend on how 
the reserve is invested. The possible forms of investment of the annuity reserve 
are different depending on who bears the investment risk. This naturally may 
also have an impact on the annuity construction itself, and primarily on the 
indexation. The possibilities are: 
1. Both the provider and the client are exempt from the investment risk; in-
dexation depends on the yield of the assets invested into the reserve. The 
basis of the investment strategy is that in such cases the provider invests 
exclusively into (good quality) bonds in an expiry structure matching the 
expiry structure of the annuity portfolio. So the provider is exempt from 
market fluctuations, since it invests only and exclusively into bonds that 
are kept until the date of expiry, which need no revaluation in accordance 
with changes in interest rates. As long as only fixed yield bonds existed, 
this strategy also meant that the annuity dues remained unchanged until 
expiry, and possibly (rarely) even grew at a pre-determined rate. These 
days bonds with yields linked to inflation are widespread, so it is relative-
ly easy to achieve an annuity that is linked to inflation through the appli-
cation of this strategy, or perhaps even an annuity that is indexed to infla-
tion plus a fixed percentage (e.g. 2 %), if the provider invests only in 
bonds with yields that are indexed to inflation. 
2. The investment risks are divided between the client and the provider; 
indexation depends on the excess yield achieved in the previous year. 
This solution in fact is the return-refund technique which is applied by 
traditional (i.e. not unit-linked) life insurances. In this case the benefit 
paid by the insurer increases every year depending on the investment 
yield achieved in the given year (so the investment risk is partly borne 
by the client), although the benefit may not decrease nominally (so part 
of the investment risk is borne by the insurer who guarantees a part of 
                                                          
39Except if the technical interest rate was set by the provider in such a way that it 
represents “the” yield that is guaranteed to the client, while the excess yield above this 
is the profit of the provider and the yield deficit below this level represents a loss for 
the provider. This is example 3 below. 
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the yield). The insurer guarantees not to achieve at least a 0% yield, but 
to achieve a usually higher yield pre-included in the benefit, the so 
called “technical interest rate”. In these cases, the insurer partly invests 
in bonds, shares and other types of assets such as real estate. With this 
solution the rate of indexation cannot be computed in advance and it is 
not possible to provide a good guarantee for this at a low cost. 
3. The annuity provider bears the entire investment risk; the annuity is not 
indexed and increases by a pre-determined percentage ratio or in abso-
lute terms. This solution is mainly applied in Britain and America, but 
the bankruptcy of some long-established insurance companies in the 
1990s (the most important example being Equitable Life, one of the 
oldest and most prestigious English insurers) showed what a dangerous 
strategy it is, although Equitable Life was able to fulfil its obligations 
despite bankruptcy. The essence of this model is that the annuity pay-
ment is not indexed (or more rarely:  its level changes at a predictable 
rate) and the insurers may compete with each other with respect to who 
will undertake the given series of payments at the lowest price. Thus 
the competition, in addition to the costs, is in the size of the yield that 
providers undertake to provide above and beyond the technical interest 
rate, i.e. the magnitude of the technical interest rate. However, any 
yield beyond the technical interest rate undertaken with respect to the 
client belongs to the insurer, which achieves this however it can. In my 
opinion, this solution cannot be applied in the case of mandatory annui-
ties, not so much because of its danger, but because it is not adequate to 
allow the application of unforeseen (e.g. inflation-linked) rates of in-
dexation, which is essential to private pension annuities and represents 
part of old-age security. 
4. The client bears the entire investment risk; the magnitude of each annu-
ity payment depends on how the reserves are evaluated when a particu-
lar annuity payment is due; indexation in advance is unpredictable. This 
solution is the transposition of unit-linked insurance facilities onto an-
nuities. The client bears the entire investment risk and the payment de-
pends on the actual daily value of the assets. If the invested assets are 
secure (e.g. not Greek government bonds), this is similar to solution 1, 
although the payments fluctuate unnecessarily as a result of daily 
changes in bond valuations, which are not compensated by the relative-
ly higher yield. If the invested assets are risky, the high yield must be 
paid for by the high fluctuation of annuity payments, which cannot be 
allowed in the case of small annuities (such as private pension annuities 
will be), and accordingly this solution should not be recommended with 
relation to private pension annuities.  
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In summary, I only regard two of the above options as being possible in the 
case of mandatory annuities, and therefore below I assume that we can only 
chose between these two options. 
2.7.2. AN EXPEDIENT EXPECTATION WITH RESPECT TO INDEXATION –  
THE GUARANTEE PARADOX 
It is worthwhile – as a bad example – to cite the Hungarian annuity regulations 
(Section 4 (7) of Government Decree 170/1997) that were in effect throughout 
the existence of the Hungarian private pension fund system (although ineffec-
tive due to a lack of actual annuity payments). According to the regulations, 
the sum assured by the annuity must be defined so that the annuity paid by the 
fund shall be indexed at least to the same extent as the pension paid by the 
social security system (Pillar 1). Obviously this rule implicitly follows the 
return-refund indexation technique, but with this technique (and in fact with 
relation to all of the above indexing techniques) it is not expedient to pose such 
expectations because: 
• The expectation itself has no relation to what the annuity can provide.40 
The annuity may be fundamentally indexed in proportion to the extra 
investment yield (providing there is no mortality loss).  
• Overall it is an incalculable risk for the service provider, because the 
change in pension provided by the social security system is very much 
dependent on politics, so the indexation of the social security pension is 
practically unpredictable according to experience.  
 
As a result of the above, either one cannot find a provider for the mandatory 
annuity with these conditions, so the state is forced to set up a central provider, 
or the providers are forced to tie up an irrationally high proportion of the annu-
ity premium (that is the private pension fund capital of the clients) for hedging 
unpredictable political risks, so the annuity would be smaller than what it 
would be without this indexation rule. Such a requirement should not be posed 
to a central provider either, because it cannot guarantee this yield through 
market investments alone without the involvement of extra state funding, while 
                                                          
40This was specifically true as long as the so-called Swiss indexation was in force 
within the social security system, because that could definitely not be covered by capi-
tal market facilities, but even if that were possible, there was still the political risk, i.e. 
that is the state could deviate from this indexation at any time, as it frequently did. The 
political risk remains even if the introduced regulation on indexation is now price in-
dexing (as was more or less introduced in Hungary in 2009).  
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when elaborating the regulations it is expedient to avoid the inclusion of state 
funding already from the word go. 
This example already indicates that contrary to everyday reasoning minimum 
requirements for guarantees with respect to yields should be set cautiously in 
the case of annuity regulations. The so-called “yield guarantee” paradox41 
states that the higher the yield we wish to guarantee to the client, the lower the 
actual benefit will be. 
This paradoxical statement may be understood if we think about the way pro-
viders can achieve a higher required yield. If the requirement is relatively 
modest, the provider would probably conduct a more prudent investment poli-
cy than it would without this requirement, so it makes investments (primarily 
into bonds) that are less volatile but generate a lower yield. As a result of this 
rule, the yield would be lower in the long term than it would be without it. If 
the requirement exceeds a certain level, the prudent investment policy of the 
provider will be insufficient in itself. In addition, a portion of the premium is 
used to meet the requirement and consequently there will be less service.  
It is therefore not expedient to pose such expectations with respect to indexa-
tion and yield, and instead investments into inflation-indexed bonds and index-
ation to inflation should be required. Alternatively, in the case of indexation 
based on return-refund, regulations should be implemented that make the 
above goal achievable but do not demand that the above paradox is avoided. 
This is a requirement of a 0% technical interest rate (and expected yield) in the 
case of an indexation technique based on return-refund, whatever relation the 
developed indexation has to indexation in Pillar 1. Nevertheless, the 0% tech-
nical interest rate means that the annuity increases at the rate of the entire in-
vestment excess yield42 (naturally only if  the mortality result is 0 or positive), 
which usually and on average will exceed the indexation of Pillar 1 at the ma-
jority of  providers even without such a formal requirement. 
 
                                                          
41This yield guarantee paradox was explained by András Kozek (Allianz Hungária 
Biztosító Zrt. Vice CEO) on 22 September 2006 in an expert meeting dealing with 
annuities as follows: “If the legislator forces the insurance companies to assure higher 
guaranteed yields, the insurers will be able to assure lower total yield for their clients, 
because the higher the guarantee, the less risky the insurer’s investment strategy, and 
this allows insurers to invest their clients’ money in more secure instruments that pro-
vide a lower yield”. 
42Or rather the portion of this that is due to the client, i.e. the total net yield on the 
investment. 
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2.7.3. INDEXING AND THE POSITION OF INSURED INDIVIDUALS –  
ADVERSE SELECTION DUE TO THE TECHNICAL INTEREST RATE 
When financial experts design the Pillar 1 annuity, they are inclined to think 
that the choice between a lower starting annuity indexed using a higher index 
and a higher starting annuity indexed using a lower index is simply an issue of 
balancing the state budget. The first alternative means a lower burden today 
because the burden is put off to a later date, while the second alternative means 
the opposite. Although this is true with respect to the entire portfolio in gen-
eral, the situation is different when it comes to individual annuitants, because 
one of the two options will be more favourable for people with different life 
expectancies. Accordingly, choosing between the two alternatives is not (just) 
a choice based on financial values, but concerns the question of which seg-
ments of the population we should benefit. Option 1 means that annuity pay-
ments begin at a higher level but are indexed at a lower level, which is favour-
able for people with a shorter life expectancy (men, blue-collar workers, peo-
ple with lower education and/or lower income, etc.). Option 2, i.e. an annuity 
that begins with lower payments but uses higher indexing, is favourable for 
people with longer life expectancies (women, white-collar workers, people 
with higher education and/or higher income), because the two segments of the 
population can maximize the total annuity received during their lifetime in 
different ways. 
This logic is valid not only in respect of Pillar 1, but also in respect of man-
datory annuities, primarily via the choice of technical interest rate. One might 
say that a higher initial annuity with lower indexation gives something back to 
those who receive a less favourable annuity because of the unisex table, com-
pared to what they would receive with a differentiated table. In addition, the 
higher income segment can better bear the devaluation that results from lower 
indexation.  
If clients can choose between different technical interest rates, or rather be-
tween providers who offer differing levels of indexation, then people with 
lower life expectancies would tend to accumulate at providers who offer a 
higher technical interest rate, while those with longer life expectancies would 
accumulate at providers who offer a lower technical interest rate,. Overall, the 
composition of the portfolio of annuitants would be different from the calcu-
lated one, so providers who offer a lower technical interest rate would accumu-
late a risk loss. It is expedient to avoid this and therefore consideration must be 
given to whether the regulation should allow for competition between tech-
nical interest rates (or more precisely: competition between different rates of 
indexation, although providers can also foresee this effect, so a uniform tech-
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nical interest rate can become a reality without regulatory intervention – at the 
maximum interest rate allowed by the regulations). 
However, the above problem may be solved without competition between 
technical interest rates because different interest rates favour different seg-
ments, so the choice itself is not a neutral one. The solution may be that in the 
case of a private pension fund annuity we calculate using different technical 
interest rates (so with different indexation rates) at different points of maturity, 
e.g. 3% until the age of 70, 1.5% until the age of 80, and 0% beyond the age of 
80. The interest rate is also fixed in this case, but nevertheless changes without 
generating adverse selection with regard to differing interest rates.43 To a cer-
tain extent this is a compromise between the above-mentioned two options; it 
favours people who are better off to a lesser extent than, for instance, a uni-
form technical interest rate of 0% would do. 
2.7.4. THE ROLE AND RATE OF THE TECHNICAL INTEREST RATE 
It is worthwhile taking a separate look at the role of technical interest rates, 
since it is different in the case of diverse investments and in the case of the 
resulting indexation techniques. I elaborate in detail on the indexation tech-
niques to be considered in the case of mandatory annuities, after which I also 
speak briefly about two other indexation techniques.  
When all the investment risks are undertaken by the insurer and the annuity 
is not indexed, the technical interest rate is essentially a competitive factor, 
                                                          
43The solution is based on István Hetényi’s proposal at one of the Pension and Old-
Age Roundtable (NYIKA) meetings in 2007, that the indexation of pensions in Pillar I 
should depend on the age of the insured; the higher the age the higher the indexation. 
This solution is however rejected by some who argue that Hetényi, being an elderly 
pensioner, was willing to change the rules driven by selfish motivation and therefore it 
should not be taken seriously. But in my view, the following arguments can support this 
proposal: 1. The higher the technical interest rate the lower the indexation, so the dif-
ference between the standard of living of pensioners and active people may be very 
different. This does not cause a problem for those with short life expectancies, but it 
does for people with long life expectancies. For them, it is worth diminishing or revers-
ing this difference. 2. According to experience pensioners react by decreasing their 
consumption, which may be fairly easily done in the case of certain goods, since many 
of the goods are already not on people’s shopping lists as they age. However, there are 
also goods that are consumed more in old age and especially at a high age. These are 
primarily medical, nursing and pharmaceutical services. Above a certain age the strate-
gy of lowering consumption does not really work especially with respect to increasingly 
small families, where fewer and fewer relatives can supplement the missing pension or 
provide care informally. 
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although this is not visible to clients, who only see that different providers are 
charging different prices for the same annuity. 
When the entire investment risk is borne by the client, as in the case of a 
unit-linked annuity, the technical interest rate does not have a role to play in 
principle since there is no guaranteed yield, which is one of the most important 
characteristics of the technical interest rate. Nevertheless, in a strict “technical” 
sense a kind of “interest rate” may be defined here, or rather just a rate, which 
is the rate at which the number of paid annuity units diminishes year by year. 
In the case of unit-linked annuities, this rate fundamentally plays the same role 
as the technical interest rate in the case of traditional insurances (disregarding 
the guaranteed yield), i.e. the investment yield must be at least as much so that 
the paid annuity does not decrease from year to year, and the more it exceeds 
this (i.e. “excess yield”) the more the annuity may increase.   
In the case of inflation-linked bonds that pay a yield, the usual interest 
paid is: inflation + a fixed percentage (e.g. 2%). If it invests in bonds of this 
nature, the insurer can to all intents and purposes44 offer two types of indexa-
tion to the client:  
1. It increases the annuity payment by the rate of inflation every year (i.e. 
it maintains the value in real terms), 
2. Every year, it increases the annuity payment by inflation + a fixed per-
centage (which is not necessarily as much as the yield of the bond!), i.e. 
it continuously increases its value in real terms. 
 
In the first case, the maximum technical interest rate is a fixed percentage of 
the bond yield, since the insurer may at most promise the entire bond yield to 
the client as a yield. However, if the technical interest rate reaches this maxi-
mum then the insurer can only cover its expenses and its profit from the one-
off charge paid at the beginning as part of the annuity premium, and must use 
this to cover everything during the entire term. Therefore it is probably expedi-
ent for the insurer not to exhaust the maximum potential of the technical inter-
est rate and to determine it at a lower rate than this fixed interest rate. Natural-
ly (if indexation is fixed) the premium is a competitive factor among insurers, 
which is affected by costs and the technical interest rate, and this pushes the 
insurer towards determining as high a technical interest rate as possible. 
In the second case, the maximum technical interest rate can be the differ-
ence between the bond yield beyond inflation and the fixed interest rate be-
yond inflation that may be granted to the client. Theoretically it is possible that 
                                                          
44Theoretically the insurer could keep the annuity payments unchanged, i.e. not ap-
ply indexation, or could promise a rate of indexation below the rate of inflation, but I do 
not elaborate on these approaches since I do not deem them realistic options at the 
moment.  
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the insurer offers the client a higher fixed increase beyond inflation than the 
bond yield fixed beyond inflation. In this case the technical interest rate will be 
negative.  
With such a policy for the regulation of the technical interest rate, it is suffi-
cient to prescribe that the insurer may not offer more to the client than it can 
achieve via the bond yield. Although during the course of regulation of the 
technical interest rate it should also be considered how the very same regula-
tion defines the indexation rule of mandatory annuities. This may be achieved 
in two ways: 
1. Each provider may index the annuity according to one scheme (e.g. 
precisely to  inflation), 
2. There is competition between the providers with regard to the level of 
indexation they apply to annuities. The possible options: to inflation or 
to inflation + a fixed percentage. 
 
In the event of the 2nd option, the danger of adverse selection must be taken 
into account since people with shorter life expectancies would opt for lower 
indexation with a higher starting annuity, while those with longer life expec-
tancies would opt for an initial lower annuity and the corresponding higher 
indexation. This creates losses for insurers who opt for higher indexation. If 
insurers recognise this then none of them will opt for this, and so the market 
will automatically settle in a state that corresponds to version 1, meaning eve-
ryone indexes exactly according to the rate of inflation.  
In the case of the return-refund technique, the regulator cannot regulate the 
technical interest rate as liberally as in the case of the previous indexation 
technique. It is expedient to apply two rules in this case: 
1. The technical interest rate should be uniform throughout the entire 
market, regulations should not allow competition in this field, 
2. The technical interest rate should be as low as possible (e.g. 0%). 
 
Arguments in favour of a fixed technical interest rate: 
• In the case of life insurances, fixing the eventual upper limit of the 
technical interest rate is a generally applied regulatory practice, because 
competition pushes insurers towards increasing the technical interest 
rate and encourages them to endanger their long term interests (i.e. the 
sustainability of services) while taking into account their short term in-
terests. Therefore the definition of a low eventual technical interest rate 
may be regarded as prudential expediency.  
• In the case of strong market competition it is not significant whether the 
regulation sets a maximum technical interest rate or a fixed technical 
interest rate because insurers will “stick” to the maximum possible val-
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ue as a result of competition. Their starting point is that the vast majori-
ty of clients prefer the certainty of a high value starting annuity to an 
eventual higher increase in value, because the latter is dependent on ex-
cess yield of uncertain magnitude. The situation is naturally different in 
the case of weak market competition – e.g. a monopoly or colluding ol-
igopoly (cartel). 
• If, despite the above, there are different kinds of technical interest rate 
on the market, it would be suitable for allowing the selection of the in-
sured according to risk criteria, which would make calculation more 
difficult and more expensive. In the case of a uniform interest rate, this 
adverse selection effect does not exist. 
• A uniform interest rate makes it easier for clients to choose between 
providers in the annuity phase (if regulations provide for such an op-
tion) and helps clients compare the performance of different insurers. 
Comparability also means that providers cannot hide higher costs by 
applying a higher technical interest rate.  
• Arguments in favour of applying a lowest possible technical interest 
rate: 
• A priority target is maintaining the real value of annuities, which (with 
this indexation technique) can be best achieved using a low technical 
interest rate, since there is a good chance that the yield will be higher 
than inflation every year. Therefore the lowest possible technical inter-
est rate of 0% is preferred. 
• A similarly important target of annuities is not only to maintain their 
value but to possibly increase their value over time. This is also best 
achieved by applying the lowest possible technical interest rate of 0%. 
• The 0% technical interest rate may be regarded as a safe interest rate if 
recalculation of annuities becomes necessary during the term of the an-
nuity because of improved mortality; this interest rate is the best way to 
avoid the decrease of the annuity payment and allows for adjustment at 
the expense of excess yield. (Naturally the possibility of negative yield 
cannot be excluded). 
• However, one must note that this technical interest rate is primarily 
beneficial for insured individuals who are healthier and who have a 
longer life expectancy and a higher level of education.  
 
This latter problem is eliminated by applying a fixed interest rate that changes 
during the term, as proposed by Mr. Hetényi and described previously.  
Finally it is worthwhile citing – as a bad example – the ineffective Hungari-
an private pension annuity regulations. According to Section 5 (3) of Govern-
ment Decree 170/1997: “the technical interest rate applied in the annuity pro-
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vider personal pension fund may be at most 1.5% higher than the interest rate 
resulting from the indexation of the social security pension determined for the 
actual year”. I find this definition fatally flawed for two reasons:  
• The technical interest rate cannot be changed annually with respect to 
annuities that have already started, and therefore it is not justifiable to 
adjust it to such a volatile standard. In addition, it is also expedient for 
the technical interest rates of annuities that commence in different years 
to be similar to each other. 
• The technical interest rate set in this manner is almost certainly too 
high, so it is almost certain that it will be impossible to achieve an in-
vestment result of this magnitude, let alone a higher one, to ensure the 
adequate increase of the annuity. For the sake of comparison: in the 
case of Hungarian life insurances, the highest possible technical interest 
rate has been 2.9% since the mid-2000s. 
2.7.5. INDEXING AND INFLATION MANAGEMENT IN LITERATURE 
In the English language literature, the issue of indexation primarily means 
inflation management and indexation to inflation, although there are different 
indexations on the market too. This is fundamentally due to the fact that in 
Britain and North America the most frequent annuity is still one that has an 
unchanged sum assured without any indexation, the so-called “level annuity”, 
the major deficiency of which is the lack of stability in value if the annuitant 
lives for a long time (Blake [1999]). According to Blake, annuitants generally 
prefer the “level” annuity, because they tend to underestimate their lifetime. In 
addition its starting level is roughly 30% higher than that of an indexed annuity 
(Blake [1999]). 
According to the World Bank [1994], private insurers are often blamed for 
not providing protection against inflation. According to them, one of the possi-
ble solutions to the problem is to index the benefit to inflation and at the same 
time to keep reserves in inflation-indexed securities or in foreign assets that are 
immune to domestic inflation. Chile is mentioned as an example. The report 
adds that the indexed annuity is naturally lower at the beginning compared to if 
it were not indexed, and therefore it is not clear whether blue-collar workers 
would be better off with indexation.  
Poterba [1994] finds the reason for the lack of indexation according to infla-
tion on the American market in the fact that the Treasury only recently started 
to issue sovereign bonds indexed to inflation, so annuity insurers have only 
been able to begin covering inflation-indexed annuities relatively recently. 
According to Blake [1999], insurers try to purchase indexed bonds with re-
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spect to indexed annuities. He writes as late as in 2006 with reference to the 
British market that indexed annuities are a relatively new development made 
possible by the fact that the government began issuing long-term bonds that 
are indexed to inflation (Blake [2006a]).  
The issue of indexation also emerges with relation to unit-linked annuities 
(variable, equity-linked, etc. annuities). This option has already been men-
tioned by the World Bank [1994], although not in relation to inflation man-
agement but rather because in their view that this is the solution to the problem 
of fixing the date of annuitisation, since the price of annuity units fluctuate 
together with the market. Nevertheless, the disadvantage of this solution is that 
the risk of fluctuating annuity must be borne throughout the lifetime of the 
pensioner. According to Poterba [1997], although the market for “variable 
annuity” has increased most significantly in recent years, these constructions 
do not necessarily protect pensioners against inflation. He mentions as an ex-
ample that this could occur if payments are adjusted to the stock market, which 
then underperforms compared to inflation.  
Similarly to the longevity problem, unit-linked annuities can be also consid-
ered as a possible solution from the perspective of insurers. This is why 
Wadsworth-Findlater [2002] offers a new kind of unit-linked annuity instead 
of the traditional “level” annuities, the cost structure and internal structure of 
which is visible (the English terminology calls this “unbundled”), permits 
changes over the course of time and most importantly does not include a lon-
gevity guarantee for the client. The concept was elaborated by Wadsworth in a 
brief article in 2002 (Wadsworth [2002]). According to this, everybody on the 
annuity market offers almost identical products (this refers primarily to the UK 
market). This will change in the future and he calls this process the “unbun-
dling dynamic”. Its logic is as follows: 
• The proportion of “enhanced” and “impaired” annuities will increase, 
so pricing becomes increasingly sophisticated, which also affects op-
portunities for pricing the remaining products. He calls this “anti-
selection”. 
• This means that the annuity will be more expensive for the survivors, 
so the traditional annuity hedged by bonds becomes increasingly less 
satisfactory. Accordingly, annuities must shift towards the capital mar-
ket and towards annuities that are linked to investments. 
• The immediate consequence of this is less longevity guarantee, since 
this is already priced inadequately today.  
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These dynamics are depicted in the following diagram: 
Diagram 1: Unbundling dynamics 
 
 
Watson Wyatt (whose partner Wadsworth deals with annuities) stated in 2008 
(Watson Wyatt [2008]) that unit-linked (“variable”) annuities are becoming 
increasingly popular, but that several insurers have suffered major losses due 
to these as a result of inadequate hedging, despite the fact that the theory be-
hind hedging is relatively well-developed and naturally requires an extensive 
knowledge of “Greek letters”. However, hedging is not enough; there is also a 
need for adequate product design and periodic monitoring. In respect of prod-
uct design, the combination of adequate incentives (bonuses) and contra-
incentives (penalties, exclusions, limiting the availability of options, etc.) is 
necessary and the use of options and customer behaviour with respect to lapse 
must be monitored. With relation to hedging, he mentions the “basis risk”, the 
causes of which are, in his opinion: 
• Choosing inadequate hedging because there was nothing better availa-
ble, 
• The fund-manager deviated from the designated path (track), which to a 
certain extent it is allowed to do, 
• Unexpected costs (e.g. taxes). 
 
 
More enhanced/impaired 
annuity
Other guaranteed annuities are 
more costly / less profitable
Increasing proportion of 
annuities based on stocks
Increasingly weak longevity 
guarantees
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In relation to unit-linked annuities we must mention that in the Anglo-Saxon 
insurance market the expression “variable annuity” does not only mean the 
annuity itself, but also entirely standard unit-linked insurances, whose theoreti-
cal target is to convert the accumulated assets into an annuity at maturity. This 
is what the term means even if experience suggests that the majority of people 
do not convert their accumulated capital into an annuity at the end of the term, 
since it is not obligatory. This is why a number of publications with the title 
“variable annuity” do not in fact deal with actual life annuities. An example is 
Abbey-Henshall [2007], who even notes that the term is often used with re-
spect to something that is neither “variable” nor an “annuity”.45 
The otherwise vague Hungarian annuity literature deals relatively extensive-
ly, but also rather unilaterally, with the issue of indexation. The starting point 
is generally the provision of the act on private pension funds that links the 
indexing of private pension annuities to the indexing of social security pen-
sions. Michaletzky [1999] raised, but did not really answer, the question of 
what happens if the yield is not sufficient for indexation. According to the Act, 
the pension fund supervisory authority must be informed, but it is unclear what 
the supervisor is able to do. In contradiction to Michaletzky, Réti [Réti 1999] 
clearly and correctly notes that the indexation requirement stipulated by law is 
impractical in insurance technical terms and is contrary to the essence of the 
private pension system. The only indexation that can have an organic relation-
ship to the private pension system in his view is indexation according to yield, 
and no other possibility is available. This also means that pension systems 
based on different principles must have different principles for indexation. In 
this dispute, Réti mentions Stahl as a counterpart for discussion and thinks that 
the understanding of indexation sharply contradicts regulation 170/1997. Réti’s 
comments on social security are also interesting, since he is one of the few 
people who have a profound knowledge of the system in Hungary. According 
to this, the Hungarian social security pension system has followed systematic 
indexation from the beginning of the 1970s, although it was only defined in the 
Act in 1992. Réti also gives the formula of the indexation from which we learn 
(without him mentioning it) that a 0% technical interest rate is taken as grant-
ed. The formula is not provided in traditional actuarial formulae, of which he 
in fact states that classic actuarial formulae cannot be used for annuities be-
cause they assume there is no inflation. These days, annuities cannot be pro-
vided based on such an assumption.  
At the time, Stahl had not yet respond in writing to Réti’s proposals, but in  
Augusztinovics-Gál-Máté-Matits-Simonovits-Stahl [2002] he already notes in 
                                                          
45This is why I prefer the term “unit-linked annuity” to “variable annuity”. 
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respect of Swiss indexation46 regulations (page 485): “Many experts believe 
that this provision further increases the risks within the system in view of non-
foreseeable wage increases. It is also unclear how the insurance companies that 
provide these services can fend off such risks”. 
However, in 2005 he clearly turns against the regulation (Stahl [2005]), say-
ing that the basis for annuity indexation must be investment and mortality 
outcome, which may even permit a decrease of the annuity. This means his 
proposal includes no guarantee with regard to indexation and consequently 
there is no need for solvency capital, but he nevertheless proposes that private 
pension funds can have solvency capital without practically any consequences, 
including the central annuity provider he proposes here. 
Arató (Arató [2006a]), who disputes Stahl, highlights that the Hungarian 
regulations in force on indexation are far less certain than indicated by Stahl, 
because in reality the provider does not have to adjust to the Swiss index, 
which is somewhat more objective, but to the actual pension increases, which 
are highly exposed to politics and are impossible to anticipate. Therefore, he 
says (page 274): “I propose that pension funds and insurers provide two types 
of annuity: one without any kind of mandatory indexation, only recomputed on 
the basis of the available assets (which means that the annuity may even di-
minish; this version is basically identical to what János Stahl proposed – B.J.), 
and another one based on Swiss indexation. This latter would be based upon 
the actually defined rate of inflation and on the wage index. The pension guar-
antee fund should operate as a re-insurer and would determine premiums for 
the Swiss-indexed annuities while taking into account the pension fund’s other 
re-insurances and investment guarantees. Naturally, the starting level of these 
different annuities would differ significantly; the annuity without mandatory 
indexation may even be 20-30% higher”. Arató proposes two types of annuity 
so that there is no pressure on the Swiss-indexed annuity to begin with a high 
sum assured, and so theoretically providers are able to manage the Swiss index 
from the high deduction at the beginning of the term. Naturally, this annuity 
would most probably not be attractive so the other option could provide a way 
out which could practically displace the Swiss-indexed annuity from the mar-
ket. So in reality Arató proposed how the Swiss index might be formally main-
tained, possibly as a gesture towards the politicians who devised and promoted 
it. We can conclude that to all intents and purposes Stahl and Arató agree.  
Joining the debate, György Németh also agrees with such an indexation 
(Németh [2006]), with the significant difference that contrary to Stahl, he 
                                                          
46The so called “Swiss indexation”, or “Swiss index” in Hungary meant the average 
of the consumer price index and wage index. Officially, SoS pensions were indexed 
according to this during the 2000s, and the SoS indexation was the basis for the indexa-
tion in the private pension annuity. 
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thinks in terms of a central pool and not a central provider with respect to 
mortality, while the pension funds would compete with each other in the field 
of investing in reserves. So pension funds would apply varying indexation 
each year, according to the sum of their common mortality and differing in-
vestment outcomes. The problem with this proposal is that its implementation 
would probably be a lot more problematic, since due to the end-of-year mortal-
ity regrouping it retrospectively turns out that the investment yield was not 
generated for as much reserve as was necessary, so the two outcomes cannot 
be simply added up for each fund, in addition to which mortality regrouping 
would also require the regrouping of yield, which could easily make this sys-
tem non-transparent. Arató, commenting on the proposal (Arató [2006]), did 
not pick up on this (page 569), but in his view: “The author obviously does not 
know that the mortality of pension fund members may be significantly diverse 
within the pension funds. Following his proposal dangerous trends might begin 
at different funds”. It is not clear what this comment refers to, since if this 
suggests that fund members might switch between funds because of mortality 
differences, then the argument is not justified, as Németh handled that problem 
with the concept of the mortality pool. 
We may conclude that in the mid-2000s Hungarian experts generally reject-
ed the indexation regulations and instead supported the common management 
of investment outcome and mortality result via indexation. 
The existing indexation rules were also rejected by Barabás-Bodor-Erdős-
Fehér-Hamecz-Holtzer [2006], with whom Ágoston-Kovács [2007] also 
agrees. The previously mentioned authors come back to Réti’s proposal ac-
cording to which “The indexation of pensions does not necessarily have to be 
identical, as this is an element of competition for the insured individuals in the 
case of non-state systems (this also does not comply with the current rules)”. 
3. SELECTION PROBLEMS AND 
THEIR MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The premiums and reserve formulae of annuities (as for any other life insur-
ances) assume that the included probabilities are valid for the providers’ annui-
ties population. This is true in the following cases: 
• The underlying annuities population and its risk composition is con-
sistent, 
• As observations concern the past and calculations concern the future, 
the probabilities may be used subject to the condition that there are no 
trends in the observed mortality. 
 
This latter phenomenon is called longevity risk, the management and mortality 
tables of which have already been covered. In this chapter, I focus on the first 
case and how it is achievable that the risk composition of the annuitants’ port-
folio of different providers is identical to the risk composition of the observed 
portfolio. In other words; how can selection (adverse for the provider) within 
the portfolio of different providers be prevented and, should this selection 
happen, what management methods can be applied? 
3.1. Possible selection effects and their management 
The problem of adverse (anti- or auto-) selection may be split into two parts: 
1. Selection between people who buy or do not buy annuities, 
2. Selection among people who purchase annuities. 
 
Experience tells us that a very strong degree of selection has evolved in the 
voluntary annuity markets. Overall, however, very few people buy annuities 
although, typically, these people live longer than average compared to the 
overall population. This increases the annuity premium which squeezes even 
more people out of the annuity market etc. This phenomenon is a significant 
obstacle that inhibits the development of the annuities market. Managing this 
phenomenon has recently begun through differentiation according to state of 
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health (see impaired annuities). Since this study only focuses on mandatory 
annuities, a precondition is the conversion of mandatory private pension sav-
ings into annuities, and therefore I shall only look at the second type of selec-
tion. 
Adverse selection among people who purchase an annuity happens mainly 
for the following reasons:  
• Accidentally – this may happen to providers with a very small portfo-
lio, and necessarily cannot reproduce the risk structure of the entire an-
nuitant portfolio, 
• For systemic reasons – this may happen with providers that are organ-
ised in a specific way (e.g. to suit different employers or professions, 
see: “Military Pension Fund”), and we may also see this as a problem 
experienced by a closed risk community. Theoretically, this may also 
happen in open risk communities, but is based either on deceiving cli-
ents or does not last long owing to competition, 
• Via conscious selection on the part of clients – people prefer funds that 
provide choice and are more favourable towards them in an open risk 
community or when given free choice. This selection may also happen 
among providers (if the given parameter is applicable to the entire scale 
of products of a given provider), but also with annuities that have dif-
ferent parameters. Selection among products may, of course, also take 
place in the first two cases which further aggravates the situation. Se-
lection amongst products may take place along the following parame-
ters: 
o By choosing amongst annuity types. Here, of major importance 
is the choice between two parameters provided by annuity types: 
 A choice between annuities with a guaranteed period and 
without a guaranteed period, and also the form of the 
guaranteed period (occurring at the beginning or at the end 
of the annuity period). The total volume or sum of benefits 
of the annuity in the case of insured people with varying life 
expectancies is different, therefore insured people with a 
shorter life expectancy will tend to choose an annuity with a 
guaranteed period while people with lower life expectancies 
will choose an annuity without a guaranteed period, 
 A choice between annuities for a single life or for two (joint) 
lives (provided differentiation according to sex is prohibited 
in the premium). In such cases, the woman of a couple will 
choose a single life annuity, and the man of the couple 
purchases an annuity for two. It is theoretically possible, 
though less likely in practice, that the range of products 
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includes both symmetrical and asymmetrical joint life 
annuities. Selection occurs if there is a choice between these.  
o By choosing the indexation rate. The provider can influence this 
by changing the magnitude of the technical interest rate. A higher 
indexation rate (i.e. a higher initial premium and a smaller starting 
annuity) will be selected more often by people who expect a 
longer lifetime, while the reverse will be true for those with short-
er life expectancies. Here, contrary to the previously discussed se-
lection due to the guarantee period, selection is not the result of 
maximising the total benefit, but rather the benefit received dur-
ing the annuitant’s lifetime. 
o By choosing the starting time of the annuity.  There may be a 
notable selection impact if clients are given the right to start their 
annuity later rather than at the date of retirement. Additionally, 
there are significant changes in possibilities with inheritance be-
fore and after the start of the annuity. People with an expectedly 
shorter lifetime would tend to delay the start of the annuity, be-
cause if they died in the meantime, their entire accumulated pen-
sion assets would be left to their heirs. This significantly reduces 
the mortality profit of the provider. Such a selection is weakened 
by the fact that not every insured person finds inheritance im-
portant (although it is a fairly general motivation) and also that 
the start of the annuity is frequently an economic “requirement” 
for insured people. 
 
For the provider, the best method for managing adverse selection, i.e. manag-
ing things if the risk composition of the portfolio of the insured party moves 
off in an unfavourable direction from the one designed, is via differentiation. If 
every risk group pays a premium that corresponds to their own risk, the com-
position of the insured portfolio may move away from the designed portfolio 
and the premium paid would automatically cover the received benefits. The 
problem with selection, from the insurer’s point of view, is not that people 
with diversified risk find themselves in a certain risk community, and this is 
not the primary reason why they should be differentiated by risk; the issue is 
that the provider does not anticipate the composition of the risk community 
and cannot prepare for the effects of selection while regulations prohibit dif-
ferentiation in general or according to important factors such as gender. So 
selection problems may need to be managed by other methods, namely by 
reducing selection factors, or by compensating for their effects. 
Selection has three major areas which can be handled using different meth-
ods:  
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1. Affecting the entire market. From among the above methods, this 
means choosing the starting point for the annuity. This may be man-
aged in two ways: 
(1) By disallowing a delayed commencement of the annuity. This may 
cause system rigidity, which may nonetheless be eased by allowing 
an interim period (see later) right after this start-off point (although 
there exists the possibility that the inheritance will be lost upfront). 
(2) By applying a mandatory guaranteed period at the beginning. As a 
result the life annuity portion will become a deferred annuity and 
during the deferred time period the insured person can start the 
annuity whenever they wish (although there can be no further delay 
of the deferred annuity). (The OECD actively proposes this 
solution – see Antonin [2008a] and OECD [2008a]).  
2. Amongst providers: when the risk composition of the annuity portfo-
lio shows diversified movement amongst different providers (if there 
are several providers on the market). Given a selection with a small 
portfolio, choice due to there being a closed risk community and due to 
the indexation rate belongs here. In theory, it may happen that a provid-
er offers different indexation rates concurrently. It may also happen that 
a provider does not provide every type of annuity from among the ones 
permitted by regulations, so a choice that needs to be made from among 
the products offered by one provider may become a selection between 
providers. This may be dealt with by using the following methods: 
(3) Central provider. This eliminates every selection problem amongst 
providers as only a single provider remains on the market. 
Theoretically, this does not deal with the problem of a small 
portfolio, though with a central provider this can only happen when 
the system first begins to operate and for a short time thereafter. 
The problem is not handled if this central provider offers several 
types of indexation concurrently.  
(4) Making all providers “closed” during the period of asset 
accumulation and prohibiting all voluntary movement between 
them (that is, non-voluntary movement; while movement linked to 
some other factors is permitted47). In parallel with this, every 
provider must calculate an annuity premium relating to their own 
mortality conditions. The existing Hungarian system stipulates that 
every provider set an annuity calculated in line with its own 
                                                          
47E.g. if there are only sectoral funds, people working in a certain sector of industry 
must join; and if someone changes jobs and their branch of industry, the person also 
changes provider, though changing insurers is not the reason for the change but rather 
the consequence. 
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mortality conditions while the regulation leaves all funds open in 
the meantime. In effect this is both ill-considered and inconsistent 
and good practice cannot be built upon this foundation. 
(5) Risk equalisation (premium equalisation), unifying the portfolio 
and creating a pool among providers. This may be voluntary or 
mandatory but in certain situations (e.g. in the special case of 
Hungary with providers that do not have their own capital) the 
regulator should choose the mandatory pool.  
3. Within the same provider: selection due to having a choice among 
different optional annuity products. This may be managed using the fol-
lowing methods: 
(6) Restriction of the product range, eliminating the practical 
possibilities of choice (e.g. only a single life annuity without a 
guaranteed period, or a single life annuity with a guaranteed period 
at the beginning, may be chosen). 
(7) Retaining the product range, though the choice is removed: 
different segments of the risk community are assigned to defined 
annuity products (“segmentation of the risk community”). E.g. 
there are both single life annuities and annuities for two persons, 
but the first one is purchased only by single people, and the second 
only by couples. 
(8) Directed selection, where the different annuity products are 
calculated according to a mortality table that reflects the risks 
inherent amongst those who opt for a given product. As I show 
below, this is an illusory option that cannot be implemented in 
practice. 
To conclude, the following solutions exist as regards selection problems:  
1. Joint management of the risk of the entire insured portfolio by a: 
a) central provider 
b) pool 
2. Restricting the possibilities of choice through: 
a) disallowing delayed commencement 
b) several types of annuities based on a clear segmentation of the 
risk community 
c) restricting the possibility of changing providers in the asset 
accumulation phase (making the providers closed) 
3. Restricting the product range, implementation of a single type of 
annuity (e.g. a single life annuity with a guaranteed period at the 
beginning), or 
4. Directed selection (which is an illusory solution) 
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These solutions, or at least some of them, must be selected and jointly imple-
mented in certain combinations. 
A more detailed discussion of the different solutions is presented below. 
3.2. Managing different risks together 
3.2.1. CENTRAL PROVIDER 
There may be different ideas relating to a central provider with functions that 
do not deal with selection effects but rather with other systemic problems.48 
Naturally, it cannot manage every type of selection issue (e.g. it cannot man-
age problems relating to choosing amongst different products or choosing the 
annuity’s starting point). Central providers manage selection risk by not allow-
ing the risk community to choose between different providers, so that both 
good and bad risks present themselves at the same provider.  
Theoretically, the central provider may be equally established and owned by 
the state or have a private owner assigned by the state. However, the monopo-
listic position in the case of a single, central, privately-owned (and therefore 
for-profit) organisation would be difficult to justify so in reality only a state-
owned provider could be considered here.  
At the same time, one can envisage a central system but with a number of 
providers handling all selection issues. These providers may be for-profit pri-
vately owned companies. Providers would have a monopolistic position not in 
respect of the total portfolio but only from the perspective of having a certain 
stake within the portfolio of insured people, e.g. people buying an annuity in 
one particular year, and this would solve the problem of selection.  
An opportunity for its realisation is that the government invites tenders for a 
central provider for a given year. The selected provider would furnish every-
one with an annuity (naturally based on mortality projections included in the 
given groups, and via this would deal with demographic upturns and down-
turns, e.g. a baby-boom period). This right would be assigned to a provider in 
respect of every insured person who retires in a given year, until the death of 
such people. In follow-up years other providers would receive the same as-
signment. (Possibly a restriction could be made, i.e. one provider could apply 
for this tender only at certain times thus avoiding the development of a mo-
nopoly situation). Using this approach, the composition of a portfolio in the 
                                                          
48 Only as an example: this may be the “final provider” should nobody be providing 
annuities on the market, e.g. as a result of rigid regulations, and a provider to whom the 
savings of “disappeared members” could be transferred, etc. 
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hands of a provider would reflect the market average in addition to being ho-
mogeneous (since everybody retired in the same year).  
This is another example where it is not the entire portfolio of annuities that 
make up a risk community, yet the majority of selection problems are elimi-
nated. This is one advantage of this possibility. The disadvantage is that people 
retiring in a particular year may find themselves in a worse situation compared 
to others if they end up with an underperforming provider. An additional dis-
advantage is that this can pave the way for corruption, for example by collabo-
ration among providers if they conspire among themselves with regard to “who 
will win” and when. A defence against this would be the strengthening of the 
Competition Office and an enhancement of competition by allowing providers 
from outside the country (although from within the EU) to apply for the tender. 
Beyond the above facts, in respect to the central provider it is conceivable that 
centralisation might be implemented, not as regards the entire annuity system, 
but only in relation to certain elements of it e.g. annuity payments, management 
of mortality risk (where a central pool would be established), etc. In this case, the 
function of centralisation will not necessarily be the management of selection 
effects (with the exception of the central pool) but would have some other, im-
portant aim such as cost saving, convenience for clients, etc. 
3.2.2. PORTFOLIO UNIFICATION (POOL) AND PREMIUM  
EQUALISATION AMONGST PROVIDERS 
Portfolio unification may be voluntary and therefore (usually) partial; this need 
not concern every provider although it may happen on a voluntary basis that 
the market unifies the portfolio. It may also be mandatory and cover the entire 
market (although theoretically it can also be partial, and only some groups in 
the market may be forced to unify the portfolio, although this would require 
very specific reasons). 
In the case of voluntary portfolio unification, risk equalisation may include 
the joint management of investment and mortality risks, yet in this situation it 
is not worth maintaining separate organisations and instead of unifying the 
portfolio it becomes more reasonable to merge the organisations. 
However, mandatory portfolio unification – basically for these reasons – 
may only include the management of mortality risk because if investment risk 
is jointly managed as well, then we are already speaking about a central pro-
vider. From another point of view, this means that a mandatory pool may be 
considered in relation to investment and indexation strategy where risk is in-
herent in the investment. Namely, if investment in bonds that are indexed to 
inflation is mandatory (as in Chile), if need arises a central provider is more 
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reasonable than a mandatory pool, as in this case the “competing” providers 
can only compete with each other with respect to cost, and this will probably 
be a priori lower with a central provider due to the scaled return than via dif-
ferent organisations within a system composed of small organisations. 
In summary, with respect to mandatory annuities mandatory portfolio unifi-
cation may only cover mortality risk and it is worth implementing with a clas-
sical yield-return investment and indexation strategy – otherwise it basically 
points to the central provider solution. 
Portfolio unification refers to joint management of the mortality risk which 
can happen in different ways. In its minimal form, it means only the (mortali-
ty) profit and loss equalisation generated at the provider when concluding 
annuity insurance; in its maximal form it means a continuous distribution and 
equalisation of the profit and loss generated during the entire period of opera-
tion. 
So the minimal form is a premium equalisation mechanism designed to 
equalise the initial profit and loss generated at different providers that occurs 
as a result of prohibiting differentiation, i.e. the compulsory use of the unisex 
premium table,49 since it is almost certain that the gender composition of new 
contracts will differ depending on the provider within a given period, e.g. one 
year. With respect to equalisation, it is also conceivable that one might take 
other factors such as level of education into consideration. Equalisation will 
give a correct result if the otherwise projected unisex mortality table is correct. 
As there is a need for a uniform scale for equalisation, with this mechanism it 
is necessary that the market has available a centrally prepared, unisex, project-
ed mortality table. Premium equalisation may technically happen such that the 
different providers transfer the surplus of the actually collected premium (ac-
cording to the unisex premium table) and the premium necessary for reserves 
according to the differentiated mortality table, and the deficit thus generated 
will be received from this organisation. This also means that, with this mecha-
nism, the differentiated mortality tables necessary for reserving must also be 
unified for the whole market, so these must be centrally defined and imple-
mented by mandate. 
One problem with relation to premium equalisation is that profit and loss 
generated by different providers within a specific period of time do not neces-
                                                          
49In the EU, differentiation according to gender is prohibited, and this is probably al-
so the case in many countries outside the European Union. In this respect, my message 
is restricted to those countries where such a prohibition is in force. With a lack of such 
a prohibition, selection problems can be solved by the oldest and probably the best 
insurance technique: differentiation of the insured according to the risk involved. An 
example of this solution is Chile, where these problems arise infrequently, and their 
method of operation cannot be adapted well to Europe. 
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sarily offset each other, as it is not certain that insured people with favourable 
and unfavourable characteristics from the insurer’s point of view will take out 
annuity insurance at the same rate and at all points of time throughout the 
market. If central mortality projections are correct, the balance of profit and 
loss will be zero in the long term, but it may not be so in the short term. This 
would cause a problem in practice if there is a deficit at the central organisa-
tion in charge of premium equalisation (i.e. initial mortality losses generated 
for the entire market, in other words more people with less favourable condi-
tions from the insurer’s point of view conclude annuity contracts at a certain 
point in time). Such a transitory deficit may theoretically be covered by the 
state by repaying it from transitory surpluses. This may force the state to pre-
pare mortality projections in a suitable manner. However, a problem occurs if 
a deficit or surplus is systematically generated in the central organisation and a 
clear problem in connection with the surplus is that insured people may be 
deprived of it in a questionable manner. 
In its minimal form, providers carry the burden of mortality losses that 
emerge later, or they transfer this (or a part of it) to clients in the form of in-
dexation. It is only logical to distinguish between initial and later mortality 
losses if the latter can be transferred to the client via indexation (which as-
sumes a return-refund indexation technique). Otherwise one might note that if 
a pool is operated, it may be done in a maximal rather than minimal form. 
In practice, the maximal form includes the above-mentioned minimal form 
as the mortality loss of the first year may be largely due to risk composition at 
the time of concluding the contract. In order to be able to continually redistrib-
ute mortality losses and gains amongst providers, reliable and uniform evalua-
tions are required. As with the premium blending mechanism, this requires 
centrally-designed standardised reserving rules and differentiated mortality 
tables along with a centrally and uniformly defined technical interest rate.  
Based on these reserving rules, different providers will define the mortality 
profit and loss in each financial year and will summarise them in total at the 
market level. If the balance is positive or at least breaks even, then they will 
define the magnitude of the uniform mortality profit using a kind of baseline, 
e.g. according to required reserving, and where there is a surplus this will be 
transferred to where there is a deficit. If the balance is negative, clearly the 
surplus is not enough to cover it. Then the deficit would be distributed against 
the return (or if the given year was also bad with regard to return, then against 
the reserve, i.e. the benefit size of the annuity) or against the solvency capital 
function against whoever will cover the final loss (i.e. the insured person or the 
provider). Clearly, this will relate to the ownership and capital conditions of 
the provider. If the insured persons themselves are the owners and the provider 
and thus have no own capital, the loss shall be accounted for by the yield and if 
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there is an actual owner, meaning there is solvency capital, then the loss may 
be accounted for via this, while amounts may be regrouped from where the 
loss is below the market level (including the profit) to where losses exceed it. 
It is worth mentioning that if a central organisation is set up on the market 
for management of the pool, this would most likely imply centralisation of 
other elements of annuity provision if this also allows for cost saving. Eventu-
ally, only the investment will remain with the separate providers, and they will 
compete over the yield if the indexation rules permit this. This is exactly the 
same system as used by the Swedish private pension system. 
3.3. Narrowing down choice options 
3.3.1. PROHIBITING LATER COMMENCEMENT 
A possible later start for payment of a private pension annuity will lead to 
adverse selection if the inheritance regulations are different before and after 
the start of paying for a private pension. This was the situation under the earli-
er Hungarian private pension law when before starting the payment of the 
annuity a beneficiary could be assigned for the entire pension capital, although 
after starting annuity payment heirs did not receive anything (with the excep-
tion of guaranteed period benefit and joint annuities). 
This problem can be handled in three ways: 
1. An annuity with a mandatory front-end guaranteed period or an equiva-
lent regular withdrawal plus deferred annuity facility where the de-
ferred annuity must be bought at the time of retirement, 
2. Changing inheritance regulations so that only the spouse inherits 
his/her pension account and it is obligatory for married couples to buy a 
joint, two-person annuity with the other insured person being the 
spouse. This solution does not deal with selection by single people, alt-
hough the motive of inheritance probably plays a less important role in 
their case, 
3. Prohibition of the deferred commencement of payments. 
 
The latter has another version, one that grants that if the insured person does 
not need the annuity at the beginning of his/her retirement period, they may 
further accumulate money so that later on the annuity will be higher without 
there being a problem of adverse selection. This may be achieved by suspen-
sion of the annuity (including immediately after beginning payments). 
A suspended annuity behaves like an annuity even during the period of sus-
pension, so that in the case of death of the insured party there is no more pay-
ment (without transferring capital to the heirs). Although the due annuity units 
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are not paid, these “flow back” to the annuity provision of the insured by in-
creasing the sum and, through this, continually increasing the annuity due to 
the insured. This is exactly why suspension is also in the interests of the in-
sured person because the longer the period of suspension, the higher the annui-
ty at a later age. 
3.3.2. SEGMENTING THE RISK COMMUNITY 
Adverse selection owing to choice among products can also be managed with-
out radically diminishing the product range if it is compulsory to segment the 
risk community according to products. Adequate justification is necessarily 
needed for such segmentation and I have identified only one such segmenta-
tion possibility: if married couples are obliged to buy a joint annuity and sin-
gles are obliged to buy a one-owner annuity. As a two-owner annuity for cou-
ples is a “natural unisex situation”, this solution would generally diminish the 
risk-related uncertainty of mandatory unisex annuities, though this makes it 
questionable whether single people should be required to purchase a unisex 
annuity.50 (The issue in Europe has been settled, at least for the time being, 
although major question marks remain.) 
For this solution, joint annuities must naturally be standardised. One of the 
possibilities is a symmetrical joint annuity, where one of the insured receives 
70% of the starting annuity if the other member of the couple dies. The other 
insured person is strictly and always a married spouse. Different joint annuities 
may naturally be conceived of as well, but only one kind should be available 
on the market, otherwise adverse selection due to choice among products will 
appear.  
Generally, members of a couple do not retire at the same time, though when 
one of them retires, then a standard joint annuity must be determined for 
him/her based on the accumulated annuity capital, and when the other member 
of the couple retires the same kind of annuity must be defined for him/her as 
well. The advantage of this way of operating is that it would solve the survival 
(widow/widower) annuity problem as well because after the death of one 
member of the couple, the other would get x% of the commonly-held annuity.   
                                                          
50In the end, the most important argument behind a unisex annuity is the characteris-
tics of the division of labour within the family (i.e. women remain at home with their 
children and therefore receive fewer pension entitlements) and women suffer disad-
vantages as a result. These disadvantages are compensated for by the pension-capital 
transfer from men to women via a unisex annuity. This kind of compensation isn’t 
justified in the case of single women, however. 
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Naturally, further detailed rules are needed for the operability of a system that 
would handle the following cases: 
• What happens if the retired spouse dies before the other retires? 
• What happens if the joint annuity payment has started and the couple 
later divorce? 
• What happens if a single person, whose one-owner annuity payment 
has already begun, should marry? 
 
There are ways to engage these issues and possible regulatory options, so in 
the order above: 
• The widow simply receives x% of the annuity of the deceased insured 
spouse, but the payment may be held back (i.e. it is suspended accord-
ing to another rule) until the survivor retires. In such a case, the survi-
vor receives a single person’s annuity via his/her own capital unless 
he/she marries again. If the widow dies before retiring, the suspended 
annuity will cease to exist without it being paid. 
• The annuity is divided into two annuities for single persons (further 
elaboration is needed to define the proportions in line with one of the 
possibilities so that persons receive an equal annuity). If one of the 
partners has not yet retired, the annuity payment is suspended in rela-
tion to him/her. 
• The annuity is converted into a joint annuity. 
 
The distinguishing and standardisation of annuities is possible if reserving, the 
mortality tables used for reserving and the technical interest rate are all stand-
ardised, so this solution assumes this to be the case.  
The above regulation does not fit logically with a regulation where the ben-
eficiary can be freely assigned in the accumulation phase (see e.g. the Hungar-
ian private pension regulations). Logically, it fits a regulation where the heir is 
the spouse in the accumulation phase and the pension assets of the deceased 
will be credited to the survivor’s pension account as an inheritance. 
An amendment of the regulations on the accumulation phase would also be 
reasonable in order to harmonise it with the above-suggested rules in the annu-
itant phase so that in the case of divorce, the portion of the balance of the de-
nominated accounts generated by the couple during the period of the marriage 
will be halved. 
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3.3.3. REDUCING CHOICE AMONGST PROVIDERS 
The issue of the development of closed funds (and more generally private 
pension providers) must be looked at differently when a private pension sys-
tem is being designed and within the conditions of an existing private pension 
system.  
The regulator may à priori decide to establish closed funds e.g. on a tech-
nical or industrial sector basis. Here, stable risk communities will be created 
where the annuity calculation may be based on one’s own mortality experienc-
es and there is no adverse selection (or at most if members are allowed to 
choose between different types of annuity).  
Yet if a fund system has already been launched on a market where practical-
ly all funds are open and everybody may enter and leave funds as they please, 
although the regulator might still leave providers to develop the mortality table 
(as the Hungarian regulator did51), the possibility for fund-choice must be di-
minished á posteriori so that the system approaches the closed funds model. 
Overall, the goal is that payment of the annuity should begin in a stable risk 
community with a computable risk. This does not require the prohibition of 
every kind of choice with respect to the insured and providers. The risk com-
munity would be stable even if this prohibition would arise sometime before 
someone’s retirement. Let us say that insured people may move freely among 
funds until the age of 50, but thereafter they may not switch funds and will 
receive their annuity from this fund (or from the insurer that has contractual 
relations with it) until the end of their life (and thus they also cannot change 
providers during their annuitant period). Thus enables the provider to calculate 
the annuity for a risk community with a stable composition; so it might, for 
example, happen that an insurer is connected to different funds with diverse 
risk compositions and provides an annuity for all of them, but charges different 
premiums in the case of each fund.  
However, we must consider whether it is worth taking a step backwards 
from a model based on free movement between providers in order to solve 
selection problems, or whether it is perhaps more expedient to choose one of 
the other methods discussed here to manage the problem. 
 
                                                          
51In Hungary, this situation was probably not generated intentionally. It seems that 
in Hungary the funds are regulated exclusively based on the characteristics of the ac-
cumulation phase, and rules for the annuity phase are superficial, or its characteristics 
were not taken into account. During the asset accumulation phase no selection problem 
is caused by clients having a free choice between funds. 
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3.4. Narrowing down the product range 
It is obvious that the possibility of choosing between different products may 
lead to adverse selection. In the following, I examine the mechanism of this 
adverse selection and what losses it can incur to the provider. The examination 
will be done via a choice permitted by existing Hungarian regulations amongst 
immediately commencing annuities for single persons; thus I assume that the 
insured may choose among three annuities: 
1. simple (i.e. without a guaranteed period ) 
2. front-end guaranteed period 
3. back-end guaranteed period 
3.4.1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
The need to discuss this problem arose as a result of the Hungarian private 
pension regulations, so I will first provide a short overview of this.  
According to the provisions in force pursuant to the Private Pensions Act, the 
annuity may be a: 
• classic life annuity 
• annuity with front-end guaranteed period   
• annuity with back-end guaranteed period  
• joint annuity with two or more lives  
 
Regarding parameters, the situation is: 
• The law does not stipulate the length of the guaranteed period so, in 
theory, it could be of any length and the client may choose from any 
available value. 
• A joint annuity with two or more lives is ill-defined. The law does 
not stipulate whether the retirement age, and thus entitlement to a pen-
sion, needs be reached in order receive a payout. Theoretically, a pen-
sion may be paid out without an individual being entitled to a pension, 
e.g. if the annuitant is younger than the retirement age. Also, the law 
does not state what happens to the annuity following the death of one of 
the annuitants (e.g. is a joint annuity possible where payouts stop after 
the death of one of the annuitants?). The Act does not separately refer 
to possibilities for the guaranteed period. Also, one cannot know 
whether or not there is a restriction on the number of annuitants. 
• Although the Private Pensions Act does not specify the frequency of 
the annuity (weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc.), it may be assumed that it 
should adjust to the frequency of the annuity from the first Pillar, i.e. it 
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must occur on a monthly basis. The question still remains: should it be 
12, 13 or perhaps more “months”?52 Given a lack of stipulations, we 
must assume that any solution is possible. 
 
Below, I shall show that a choice amongst products in the above manner with-
out pre-determined restrictions leads to severe adverse selection, something 
that one would wish to avoid, so choice options need to be reasonably restrict-
ed or narrowed down. 
I first look at the logic of adverse selection as a consequence of choice be-
tween products. When examining the criteria people look at when choosing 
an annuity, two extremely objective “targets” are imaginable, namely that in 
comparison to the payable premium, the client maximises  
1. the payout received during his/her lifetime, 
2. all benefits (irrespective of whether they are received during his/her 
lifetime). 
 
The reason for the latter may be the rational consideration that the client wants 
to leave a portion of their capital as an inheritance, i.e. they would like to look 
after someone such as the surviving partner or there might be the irrational but 
existing fear that “when I die, the insurer will pocket my money”. Yet a com-
bination of these extremes is also possible, i.e. if someone maximises the bene-
fit received during their lifetime but also wishes to look after survivors to a 
certain extent. However, the guaranteed period is not the best form of caring 
for survivors (as at the time of drawing up the contract, one cannot know from 
when they may need to be looked after, so a “solution” within these extremes 
is likely to be very restricted, and accordingly it is reasonable to focus on the 
most objective targets). 
The more people adhere to this objective target of maximising all benefits, 
the larger the selection problem will be. There is no selection problem whatso-
ever if everyone seeks to maximise the benefit received during their lifetime 
as, in this case, everyone will obtain a simple annuity and nobody would see it 
as worthwhile to pay for a guaranteed period to leave an annuity for someone 
after their death. The transitory option – i.e. somewhere between the two – 
clearly mitigates the problems arising because of this with the provider (which 
are bigger if everyone maximises things according to extreme assumptions 
made). In the computation I shall thus use this supposition, which also means 
that my results will give the worst possible results from the insurer’s point of 
view. 
                                                          
52In Hungary, during the 2000s pensioners received 13 months of annuity for some 
years. In 2006, during the election campaign, one party even promised pensioners a 
14th month pension. The 13-month annuity was abolished in 2009. 
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Different types of annuity are worth looking at by themselves from the per-
spective of “potential” adverse selection. If we take a simple annuity as the 
basic case, we can say that the difference in mortality profit and loss between 
the best and the worst (from an annuity point of view) groups of insured per-
sons (with the shortest and longest life expectancies) is lower in all the other 
annuity types than in this basic case. Namely: 
• A life annuity with a front-end guaranteed period is the sum of an annu-
ity certain and a deferred annuity. Within the premium, the mortality 
selection affects only the deferred annuity part, and its weight is smaller 
with respect to the identical monthly annuity than in the case of imme-
diate annuities. 
• An annuity with a back-end guaranteed period is the sum of an imme-
diate lifelong annuity and a whole life insurance. The annuity and the 
whole life insurance behave contradictorily from a risk point of view so 
the effect of selection is mitigated by the fact that they are present in 
one contract. 
 
However, this also means that the risk composition of the insured portfolio is 
most important in the case of a simple annuity, and the longer the guaranteed 
period, the more its significance decreases (although it does not cease to exist), 
i.e. the smaller the magnitude of potential loss due to an unfavourable portfolio 
composition. In other words, it would be most beneficial to the provider if 
everyone were obliged to buy an annuity with a relatively long guaranteed 
period.  
The question from the point of view of adverse selection due to choice is 
which group of insured persons should buy which type of annuity if the objec-
tive target of clients is to maximise all the benefits compared to the premium 
paid. In general, we may state the following: 
• The more certain somebody is of not having a long life (e.g. because he 
is a man and also has an illness), the more worthwhile it is for them to 
purchase a guaranteed period annuity, and the less worthwhile it is to 
purchase a single life non-guaranteed period annuity, as the guaranteed 
period would certainly increase the received benefit, meaning it would 
be an effective guarantee in their case. 
• Those who expect to lead a long life (e.g. healthy women) will not see 
paying the guaranteed period surcharge as being worthwhile; they are 
better off choosing a single life non-guaranteed period annuity as they 
will receive the front-end guaranteed period benefit without requiring 
the guaranteed period, and in addition they will receive a bigger benefit 
than the expected value for the entire risk community. 
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These are only my preliminary ideas in the context of this topic, which will be 
further elaborated on after the analysis below, during which I rely on the fol-
lowing purely technical assumptions to support my calculations, which do not 
influence the essence of my findings: 
• the annuity is annual and annuity-due, 
• g, i.e. the guaranteed period, is a whole number,53 
• g is the same in relation to both front-end and back-end annuities. 
 
The following assumptions do affect the substance of the investigation and are 
very “strong” assumptions that one would do well to partially resolve or miti-
gate in a later investigation: 
• First of all, I assume that the client is precisely aware of his/her remain-
ing lifetime (denoted with “h”). This assumption is necessary to a cer-
tain extent as the essence and the cause of adverse selection is that the 
client possesses certain information about his/her expected lifetime that 
the provider does not have (and even if the provider would possess that 
information, it could not take it into account). The assumption is an ex-
aggeration, but it also shows us what the least favourable situation is 
from the provider’s perspective. So, with this assumption, the number 
received for the impact of adverse selection may be regarded as the 
maximum loss to the provider. 
• Similarly, the worst case scenario for the provider is if every single cli-
ent maximises all of the benefits (“B”) compared to the premium paid 
(“P”), so they maximise the 
J
K quotient. The opposite assumption 
whereby a client would prefer the maximum benefit to premium quo-
tient during their lifetime need not be investigated, as the result has lit-
tle impact. It is easy to admit that, in this instance, everyone will pur-
chase a simple annuity as it is not worth paying for the guaranteed peri-
od, which is worth nothing to the client.  Every other assumption 
between these extremes may only be more complex and more subjec-
tive and also increases the complexity of the analysis, so I will not deal 
with them here (although it is an issue that is worthy of later investiga-
tion).  
 
                                                          
53The value of g is obviously either at least 0 (if it is irrelevant whether there is a 
guaranteed period or not) or at least 1 (if we compare guaranteed period annuities, we 
must assume that there is a guaranteed period), or 2 (if we are speaking about front-end 
guaranteed period annuities that guarantee something, because a “simple” primary 
annuity is nothing other than a g=1 year front-end guaranteed period annuity. 
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In what follows, I make no assumption for the technical interest rate other than 
it being at least 0%. 
It is worth taking into account the possible magnitude of all the received 
benefits (i.e. B). This obviously depends on the type of annuity, the length of 
the guaranteed period (g) and the remaining lifetime of the client (h). As 
above, I have assumed annual annuities, so B “jumps” at the integer values of 
h, while the value of h is obviously continuous. Therefore the integral part of 
h, [h], plays an important role in the formulae. As the annuity payments take 
place at different times, the time-value of B must be taken into account for 
computation, so the different payments must be reduced to a kind of common 
denominator. In principle, different interest rates should be considered for 
discounting, but I shall assume it is only worth discounting with the use of a 
technical interest rate. Should we do something else, the result would be very 
subjective and we might come to almost any conclusion from the calculations. 
So the possible values of B as a function of the relevant parameters are: 
 
• For a (“simple”) primary annuity without a guaranteed period:  
B = 1 + v + v; +⋯+ vMNO = 1 − vMNO51 − v = äMNO5| 
• For an annuity of with a g-year front-end guaranteed period:  
if 	h < g: 	
	B = 1 + v + v; +⋯+ v$= = 1 − v$1 − v = ä$|  
if 	h ≥ g:  
B = 1 + v + v; +⋯+ vMNO = -TMUOVW-T = äMNO5| 
• For an annuity with a g-year back-end guaranteed period:  
B = 1 + v + v; +⋯+ vMNO + vMNO5 + vMNO5$ = 1 − vMNO55$1 − v = äMNO55$|= ä$| + v$ ∙ äMNO5| 
Below, I answer the following questions using the above assumptions: 
1. Which type of annuity does the insured individual choose (from among 
these three)? 
2. If the insured individual chooses a guaranteed period annuity, which of 
the possible guaranteed periods will they choose? 
3. What is the rate of adverse selection at the insurer as a result of these 
choices? 
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Answers are given partly by an abstract analysis of annuity formulae (details 
of which are not presented in this book) and partly by calculations with which 
I am able to control answers given to the third question only by calculation, 
although the theoretical answers given to the first two questions are also con-
trolled by these calculations. In addition to the above, and in a separate section, 
I investigate the question of whether adverse selection due to choice may be 
eliminated by increasing the premium (or via the use of a selection table that 
primarily considers the mortality of those choosing a given annuity, which is 
the same thing).  
In both cases the investigation has two steps – first for cases with a net pre-
mium, after which I generalise the results for gross premiums. At the begin-
ning of the investigation I note general considerations concerning the cost 
portion of the gross premium and also regarding loading, i.e. the relative value 
in respect of the net premium, meaning I shall make an effort to determine the 
broad values between which they should lie. 
3.4.2. WHICH ANNUITY DO THE INSURED CHOOSE? EXAMINING SELECTION EFFECTS 
3.4.2.1. General considerations – loading thresholds in gross premium cases 
In advance, and very generally, the following can be said about loading: 
• In the case of different annuities, the relative value of the 
J
K ratio does 
not change if the loadings are the same, that is if  λX = λY = λN,54 then 
the rule of selection among different annuities will be identical in the 
case of both gross and net premiums. 
• Since the client receives the most benefits from a back-end guaranteed 
period, then from a front-end guaranteed period and finally from a sim-
ple annuity (provided that g is identical for both guaranteed period an-
nuities and is not 0 or 1), the following inequality must be true with re-
spect to the gross premium:  
!ä | +  ∙ ä" ∙ 1 + Z[ > !ä | + ä | " ∙ 1 + Z\ > ä ∙ 1 + Z] 
Of this latter inequality, certain thresholds are added on top of the possible 
magnitude of loadings of different annuities; though the problem of thresholds 
may be raised more generally, and issues relating to different types of thresh-
                                                          
54Loadings for different annuity types: λX for a simple annuity, λY for an annuity 
with a front-end guaranteed period and  λN for an annuity with a back-end guaranteed 
period. 
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old arise in the case of gross premium (contrasting with the problem of the net 
premium). This problem does not manifest itself in connection with the net 
premium and the only question to be answered is which of the two or three 
annuities are worth getting if one knows one’s remaining lifetime and it is 
taken for granted that a person is interested in maximising all the benefits 
received from the provider. If we assume that everyone knows how long they 
will live, the question of choice only makes sense if we presume that clients 
are being obliged to purchase an annuity from the money they have accumu-
lated for that purpose. Should this not be the case, a reasonable solution for 
many would be to not buy an annuity at all but to budget for their remaining 
lifetime. However, if we disregard the assumption that there exist “all know-
ing” annuitants, then in the case of net premium the idea that one of the annui-
ties is not worth getting (in general, or in comparison with other options) does 
not arise, not only because buying an annuity is mandatory, but also because 
the annuity calculation is “fair”, i.e. it is based on an equation between the 
premium and the expected value of the benefit. 
This is not the case with the gross premium, where three further questions 
may be raised with respect to the absolute and relative magnitudes of the cost 
(loading) portion of annuities, this being in addition to the above-discussed 
problems related to the net premium: 
I. Is it worthwhile for anyone to buy one of the annuities i.e. does it 
have an excessively large loading (apart from the fact of whether or 
not it is mandatory to buy some form of annuity)? 
II. Is it worth purchasing the given annuity type in comparison to the 
other annuity types, i.e. does it have excessive loading compared to 
others? 
III. From what loading value is it worth purchasing one annuity compared 
to another for a client with a given length of lifetime remaining? 
 
In the first two cases, the investigation concerns the “final” limits, i.e. is there 
anybody at all existing among eventual clients with a different remaining life-
time (who were the same age at point of entry) for whom it is worth buying 
one given type of annuity? In the third case, the question is more specific, 
therefore the threshold of type III must be within the thresholds of type II, and 
type II within that of type I. Below, I investigate the size of threshold types I 
and II, and will later use this for delineating the thresholds for type III.  
These three issues have been raised because of the need to include loading 
in the investigation – and its magnitude obviously has rational limits; the ques-
tion is where these limits are. 
If we first examine type I thresholds and the definition of the threshold up to 
which premium limit it is worth purchasing an annuity, we can see that the 
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criteria for defining such a threshold in this case is not completely obvious. 
Nevertheless, it may be logical to say that if the maximum possible benefit 
from an annuity is smaller than its premium, it is not worth obtaining. Alt-
hough if it is mandatory to buy an annuity, the issue is not whether or not it is 
worth buying a specific annuity, but it is still a good idea to be aware of the 
theoretical upper price limit.  
The possible maximum benefit of the annuity is not self-evident as its value 
depends on how long the annuitant with the longest life is going to live. Natu-
rally, nobody can say, so we can only define a theoretical value. Thus, in order 
to calculate the maximum possible benefit, the (statistically relevant) maxi-
mum possible age must first be decided and also by what discount coefficient 
we shall reduce the annuity units to a common denominator. In my view, the 
logical answer to both questions is “the coefficient that was taken into account 
in the calculation”. So the maximum age for the mortality table should also be 
the highest age here, though we do know that there is a (small) chance of 
someone having a higher actual age than this as we do not really know what 
the “biologically possible” maximum age is. For discounting, it is reasonable 
to take into account the technical interest rate used in the calculation as a client 
would also be able to achieve that if they were managing their own assets and 
didn’t purchase an annuity.  
From this, the following inequalities may be established, and from these we 
may determine the threshold of type I: 
• The possible maximum benefit of a back-end guaranteed period 
annuity: 
1 +  + ; +⋯+ >= + >=5 +⋯+ >=5 = 1 − >=55 1 − = ä>=55 | 
so for the gross premium it must be true that: 
ä>=55 | > !ä | +  ∙ ä" ∙ 1 + Z[ 
and via this the rule applicable for the loading maximum is: 
ä>=55 |ä | +  ∙ ä > 1 + Z[ 
• The possible maximum benefit for a front-end guaranteed period 
annuity (assuming ω-x>g, without which we would not, in effect, be 
referring to a life annuity but an annuity certain) is ä^-5_; it must 
hold true for the gross premium that: 
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ä>=5| > !ä | + ä | " ∙ 1 + Z\ 
From this, the rule applicable for maximising the loading is: 
ä>=5|ä | + ä |  > 1 + Z\  
• The possible maximum benefit from the simple annuity is the same as 
that of the front-end guaranteed period, so for the gross premium it 
must be true that:  
ä>=5| > ä ∙ 1 + Z] 
And via this we have a rule applicable for the maximum loading:  
ä>=5|ä > 1 + Z] 
In answering question II, the observation made at the beginning of this section 
gives us some support. According to this, there is a strict hierarchy of benefit 
among three different single annuities (if we assume that g is the same for two 
guaranteed period annuities and is at least 2); the most is provided by a back-
end guaranteed period annuity, the next highest by a front-end guaranteed 
period annuity, and the least of all is provided by a simple annuity. So the 
following inequality must exist with respect to gross premiums:  
!ä$| + v$ ∙ ä" ∙ !1 + λN" > !ä$| + ä$| " ∙ 1 + λY > ä ∙ 1 + λX 
In other words: if these inequalities do not exist it is not worth the client buy-
ing certain types of annuity so the loading of a simple annuity compared to the 
loading of the front-end guaranteed period annuity cannot exceed a certain 
level, otherwise only the front-end guaranteed period annuity is worth purchas-
ing; and this situation is the same with respect to simple and back-end guaran-
teed period annuities.  
Further progress as regards the question can be made by exploring the bene-
fit hierarchy amongst annuities: 
• From two annuities, the one with a higher benefit will be bought by the 
client if its gross premium is not obviously higher than the gross pre-
mium of an annuity with a lower level benefit, i.e. if the loading is too 
small compared to the loading of the other annuity. 
• However, nobody will purchase the higher-benefit annuity if the gross 
premium is much higher than the provided excess benefit, i.e. if the 
loading is too high.  
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The above inequalities assist in determining a loading that is “too small”. Let 
us look at these relative lower limits; if any of the previous three inequalities 
are not satisfied, we may be certain of the result. 
• if !ä$| + ä$| " ∙ 1 + λY ≤ ä ∙ 1 + λX, and in fact even if !ä$| + v$ ∙ä" ∙ !1 + λN" ≤ ä ∙ 1 + λX, then nobody will purchase a simple an-
nuity  
• if !ä$| + v$ ∙ ä" ∙ !1 + λN" ≤ !ä$| + ä$| " ∙ 1 + λY, then everyone 
will purchase a back-end guaranteed period annuity instead of a front-
end guaranteed period annuity. 
Therefore I assume that:  
!ä$| + v$ ∙ ä" ∙ !1 + λN" > !ä$| + ä$| " ∙ 1 + λY > ä ∙ 1 + λX 
will be true, which may also be stated in these alternate forms:  
1 + λY1 + λX > ää$| + ä$|  
and 
ä$| + v$ ∙ ää$| + ä$|  >
1 + λY1 + λN 
or differently,  
1 + λN1 + λY >
ä$| + ä$| ä$| + v$ ∙ ä 
It is naturally true that  
1 + λN1 + λX > ää$| + v$ ∙ ä 
but this is already a consequence of the previous two. 
Further considerations are required for an exploration of “too large” loadings. 
It is obvious that the premium for “dominant” annuities (i.e. the other two 
regarding simple annuity, and back-end guaranteed period annuity in the case 
of the front-end guaranteed period annuity) can be increased to such an extent 
that buying them (in comparison with other annuities as alternatives) becomes 
á priori irrational for a client. Calculation of the threshold can begin from the 
J
K 
quotient, so let us examine the question according to annuity pairs. In the ex-
amination I have utilised the observation that it will be in no one’s interests to 
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purchase an annuity of higher benefit (what we referred to above as “domi-
nant”), if it is not worth purchasing by those who can benefit the most from 
this higher level of service compared to annuities that provide less benefit.  So: 
• With respect to simple and back-end guaranteed period annuities, the 
question of when it will never be worthwhile getting a back-end guar-
anteed period annuity may be seen in the light of when it will always be 
true that: 
Bä ∙ 1 + λX >
B
!ä$| + v$ ∙ ä" ∙ 1 + λN 
Clearly it is true that the most difficulty occurs if the benefit is a mini-
mum, as in this case the back-end guaranteed period annuity would 
normally be better for the client. An extreme case of this is when a cli-
ent dies immediately, so they only receive EUR 1 annuity in the case 
of a simple annuity and ä$5| annuity in the case of the back-end guar-
antee. This is when the difference in the benefits of the two annuities 
will be maximum. So the issue is when the following inequality be-
comes true? 
1ä ∙ 1 + λX >
ä$5|!ä$| + v$ ∙ ä" ∙ 1 + λN 
Clearly if: 
1 + λN1 + λX >
ä ∙ ä$5|ä$| + v$ ∙ ä 
Thus it can be stated that the inequality  
ä ∙ ä$5|ä$| + v$ ∙ ä ≥
1 + λN1 + λX  
must be true. 
• Regarding simple and front-end guaranteed period annuities, the annui-
tant will not take out a front-end guaranteed period annuity for the same 
reasons (as the difference in benefits between the two annuities is big-
gest in connection with annuitants who have the shortest life expectan-
cy), if: 
1ä ∙ 1 + λX >
ä$|!ä$| + ä$| " ∙ 1 + λY 
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In other words: 
1 + λY1 + λX >
ä ∙ ä$|ä$| + ä$|  
So the inequality  
ä ∙ ä$|ä$| + ä$|  ≥
1 + λY1 + λX  
must always come true. 
• The difference between the benefits of the front and back-end guaran-
teed period annuities gradually increases in the first g year, then it re-
mains constant after the expiry of the front-end guaranteed period; i.e. 
at present value it is biggest in real value in year g. So the question is 
when does the inequality below: 
ä$|!ä$| + ä$| " ∙ 1 + λY >
ä$5$|!ä$| + v$ ∙ ä" ∙ 1 + λN
= ä$| + v$ ∙ ä$|!ä$| + v$ ∙ ä" ∙ 1 + λN 
become true? 
Or rather: 
1 + λN1 + λY >
!ä$| + ä$| " ∙ 1 + v$ä$| + v$ ∙ ä  
So the inequality  
!ä$| + ä$| " ∙ 1 + v$ä$| + v$ ∙ ä ≥
1 + λN1 + λY  
must always come true. 
In summary, the threshold values are: 
The “absolute” maximum of loading, i.e. the threshold values of type I, 
are: 
• in the case of back-end guaranteed period annuities:  
ä^=55$|ä$| + v$ ∙ ä > 1 + λN 
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• for a front-end guaranteed period annuity:  
ä^=5|ä$| + ä$|  > 1 + λY 
• for a simple annuity:  
ä^=5|ä > 1 + λX 
It is of course logical to assume that the costs are positive, so 1 + λN > 1, 1 + λY > 1 and 1 + λX > 1 become true, but this has no significance going 
forward. 
The relative values of the loading must fall between the following extremes 
(type II threshold values): 
ä ∙ ä$5|ä$| + v$ ∙ ä ≥
1 + λN1 + λX > ää$| + v$ ∙ ä 
ä ∙ ä$|ä$| + ä$|  ≥
1 + λY1 + λX > ää$| + ä$|  
!ä$| + ä$| " ∙ 1 + v$ä$| + v$ ∙ ä ≥
1 + λN1 + λY >
ä$| + ä$| ä$| + v$ ∙ ä 
As it certainly becomes true that   
ä$| + v$ ∙ ä > ä$| + ä$|  > ä 
(at least if the guaranteed period is effective, i.e. g≥2), thus it will be true for 
every type II lower threshold value that it is smaller than 1, i.e.:  
1 > 1 + λN1 + λX  
1 > 1 + λY1 + λX  
1 > 1 + λN1 + λY  
The question is what will the criteria be for choosing between annuities within 
the above thresholds? And can we give a more specific answer to the loading 
values while also taking into account the remaining lifetime of the client? 
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3.4.2.2. The choice between simple and back-end guaranteed period annuities 
First, I shall investigate the case of the net premium. The question is; when 
does the inequality 
äMNO5|ä ≥
äMNO55$|ä$| + v$ ∙ ä 
become true – and when is its inverse true? 
The result is that if 
äMNO5| ≥ ä 
is true then the client will choose a simple annuity rather than a back-end an-
nuity. 
Since we can (approximately) call äMNO5| the “discounted remaining life-
time”55 and ä the “discounted average remaining lifetime”, we can say in 
summary (and somewhat liberally) that the threshold for choosing between a 
back-end guaranteed period and a “simple” annuity will always be the dis-
counted general remaining lifetime, irrespective of the magnitude of the guar-
anteed period. Independently of the duration of the guaranteed period, the 
client will always choose a “simple” annuity in the case of a discounted re-
maining lifetime above this, and below it the client always chooses a back-end 
guaranteed period annuity, provided the calculation is of the net premium and 
both variations were prepared using the same mortality table. Here, the “sim-
ple” annuity will certainly generate a loss, and the back-end guaranteed period 
annuity will certainly be profitable for the insurer.  
This choice is presented in the diagram below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
55Since with a 0% technical interest rate, äMNO5| can be simplified to MhO + 1 and ä 
to e + 0.5, the dividing line will be the inequality MhO + 1 ≥ e + 0.5. This may be 
otherwise illustrated as MhO ≥ e-0.5. This is a similar, although not identical rule to the 
one which states that the remaining lifetime must be higher than the expected remaining 
lifetime. 
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Diagram 2: The annuitant’s choice between “simple” and back-end  
guaranteed period annuities 
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If we extend our analysis to the case of the gross premium, we need to ask 
when the   
äMNO5|ä ∙ 1 + λX ≥
äMNO55$|!ä$| + v$ ∙ ä" ∙ 1 + λN 
inequality is true, and when its inverse is true. 
Obviously, this is if 
äMNO5| ≥ 1 + λX1 + λN ∙ ä 
is true. 
So with the gross premium the net premium rule is modified, and the above 
line is shifted by the ratio of the loading, i.e. above the 
äMNO5| = 1 + λX1 + λN ∙ ä 
line, the client chooses a simple annuity, while below it they will choose a 
back-end guaranteed period annuity.  
The limits discussed above must also be considered with the loadings. 
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3.4.2.3. A choice between simple and front-end guaranteed period annuities 
In the case of the net premium, the relationship between the benefit and the 
premium differs depending on how h and g relate to each other in the case of 
front-end guaranteed period annuities. 
If  h ≥ g, then  
äMNO5|ä ≥
äMNO5|ä$| + ä$|  
since  
ä ≤ ä$| + ä$|  
so in this case the client will certainly choose a simple annuity, for if they are 
certain of surviving the guaranteed period, why should they pay its price? In 
this case, the guaranteed period will have a zero value for them.   
If 	h < g , then  
äMNO5|ä ≥
ä$|ä$| + F$ 
will be true if 
äMNO5| ≥ ää$| + ä$ ∙ ä$|  
is met, meaning the client will purchase a simple annuity if the discounted 
remaining lifespan of the client is higher than a portion of the (discounted 
value of the) guaranteed period (the longer the guaranteed period, the smaller 
the portion). 
Therefore the borderline of choice is the curve: 
äMNO5| = ää$| + ä$| ∙ ä$|  
which splits the cases. This curve is always below the line  
äMNO5| = ä 
But if we increase g, the curve converges on this line. 
However, if 	h = 0 we get 	g = 1 from the above equation, so the curve 
starts from this point on the g axis. 
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Diagram 3: The annuitant’s choice between a simple annuity  
and a front-end guaranteed period annuity 
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As regards gross premiums – similarly to the choice between the simple an-
nuity and annuities with a back-end guaranteed period – the result also de-
pends on the ratio 
1 + λY1 + λX  
which may have three different values: 
1. too small, in which case the client will certainly not purchase a simple 
annuity, 
2. too large, in which case the client will not take out a front-end guaran-
teed period annuity, but will instead purchase a simple annuity, and 
3. somewhere in between the two thresholds. 
 
In summary, in the case of the gross premium, the dividing line between the 
two types of annuity will be similar to that of the net premium with the condi-
tion that the curve is corrected by the ratio of loadings and given an extreme 
magnitude of loading (setting aside the formal demonstration), the only ration-
al decision is a choice between one of the two annuity types. 
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3.4.2.4. The choice between back-end and front-end guaranteed period annuities 
With guaranteed period annuities, when net premiums are investigated we can 
assume that g is at least 1. In this case, the relationship between the benefit and 
the premium of annuities with a front-end guaranteed period may be different 
depending on the relationship between h and g. In the case of annuities with a 
back-end guaranteed period, this ratio is always the same. This is why we must 
investigate two scenarios: 
Let us see which annuity is chosen by the client.  
If  	h ≥ g , then  
äMNO5|ä$| + ä$|  <
ä$| + v$ ∙ äMNO5|ä$| + v$ ∙ ä  
will be true if: 
äMNO5| < ä$| ∙ ! ä$|  + ä$| "ä$| ∙ 1 − v$ + v$ ∙ ä:$|  
So the dividing line of choice will be the curve: 
äMNO5| = ä$| ∙ ! ä$|  + ä$| "ä$| ∙ 1 − v$ + v$ ∙ ä:$|  
which will always be above the  äMNO5| = ä line. 
If  	h < g  , then  
äMNO55$|ä$| + v$ ∙ ä =
ä$| + v$ ∙ äMNO5|ä$| + v$ ∙ ä >
ä$|ä$| + ä$|  
becomes true if: 
äMNO5| > ä$| ∙ v
$ ∙ ä − ä$| v$ ∙ ä$| + v$ ∙ ä$|  
This time, the client will choose a back-end guaranteed period annuity instead 
of a front-end guaranteed period. Otherwise, the client chooses a front-end 
guaranteed period annuity. 
The threshold for the choice is the curve 
äMNO5| = ä −
ä$| v$ä$|  + ä$|  
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which will always be below the äMNO5| = ä line. 
In summary, the client chooses a back-end guaranteed period annuity if h falls 
within the following interval: 
ä − ä$| v$ä$|  + ä$| < äMNO5| <
ä$| ∙ ! ä$|  + ä$| "ä$| ∙ 1 − v$ + v$ ∙ ä:$|  
and will select a front-end guaranteed period annuity outside this interval. The 
upper limit of the interval is always above the äMNO5| = ä line, and the bottom 
limit will be below this line. 
 
 
Diagram 4:  The annuitant’s choice between back-end and front- 
end guaranteed period annuities 
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With the assumption of gross premium, the illustration above will be different 
in the following ways: 
The type I thresholds are: 
 
ä^=55$|ä$| + v$ ∙ ä > 1 + λN > 1 
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ä^=5|ä$| + ä$|  > 1 + λY > 1 
The type II thresholds are: 
!ä$| + ä$| " ∙ 1 + v$ä$| + v$ ∙ ä ≥
1 + λN1 + λY >
ä$| + ä$| ä$| + v$ ∙ ä 
In conclusion, with the above loading thresholds, the client will choose a back-
end guaranteed period annuity if h falls within the following interval: 
ä$|1 + λN1 + λY ∙ ä$| + v
$ ∙ ää$| + ä$|  − v$
≥ äMNO5| ≥ ä$|v$ ∙ b1 + λ
N
1 + λY ∙
ä$| + v$ ∙ ää$| + ä$|  − 1c 
Outside the above interval, or if the loadings fall outside the range defined by 
the thresholds, the annuitant will go for a front-end guaranteed period annuity. 
 
3.4.2.5. Summarising: The choice between annuities (in the case of a net premium) 
Summarising the above, the following statement can be made. We can deduce 
the following three rules from the three paired examinations above. 
 
1. Clients choose between simple and back-end guaranteed period 
annuities such that above the line äMNO5| = ä they choose a 
simple annuity, while below this a line they choose a back-end 
guaranteed period annuity. 
2. Clients choose between simple and front-end guaranteed period 
annuities such that above the 
äM[O5| = ä | ∙ ää | + ä |  
curve they choose the simple type, while below it they will go 
for a front-end guaranteed period annuity. The  
äM[O5| = ä | ∙ ää | + ä |  
curve is always below the äM[O5| = ä line, and the 
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äM[O5| = ä | ∙ ää | + ä |  
curve starts from point g=1. 
 
3. Clients choose between back-end and front-end guaranteed period 
annuities such that between the curve 
äMNO5| = ä$| ∙ ä −
ä$| v$ä$| + ä$|  
and the curve 
äMNO5| = ä$| ∙ ä$| ∙ !ä | + ä$| "ä$| ∙ 1 − v$ + v$ ∙ ä: 
they will select a back-end guaranteed period annuity, while out-
side these thresholds they will choose a front-end guaranteed pe-
riod annuity. The upper limit of the band is always above the line äMNO5| = ä, while the bottom limit will be below this line. 
If we apply these three rules together, we come to the conclusion that: 
• According to rules 1 and 2, the annuitant will take out a 
simple annuity above the line äMNO5| = ä. Rules 1 and 2 
also mean that above the line, the simple annuity dominates 
both the front-end and back-end guaranteed period annuities, 
so rule 3 has no significance. 
• Below the line äMNO5| = ä, however, according to rule the 
back-end guaranteed period annuity will dominate over the 
simple annuity, and below the line the annuitant will 
certainly choose a guaranteed period annuity according to 
rules 2 and 3. According to rule 3, the  
äM[O5| = ä | ∙ ä | ∙ !ä | + ä | "ä | ∙ 1 −   +  ∙ ä: 
curve is always above the äMNO5| = äcurve, so this curve 
does not have an effective role to play in any choice made 
below the line. 
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• According to rule 3, in the case of the area below the line äMNO5| = ä the client will choose a back-end guaranteed 
period annuity above the  
äMNO5| = ä$| ∙ ä −
ä$| v$ä$| + ä$|  
curve and will choose a front-end guaranteed period annuity 
below it. According to rule 2 the  
äMNO5| = ä$| ∙ ää$| + ä$|  
curve is the threshold. Above it, the client will choose a sim-
ple annuity, or in accordance to rule 1 a back-end guaranteed 
period annuity that dominates it, while below the line the cli-
ent chooses a front-end guaranteed period annuity. Since 
ä$| ∙ ää$| + ä$|  > ä$| ∙
ä − ä$| v$ä$| + ä$|  
the borderline between the front-end and back-end guaran-
teed period annuities will be the curve 
äMNO5| = ä$| ∙ ä −
ä$| v$ä$| + ä$|  
We can also summarise the results in a diagram. 
In case 1, two of the above-mentioned four curves will be effective, and these 
two will divide the g-h plane in the manner below (I have only indicated the 
h=g radius for the sake of orientation): 
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Diagram 5: The annuitant’s choice between 3 annuities 
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Ignoring the formulae, the above results may be explained as follows (with a 
net premium56). I have assumed a 0% technical interest rate in the explanation 
because disregarding the interest rate greatly improves transparency: 
• If the client knows they will get back at least the price of the simple an-
nuity as a benefit (i.e. if their remaining lifespan exceeds the expected 
value), then it is not worth paying for the guaranteed period as the 
J
K 
quotient is already greater than one. In the case of a front-end guaran-
teed period annuity, a guaranteed period that is shorter than the ex-
pected lifetime will not offer the client any extra benefit for the extra 
premium, while in the case of a longer guaranteed period than the cli-
ent’s life expectancy, the premium (which is definitely bigger than the 
guaranteed benefit) will certainly be larger than the attainable benefit. It 
is also not worthwhile buying a back-end guaranteed period annuity, as 
the client can purchase every extra 1-year back-end guaranteed period 
(for EUR 1 extra benefit) for a EUR 1 premium, meaning the ratio of 
extra benefit to extra premium is 1, which is less favourable than what 
                                                          
56Only an “elegant” explanation is possible here. As we can see above, this explana-
tion – with a very broad interval – is also true with regard to the gross premium. 
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has already been achieved with the simple annuity, so it is not worth 
buying an extra service of this kind.  
• In general we may say that if the client lives longer than the possible 
length of the guaranteed period, it is not worth them purchasing a front-
end guaranteed period annuity as they do not receive any extra benefit 
for the extra premium paid with respect to the guaranteed period. 
• In the case of the simple annuity, if a client knows that they will not get 
back the premium as a benefit (because their life expectancy is shorter 
than average), then it is more worthwhile buying a back-end guaranteed 
period annuity than a simple annuity. In this case, the premium for 1 
year of extra benefit is EUR 1, so the ratio of the extra benefit and the 
extra premium is 1, which is higher than the less favourable benefit-to-
premium ratio in the case of the simple annuity, so purchasing a one-
year back-end guaranteed period increases this ratio. This is also true 
for every extra year, so it is worth choosing an annuity with the highest 
possible back-end guaranteed period. Within this, if the longest possi-
ble guaranteed period is shorter than the remaining life expectancy, it is 
not worth getting a front-end guaranteed period annuity, so in this in-
stance the optimum choice will be an annuity with a back-end guaran-
teed period (of maximum length).  
• Based on the above, it is only worth choosing a front-end guaranteed 
period annuity if the guaranteed period is greater than the remaining 
lifespan, but the remaining lifespan is itself shorter than average. In this 
case, however (within this) it is worth buying an annuity with the long-
est possible guaranteed period because the magnitude of the benefit (the 
numerator) is the same as that of the guaranteed period, while the de-
nominator will be the guaranteed period plus “something else”, i.e. the 
quotient will be smaller than one. This “something else” is nothing oth-
er than the premium of the annuity deferred by the guaranteed period. 
In such a case, if we increase the guaranteed period by one, then the 
numerator is increased by one and the denominator is increased by less 
than one, as a 1-year increase in the front-end guaranteed period in-
creases the premium by less than one (because all that has happened is 
that an uncertainly due unit of benefit with a premium smaller than 1 
now has a certain unit of premium, i.e. equal to 1). The ratio of extra 
premium to extra benefit is higher than one, i.e. adding the extra guar-
anteed period increases the benefit-to-premium ratio.   
• We cannot, however, be certain that in this case it is worthwhile for the 
client to purchase a front-end guaranteed period annuity. What is cer-
tain is that a back-end guaranteed period annuity is better in this case 
than a simple annuity, but in the majority of cases it is also better than 
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the front-end guaranteed period annuity. Supposing that the maximum 
possible guaranteed period is identical in both front-end and back-end 
guaranteed period versions; we can say that if the client is likely to live 
almost until the end of the guaranteed period, it is more beneficial for 
the client to obtain a back-end guaranteed period annuity than a front-
end guaranteed period annuity. This can be seen from the perspective 
that a front-end guaranteed period only slightly increases (relatively) 
the premium of the annuity compared to that of the simple annuity so it 
can be taken as being (approximately) the same. As the benefit-to-
premium quotient is smaller than for front-end guaranteed period an-
nuities, and in the case of a back-end guaranteed period both the nu-
merator and the denominator increase roughly by the guaranteed peri-
od, the extra benefit premium quotient will be 1, which increases the 
benefit-premium quotient compared to the front-end guaranteed period 
variation. However, if we lessen the client’s remaining life at a given 
guaranteed period, after a while we may say that it is not rewarding for 
the client to pay the extra premium of the back-end guaranteed period 
for the extra guarantee provided by the insurer compared to the front-
end guaranteed period annuity as, while the ratio of the premium of the 
two types of guaranteed period annuities is unchanged, the ratio of the 
guarantee provided by a back-end guaranteed period annuity is contin-
uously decreasing, so after a while it will not be rewarding for the cli-
ent. If we examine a case where the guaranteed periods of a front-end 
guaranteed period and back-end guaranteed period annuity are differ-
ent, then we might say that if the front-end guaranteed period is longer 
than the life expectancy plus the back-end guaranteed period, then it is 
definitely not worth choosing the more expensive back-end guaranteed 
period. It may be more rewarding to choose the front-end guaranteed 
period annuity even above this limit for a while compared to the back-
end guaranteed period one, but the back-end guaranteed period annuity 
will eventually “win”. 
3.4.3. WHAT GUARANTEE PERIOD WILL THE ANNUITANT CHOOSE? 
Let us first take a look at back-end guaranteed period annuities. In the case 
of the net premium, according to the above the back-end guaranteed period 
annuity will only be chosen by the insured person if the äMNO5| < ä inequality 
is met. Here, the client must maximise the 
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äM[O5| + M[O5 ∙ ä |ä +  ∙ ä |  
quotient. As it can be easily demonstrated that this function increases in pro-
portion to g, i.e. an increase in g also causes an increase in the benefit-to-
premium quotient, the client will always choose the biggest one from among 
possible alternatives in the case of a back-end guaranteed period.  
In a relatively more complicated way, we can demonstrate that this will also 
be true with relation to gross premiums. 
Examining front-end guaranteed period annuities in connection with the 
net premium according to the above, the client will only opt for the front-end 
guaranteed period annuity if the h<g inequality is met. Here, the client maxim-
ises the   
ä$|ä$| + ä$|  
ratio. Its reciprocal 
ä$| + ä$| ä$| = 1 +
ä$| ä$|  
is a clearly decreasing function of g since if g increases the denominator in-
creases and the numerator decreases, so the original coefficient increases ac-
cording to the increase of g, i.e. the client aims to purchase the longest possible 
guaranteed period annuity from among the front-end guaranteed period annui-
ties available.   
Assuming a gross premium it is obvious that the quotient  
ä$|!ä$| + ä$| " ∙ 1 + λY 
also increases together with the increase of g, i.e. given a gross premium it will 
be true that a client will choose the one with the highest guaranteed period 
from amongst the guaranteed period annuities available. 
In summary: from the point of view of choice amongst possible guaranteed 
periods, the size of the loading has no significance, or it will only have signifi-
cance if the loading is identical with respect to every guaranteed period. If it is 
different, it is naturally possible that the smaller guaranteed period annuity will 
be the more favourable choice if its loading is adequately smaller than that of 
the longer guaranteed period annuity. 
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3.4.4. THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE RATE OF LOSS DUE TO ADVERSE SELECTION 
To assist my calculations, I have created a unisex extinction order based on 
one of the male-female mortality tables, where I have weighted the mortality 
probabilities with the ratio of the population of given ages. (The choice of 
extinction order [mortality table] occurred within relatively wide boundaries 
because I was not interested in the impact of the extinction order itself, so I 
worked with different kinds of optional extinction orders.) On this basis I have 
calculated the net premium of all possible annuity types with all kinds of guar-
anteed period – from 1 to 40 years – and have looked at how differences be-
tween the gained benefits and the premium compare to the premium with re-
spect to individuals with different life expectancies. I then assumed that the 
client will choose the option with the highest value, and accordingly so I could 
estimate the maximum loss to the provider that might result from this choice. 
In the model I have developed, the mortality tables (between 1990 and 
2000) that provide the basis for the unisex table can be changed so that in each 
case I compute the unisex table by weighting the gender distribution of the 
population of the given year. The age of entry can be chosen between the ages 
of 50 and 70, the technical interest rate can be changed (although I have chief-
ly utilised the results received at 0%), and one can also amend the number of 
years of guaranteed period that can be taken into account as a maximum (be-
tween 1 and 40 years57). The results published below were calculated using the 
1990 select mortality table and with an entry age of 62 (otherwise, the mortali-
ty table only changes the results to a minimal extent in my experience). 
For the maximum degree of adverse selection as a function of the maximum 
possible guaranteed period and the technical interest rate, we get the following 
results: 
  
                                                          
57Or rather, in the case of front-end guaranteed periods, up to a maximum age of 
101, meaning a guaranteed period of 39 years can be taken into account with respect to 
an entry age of 62, as can also be seen in the results.  
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Table 2: The maximum possible rate of adverse selection 
Technical 
interest 
 rate 
The maximum possible guaranteed period (years) 
1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 30 40 
0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.46% -3.58% -8.01% -12.59% -14.78% -12.56% 
0.5% -0.26% -0.49% -0.72% -0.93% -1.56% -4.72% -9.09% -12.61% -13.93% -12.38% 
1.0% -0.55% -1.05% -1.52% -1.96% -2.78% -6.61% -10.62% -13.92% -15.01% -13.99% 
1.5% -0.93% -1.77% -2.55% -3.27% -4.32% 8.93% -13.31% -16.05% -17.27% -17.00% 
2.0% -1.37% -2.61% -3.74% -4.77% -6.08% -11.19% -15.82% -18.84% -20.56% -20.76% 
2.5% -1.86% -3.53% -5.04% -6.40% -7.99% -14.08% -18.79% -22.06% -24.16% -25.06% 
3.0% -2.45% -4.63% -6.58% -8.33% -10.23% -17.41% -22.62% -25.88% -28.54% -29.88% 
3.5% -3.06% -5.76% -8.15% -10.28% -12.50% -20.41% -26.17% -29.76% 32.95% -34.64% 
4.0% -3.57% -6.70% -9.47% -11.93% -14.13% -23.27% -29.48% -33.07% -36.72% -38.70% 
4.5% -4.01% -7.51% -10.60% -13.34% -15.78% -25.73% -32.04% -36.15% -40.13% -42.26% 
5.0% -4.44% -8.31% -11.71% -14.72% -17.40% -28.11% -34.80% -38.89% -43.20% -45.49% 
 
Explaining the diagram: if the insurer calculates the premium of different sin-
gle annuities and does not take into consideration the effect of adverse selec-
tion caused by choice, clients will choose the best modality for themselves and 
the premium collected by the insurer will then be that much lower than the 
benefit paid. So, for example, with a 10-year maximum possible guaranteed 
period and a 0.0% technical interest rate, the insurer collects 3.58% less pre-
mium as a result of adverse selection than it pays out in benefit. (N.B. such a 
calculation does not include a possible loss for the insurer if the actual mortali-
ty of the insured does not correspond to the one calculated). 
The results can be evaluated as follows: 
• With a 0% interest rate and low guaranteed period (4-5 years), the 
choice made will have no adverse selection impact in practice, 
• With a 0% interest rate and a longer guaranteed period, the adverse se-
lection impact will be greater for a certain period of time (in the table it 
is -14.78% for a 30-year period, meaning the total premium collected 
by providers will be this much lower compared to the benefits paid 
out), after which it decreases somewhat, 
• A similar trend prevails with other technical interest rates with the addi-
tion that the higher the technical interest rate, the higher the guaranteed 
period at which adverse selection has a maximum effect. 
• The higher the technical interest rate, the stronger the effect of adverse 
selection. Overall, the interest rate has a very strong impact on adverse 
selection. 
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3.5. Directed selection 
If insured people are able to choose between different types of annuities at a 
given provider, those with the shortest life expectancy will choose a front-end 
guaranteed period annuity, and those with a longer, but shorter-than-average 
life expectancy will opt for a back-end guaranteed period annuity, while those 
with a longer than average life expectancy will choose a simple annuity. If we 
calculate all three types of annuity using an identical mortality table, the result 
of this selection will be that the insurer makes a profit on the guaranteed period 
annuities and a loss on the simple annuities, and with a bit of luck the profits 
and losses of the various annuity types will offset each other.  
One way of solving the problem might also be that the annuities are calcu-
lated with different mortality tables so that they are adjusted to the mortality of 
those who, based on rational considerations, voluntarily opt for it. If this is 
possible, insurers could choose to take advantage of selection instead of strug-
gling against it, and in this way they would get a risk community selected on 
the basis of risk aspects where the clients themselves, using rational considera-
tions, voluntarily select the risk community they wish to join. Insurers might 
even help clients and inform them about which annuity is most beneficial, and 
if someone is uncertain about how long they might live, insurers could suggest 
they have a medical check-up, which will help them assess their life expectan-
cy. After this, the insurer would simply allow them to make a choice. In this 
way, risk assessment can be eliminated with the help of precise calculations 
and “trained advisors”, and what is most advantageous for whom is clearly 
visible. This also helps to avoid problems resulting from concealing data from 
assessment. 
The principal question is whether this scenario is at all possible, and would 
such an effort to find a way of operating perhaps lead to contradictions? Be-
cause if it turns out that this is not the way to go, precisely the opposite must 
be done. It is possible for the insurer to lessen the risk to itself by applying the 
above-described adverse (auto-) selection of annuitants so that the annuities 
actually provided are drastically diminished compared to the possible annui-
ties. If, for example, a provider only sells guaranteed period annuities, it means 
that its risk will be radically reduced since:  
1. A guaranteed period annuity can á priori be provided with a smaller 
risk than one without a guaranteed period, and what’s more 
2. this attracts prospective annuitants with shorter life expectancies (pri-
marily men) and makes it less attractive to people with longer life ex-
pectancies (mainly women), and in this way the insurer is indirectly se-
lecting its own risk community. 
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Because of the consequences of item 2, whether this possibility should be 
permitted needs to be seriously considered. It is better if, in this case, the law 
excludes this possibility and ensures that an annuity provider is obliged to 
provide all of the annuities permissible by law.  
I show below that this solution is not possible, so the targeted selection will 
not work, and so I conduct an examination, as I did above, into the option of 
simple, front-end and back-end guaranteed period annuities.  
The issue of whether adverse selection owing to choice may be eliminated 
by using adequate mortality tables might be restricted to a question of whether 
adverse selection may be eliminated by increasing or reducing the premium, as 
a client takes into account the different mortality tables only via the premium.   
The answer here is not clear, for if we change the mortality table, the pre-
mium for the annuity changes along with the composition of those who will 
opt for such an annuity over others. The issue then is whether this change leads 
to every type of annuity remaining on the market for an adequate range of 
clients or whether, in reality, certain types of annuity will lose ground.  
In the case of 3 single-life annuities, this question can further be simplified 
upon examination; can adverse selection loss suffered due to the choice of a 
simple annuity be eliminated by increasing the simple annuity’s premium or by 
lowering the premium for guaranteed period annuities? From this point of 
view, it is of secondary importance whether adverse selection presents itself if 
the insured can only choose between two types of guaranteed period annuities, 
and if the answer is “yes”, whether adverse selection might be eliminated by 
increasing or reducing the premium. As this question is not a practical one, I 
shall not provide an answer here.  
So, the question is: can adverse selection be eliminated by increasing the 
premium of the simple annuity, or not?  
First, I will look at the case of a simple annuity and an annuity with a 
back-end guaranteed period; and in the case of a net premium, those people 
will choose a simple guaranteed period for whom it is true that  
äM[O5| ≥ ä 
i.e. people who will certainly receive as much in benefit as the amount of pre-
mium they pay, since in this case, and only in this case will 
äM[O5|ä ≥
ä | +  ∙ äM[O5|ä | +  ∙ ä  
be true. If we increase the price of the simple annuity from ä to ä' , and in the 
meantime leave the price of the back-end guaranteed period annuity un-
changed (i.e. in the case of the simple annuity we assume a greater remaining 
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lifetime), then it is obvious that those who have so far chosen a back-end guar-
anteed period annuity (i.e. in whose case  
äM[O5| < ä 
was true) would continue buying this because they have no reason whatsoever 
to change. 
In the case of those for whom  
ä ≤ äMNO5| < äe  
is met,  
äMNO5|äe <
ä$| + v$ ∙ äMNO5|ä$| + v$ ∙ ä  
will always be true, since 
äMNO5|äe ≤ 1 <
ä$| + v$ ∙ äMNO5|ä$| + v$ ∙ ä  
So some clients who chose a simple annuity with a lower premium would now 
shift to a back-end guaranteed period annuity. In addition, those who change 
annuities will all be clients in whose case the received benefit will be smaller 
than the premium paid for the simple annuity; simply annuities will continue to 
be only purchased by people who receive a bigger payout than the premium of 
the simple annuity.   
Based on the above, we can ascertain that if we increase the price of a sim-
ple annuity, we exclude clients from buying a simple annuity who would have 
chosen it at a lower price, but for whom the new, higher price exceeds the 
anticipated benefit. Only those clients for whom the anticipated benefit will 
again be higher than the price will choose the simple annuity with the new 
price, while others will convert to buying a back-end guaranteed period annui-
ty. This means that the simple annuity continues to make a loss, so raising the 
price of the simple annuity will not result in simple annuities becoming profit-
able for the provider, and such attempts would eventually lead to simple annui-
ties being edged out of the market.   
Assuming a gross premium does not significantly change the above; the 
logic applied with regard to the net premium can also be applied here, so ad-
verse selection cannot be eliminated by increasing the premium. 
Examining simple and front-end guaranteed period annuities in the net 
premium case (although assuming gross premiums will again not change the 
logic in this case), based on the above the threshold between the simple and the 
front-end guaranteed period annuities is the   
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äM[O5| < ä | ∙ ää | + ä |  
inequality (where 	h < g will obviously also be true and the relationship 
äM[O5| < ä 
will also be valid). If the inequality is true, the client will choose a front-end 
guaranteed period; if it isn’t they will choose a simple annuity. 
It is obvious that the best simple annuity clients would choose the front-end 
guaranteed period annuity, so the simple annuity will generate a loss, although 
not to the extent we might see in the case of simple and back-end guaranteed 
period annuities, because in this case the simple annuity will also be purchased 
by people for whom the received benefit will be smaller than the premium 
paid. The question is whether the profitability of the simple annuity may be 
restored by increasing the premium of the simple annuity, i.e. if we increase 
the premium from ä to ä' . 
In the context of an increasing premium, we must immediately ask whether 
there is some cap on it. It is obvious that the premium of the simple annuity 
cannot be increased above the premium of the front-end annuity as there would 
be no argument in favour of buying a simple annuity instead of a front-end guar-
anteed period annuity in such a case. In fact, we can be a little more precise: the 
premium of the simple annuity must be lower than the premium of the guaran-
teed period annuity as this is the sole reason the client chooses an annuity that 
offers a lower benefit from among two annuities with the same premium. 
If the premium of the simple annuity were raised to the level of one with a 
front-end guaranteed period, and if we were to suppose (in contrast to the 
above) that only those individuals purchase a front-end guaranteed period 
annuity for whom the guaranteed period actually guarantees something on the 
basis of their remaining lifetime, then we may state that in the case of a pro-
vider that offers two (i.e. simple, and front-end guaranteed period) annuities, 
all adverse selection could be eliminated. Under such conditions, the provider 
actually only sells an annuity with a front-end guaranteed period while in the 
case of an annuity the problem of adverse selection owing to choice cannot 
emerge, or at least not at the level of the provider. So the insurer collects pre-
mium from the entire risk community and it pays out the same sum in benefits. 
However, the clients – also based on the above – are divided among the two 
formally different types of annuity whereby individuals whose life expectancy 
remains below the guaranteed period choose the guaranteed period annuity, 
while the rest opt for the simple annuity. In these circumstances, people who 
choose a guaranteed period annuity obviously pay more in premium than they 
receive as benefit, and therefore those who opt for a simple annuity obviously 
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pay less if the entire risk community is in balance with respect to premium and 
benefit. So the loss generated by the simple annuity cannot be eliminated by 
raising the premium.  
The question arises whether the reverse could provide a solution, i.e. can 
we stop adverse selection by lowering the premium of guaranteed period 
annuities? In other words, the question is whether the range of simple annuity 
buyers will grow in response to an inverse strategy i.e. in response to decreas-
ing the premium of either of the (front-end or back-end) guaranteed period 
annuities. The answer is obviously no, because for those individuals for whom 
it was worth buying a guaranteed period annuity to begin with it will have 
become even more worthwhile. In addition, a segment of simple annuity buy-
ers would shift to becoming guaranteed period annuity buyers, i.e. those with 
the shortest remaining life expectancy from among the simple annuity buyers. 
But relatively speaking, these were the most favourable clients from a simple 
annuity perspective, so the simple annuity might generate an even higher loss, 
meaning the loss cannot be eliminated in this manner. 
In summary: in a given situation where clients know their remaining 
lifespan and all of them wish to maximise the total benefit received compared 
to the premium paid, it would be impossible to see the single annuity as profit-
able in itself as neither increasing the premium of a single annuity nor decreas-
ing the premium of some of the guaranteed period annuities would prevent the 
single annuity maximum from losing ground on the market. In other words, 
this means that it is impossible to prepare selection tables that reflect the 
mortality of individuals who opt for different annuities, and therefore 
directed selection does not work as a solution. 
3.6. Selection in literature 
Practically all the literature refers to it as being self-evident that the mortality 
of annuitants is lower than that of the entire population (see e.g. a more than 
100-year-old book by Bein-Bogyó-Havas [1907], page 162). A large portion of 
the literature makes reference to “adverse selection” via an analysis of this 
phenomenon (see e.g. Banyár [2003]). According to Hylands-Gray [1992], 
potential annuitants conduct a kind of adverse (auto-) selection, and an indi-
vidual with a bad state of health would rarely (voluntarily) purchase annuity 
insurance. In their view, not only is the mortality of people who do purchase 
annuities better than that of the average population, but in addition, signs of a 
temporary initial selection can be observed (such phenomena can also be iden-
tified with other life insurances, if for no other reason than because of the risk 
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assessment performed by the insurer, which is of course not a characteristic of 
annuities). 
Interestingly, the thick volume of Booth-Chadburn-Cooper-Haberman-
James [1999], which is meant as a summary of modern actuarial science, does 
not include either the expressions “adverse” or “selection”, and moral hazard is 
not specifically elaborated either, although they do say that in the case of annu-
ities (page 226-227) risk assessment is not necessary since the individuals who 
apply to purchase annuities are “self-selected”, and therefore their life expec-
tancy is longer than the average for the population.  
In the literature, infrequent reference is made to the selection impact of choices 
made between different annuity types, but such references do exist. For exam-
ple, Watson Wyatt Partners [2002] point out that in the case of non-indexed 
(unchanged) annuities, this is definitely advantageous for those with shorter 
life expectancies. 
Cardinale-Findlater-Orszag [2002] say that the literature relating to annui-
ties focuses on individuals’ costs and adverse selection. The most complete 
and most often quoted summary of the topic comes from Amy Finkelstein and 
James Poterba in two studies (Finkelstein-Poterba [2002] and [2004]). The 
Finkelstein-Poterba [2002] study examines not only the selection that occurs 
via a voluntary annuity choice as typically discussed in literature, but also 
selection that is the result of choices between different products, which in their 
opinion is becoming increasingly prevalent because of the expansion of DC 
systems. They did not perform their investigations in the US annuity market 
(which they regard to being too small), but rather in the bigger UK market. In 
their view, the UK market is good because both voluntary and mandatory 
annuity markets exist, so lifetime extension among annuitants may be exam-
ined in both of these markets. 
Finkelstein-Poterba [2002] find the roots of adverse selection in the fact that 
there is information asymmetry between clients and insurer. The client chooses 
whether or not to purchase an annuity, and if so then which one, on the basis of 
better information than the insurer has available. The study distinguishes be-
tween two types of selection: one at the time of entry and selection within the 
market. Individuals with a long life expectancy have better incentives regard-
ing annuity purchase (entry selection) and also when choosing the type of 
annuity. They favour so-called “backloaded” annuities that have an unchanged 
real value (i.e. indexed to inflation), as opposed to nominally fixed annuities. 
In contrast, individuals with a short life expectancy will buy guaranteed annui-
ties (either with a guaranteed period or other payback guarantee), which allows 
them to leave a legacy. Naturally, adverse selection only occurs in cases where 
information is clearly asymmetrical; otherwise the insurer adjusts the price to 
the individual risk. In their view, the insurer may take into account the mortali-
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ty of those who take out this type of insurance, although here I eventually 
prove that this is not possible! Active and passive selection are to be distin-
guished. In the first case, someone decides about purchasing an annuity on the 
basis of their life expectancy, while in the second, although they cannot know 
their expected lifespan, they make a purchasing decision with regard to a factor 
that can correlate to this, namely their wealth. Both cases have similar effects. 
Finkelstein and Poterba (unlike myself) examine adverse selection that occurs 
in an existing annuity market (which I could not do, since no such market exists 
here in Hungary). They presume that insurers know the rate of selection, and this 
is reflected in the annuity premium. This is of course a rational assumption, for it 
exists within a competitive annuity market with a long history, and with old and 
experienced annuity providers since in such markets providers may well have 
empirically arrived at their adequate pricing policy, and strong, safety-based 
overpricing is excluded by competition. The method of their examination is that 
they look at diversions from pricing using a selected “standard” mortality table 
with various annuity provisions. This diversion is called the “money’s worth” of 
the annuity, and it is proportional to the estimated discounted value to be paid as 
a “standard” according to the annuity’s premium. This value is “one” if the pre-
mium of the annuity is actuarially fair. The costs, adverse selection, etc. bring it 
to below one. If we use a national mortality table, it is even further below one, 
although even if we calculate using the annuitants’ mortality table, we will still 
be below one because of costs. 
The authors found proof in the annuity premiums for both of the examined 
selections. Concerning selection within the market, they saw that the money’s 
worth of the annuity almost always decreases with the advancement of age as 
well as with increases in the premium’s magnitude. Another experience was 
that the more the guaranteed period increases, the greater the money’s worth 
(so, as expected, guaranteed period annuities are principally purchased by 
individuals who might expect a shorter lifetime).  
They present two kinds of proof for entry selection. The first is a compari-
son of national mortality tables to the annuity mortality tables issued by the 
“Institute of Actuaries”, through which it is clear that survival probabilities are 
highest in the voluntary annuity market, lower in the mandatory annuity mar-
ket and lowest in the population as a whole. The second piece of proof is pre-
cisely the fact that selection on the mandatory market is half that of the volun-
tary market with respect to any annuity product. The consequence of this (for 
them) is that making annuity mandatory would be useful, amongst other 
things, in order to reduce the level of selection.  
Finkelstein and Poterba repeated their study two years later (Finkelstein-
Poterba [2004]), when they had access to the database of a United Kingdom 
insurer and were able to test their assumptions with relation to this. They saw 
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that adverse selection according to the amount of the sum assured was very 
small, although other studies generally focused on the relationship between 
this factor and adverse selection. Yet strong adverse selection was found to 
relate to other parameters. Strong proof was found with regard to the fact that 
people who expect a longer lifetime buy more back-loaded (e.g. indexed, pos-
sibly indexed to inflation plus) annuities both on the voluntary and mandatory 
markets, while guaranteed period annuities tend to be bought more by individ-
uals who expect to have a shorter lifetime, although the difference in lifetime 
related to buyers’ guaranteed period and back-loaded annuities in the mandato-
ry market was not statistically significant. On the mandatory market, those 
who purchase a bigger annuity may expect a longer lifetime, but this is not the 
case on the voluntary market. The explanation here may be that, á priori, the 
very rich are present in the voluntary market, so there is no great mortality 
variation in this case. In the voluntary market, mortality differences between 
guaranteed period and non-guaranteed period annuitants are only a little nar-
rower than between men and women, yet differences associated with the initial 
sum assured are minor.  
In relation to any evaluation here, the authors note that their results may al-
so be interpreted in the light that those who buy an annuity alter their behav-
iour so that they can live longer, meaning the results may also be explained by 
moral risk! Another possible explanation is that we are not talking about 
asymmetrical information or a competitive market, but instead about symmet-
rical information and a non-competitive market, which may lead to similar 
results. However, this probability is not seen as being possible. The third pos-
sible explanation is that individuals have diverse preferences; they do not be-
long to the same risk type and none of them are monitored fully by the insurers 
(I would say it depends on the target function, as I note later). Such items of 
preference may include: interest rate, risk avoidance or the desire to leave an 
inheritance, and these may correlate with the risk type. 
The literature widely acknowledges and notes a solution for significantly 
decreasing adverse (auto-) selection, or possibly even eradicating it, by making 
annuity purchase mandatory. Naturally, this may only be the case in mandatory 
systems or in those DC systems where there is a tax incentive. I have earlier 
quoted Finkelstein-Poterba [2002] from this point of view, yet this idea had 
already appeared at the World Bank [1994] and Hylands-Gray [1992]. They 
also remark that individuals with a bad state of health probably opt for the 
longest guaranteed payment period; so adverse selection for the insurer may 
also occur here, although it is doubtful that this would be of significant magni-
tude. For this reason, there was a debate on making annuity mandatory in the 
United Kingdom (Wadswort [2002]), and the idea is included in the OECD 
recommendations (Antolin [2008a] and OECD [2008a]), although they do 
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state that making it mandatory is regarded as a “rough” solution and recom-
mend that the mandatory transition to annuities be the default rather than a 
regulatory obligation, which according to experience will achieve almost iden-
tical results (which is called “soft compulsion” or a “nudge” – see Thaler-
Sunstein [2008]). In their view, this will be especially effective if financial 
education is enforced parallel to it in the interests of promoting annuities. 
The idea of directed selection also appears in the literature, as I have de-
scribed (and disproven) above. According to the World Bank [1994], redistri-
bution as the result of a uniform premium can be mitigated by offering insured 
individuals with different risks different types of contract and allowing them to 
choose between these. Clients with a lower life expectancy will choose a con-
tract that includes a death grant. The argument is that if every type of contract 
is priced so that they are self-supporting, this diminishes the problem of ad-
verse selection and undesirable redistribution.  
The issue of selection has not been systematically processed in the Hungari-
an literature, with the exception of my own work. Instead, only scattered ideas 
can be found. For example, Kolos Ágoston and Erzsébet Kovács highlight the 
adverse selection impact of compulsory unisex tables in what they also see as 
becoming manifest in options among annuities (Ágoston-Kovács [2007]). 
According to them, “when applying the uniform (unisex) mortality table, the 
mortality of men and women is averaged in proportion to the number. This 
does not point to a perfect solution due to individual decisions, for example 
men buying two life annuities and women buying one life annuity reverses the 
pre-set proportions”. They are also concerned with the fact that due to mortali-
ty differences between genders “unpredictable migration may begin between 
funds, since everyone tries to get into a fund where there are more young 
men”. Or they may try to keep women away from such funds by setting up 
closed “professional” funds like the “miners’ fund”, for example.  
There is little discussion in the literature about the selection impact of choos-
ing an otherwise mandatory pension annuity at its start, although references are 
made to this as a well-known phenomenon. For example, Winkler and Mattar 
[1999] propose to insurers that reducing risk postponement at the start should be 
allowed only to a certain extent. In respect of this subject, it is worth mentioning 
that András Simonovits devoted a whole series of studies to this issue in recent 
years (the first two being Simonovits [2001] and Simonovits [2002]). He is criti-
cal of the free option at the start of an annuity and of the so-called “actuarially 
fair” setting of an annuity, yet his criticism is mainly targeted at the efforts of 
Pillar I (most prominently towards the NDC solutions). Although his statements 
could be generally applied to the DC type of funded Pillar annuities, I cannot do 
so because I have serious problems with Simonovits’s approach, and I have 
written a separate study on this (Banyár [2011b]). 
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Above I have reviewed the major annuity-related problems and the possibili-
ties for managing these problems. During the course of discussing them it was 
clear that not every item can be voluntarily combined with other items and 
certain items presuppose other ones, while others exclude each other and there 
are also neutral items. Therefore, when developing the annuity system the 
legislator may choose among the different annuity systems or models. Howev-
er, before starting to analyse the possibilities we must ask whether it is a must 
to choose a model and whether it is sufficient to let providers and clients offer 
or choose the annuities they wish. In my view, this is not possible in the case 
of mandatory annuities, but the reasons why are worthy of explanation. 
4.1. The no model model  
– Entirely liberalised annuity service provision as a possibility? 
 
We must begin by clarifying that the notion of “fully liberalised” annuity ser-
vice is not quite precise, since in practice the annuity market, which operates 
with only minor restrictions, is also generally regarded as “fully” liberalised, 
and accordingly “full” liberalisation is also scalable. At one end of the scale is 
the annuity market that operates to all intents and purposes without regulation, 
while at the other end there is the “liberalised” annuity market, which operates 
with several, but very general rules.  
The annuity market, which operates with only minor restrictions, can cer-
tainly not be logically linked to the system of “mandatory” annuity, the basis 
of which is that the state requires citizens to continuously save a targeted and 
defined portion of their income during their active carrier for consumption in 
their old age. This requirement is based on the presumption that the vast ma-
jority of citizens are short-sighted and undisciplined, and prefer current con-
sumption to old age security, and this is the reason why a state that does not 
pose such a requirement would eventually be confronted with a large, low-
income old-age population that ends up relying on social benefit. If this is what 
we presume of the citizens, if this is the reason for obliging them to accumu-
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late, then this presumption is not in accordance with the regulation that permits 
them to do whatever they want with their money at the time of retirement, 
because it can be presumed that even at that time the majority would spend it 
in a short-sighted manner, meaning the original problem is reproduced. In 
other words, fully liberalised annuity provision is in fact the logical approach 
in lieu of a mandatory labour pension and mandatory pension savings. Such a 
pension system is also possible, meaning when there is no central pension 
system at all, or if there is just a basic pension that provides only a minimal 
service for everyone, and there are international examples of this and it also 
has many advocates, but the detailed analysis of this system is outside the 
scope of this book, as here we are dealing with possible models for the applica-
tion of mandatorily accumulated capital. 
So for mandatory savings, in the case of “fully liberalised” annuity service 
there is still a need for at least one rule: mandatory pension savings (or a man-
datory fixed minimum portion of that) must be converted to an annuity.  
Naturally this rule in itself is not sufficient, since the meaning of the word 
“annuity” – as I have indicated – is relatively broad, it includes, for example, 
both life annuities and annuities certain. Since pensioners are more and more 
dependent on pension income as their age progresses, only the life-long life 
annuity is suitable as a mandatory annuity (i.e. temporary life annuity is inade-
quate!). Consequently, this rule is worthy of further development: mandatory 
pension savings (or a mandatory fixed minimum portion of them) must be con-
verted to life-long (but not necessarily immediately commencing) life annuity.  
Yes, but if there exists such an absolutely minimum regulation, then it is 
almost certain that the legislator will find himself in a kind of “legislative 
spiral”, so it becomes unavoidable to further elaborate on what is meant by 
“life-long life annuity”. This is because providers (who continue to serve the 
short-term interests of short-sighted consumers) will try to pay out the savings, 
or the highest possible portion of it, in a lump sum and within the shortest 
possible time to circumvent the aim of the regulations by sticking to them 
formally. This is possible e.g. by paying out the life-long annuity in decreasing 
amounts, for example at each payment they pay out 50% of the reserve to the 
client until the end of his/her  life (though this very quickly decreases the “life 
annuity” to a nominal amount). So it is useful to add that life annuities must 
not be of decreasing amount, etc. 
By making it mandatory, the state implicitly also takes responsibility, mean-
ing it cannot allow irresponsible providers who steal the clients’ money or are 
later unable to pay the promised benefits to appear on the market,. This forces 
the state to restrict the range of possible providers, to supervise their activities 
and, by setting requirements on available capital, to make them able to provide 
the undertaken service. 
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The state can probably not avoid taking a stand on questions such as accord-
ing to what criteria (e.g. age, gender, occupation, place of residence, size of 
assets, etc.) providers may differentiate between clients. In the European Un-
ion for example it is currently forbidden to differentiate between genders, and 
no matter to what extent I regard this rule as disputable, one must take it into 
account. 
It is also probable that the state must make some kind of statement concern-
ing the indexing of annuities: is it compulsory or not, and if so then what is it 
based on (rate of inflation, wage index, etc.)? If the state prescribes something 
with relation to this then it launches another spiral of legislation: can the lon-
gevity risk be devolved to the client or not?; how can it be avoided (through 
more regulations) that the provider finds itself in a difficult financial situation 
as a result of an obligation for which the responsibility lies not with the pro-
vider, but with the state, etc.? 
The justification for a liberalised annuity service may be twofold; a “practi-
cal” and an “ideological” reason. According to the “practical” justification, 
letting the market develop the annuity service system saves the state from 
having to perform the legislative work. The “ideological” justification states 
that competing providers provide the best possible result for the client; compe-
tition results in the best possible service for the client at the lowest possible 
price.  
Serious counter-arguments can be raised against both justifications. All of 
the abovementioned counter-arguments contradict the “practical” justification, 
because if the state has an obligation with regard to the pension system, then 
the state inevitably gets into a spiral of legislation. The argument against the 
“ideological” justification is the example of the Hungarian life insurance mar-
ket (and probably many others), where expensive products that do not meet the 
clients’ needs have been offered for a long time by competing providers. The 
reason for that is obvious and it would clearly work similarly in the “liberal-
ised annuity market”: in the case of liberalised annuity, service providers 
would do their best to include the highest possible costs in the premium of the 
product. This can be best achieved if they offer products that are incomparable 
with those of their competitors and overvalue the significance of the difference 
through advertising. So unregulated competition that extends too many param-
eters in reality means less competition, because it exploits the low level of 
information available to clients. In the case of all goods, intensive competition 
means competition between standardised products at a central location, which 
is best symbolized by how the stock exchange operates. There would be no 
stock exchange without standardization, and accordingly the ideological argu-
ment is built on a market vision that is contrary to the real operation of the 
market.  
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Altogether I think that the fully liberalised annuity service model is not com-
patible with mandatory labour pensions and the system of mandatory pension 
savings; such a model can only operate in countries where the state does not 
impose any kind of obligation with relation to pension savings. Where such an 
obligation exists and this model is nevertheless applied, the expectations to-
wards the state and the consequent regulatory spiral easily leads to a state of 
affairs in which we may begin with a fully liberalised annuity provision sys-
tem, but will quickly end up with a haphazardly regulated annuity provision 
system. Therefore it is expedient to avoid this trap and to review the expecta-
tions that can be made of a mandatory annuity-provision system, and to in-
clude this within a well-considered regulatory system. 
4.2. The possible elements of annuity systems and their context 
In the above two chapters I have analysed how the selection of the different 
key elements (scope of choice of the insured individuals, applied indexation 
technique, etc.) determine the other elements of the annuity system, the result-
ing problems and the tools for managing them. In summary, due to the internal 
context of the solutions an annuity system cannot be built up such that the 
above elements are arbitrarily attached to each other; they can only be com-
bined with each other in a determined way. The above elements define several 
interrelated annuity systems, but the decision-makers usually only choose from 
these annuity systems; they are not free to mix the various elements.  
Below, I summarise the above-detailed relationship between the elements, and 
on these grounds I attempt to identify the possible annuity models. 
4.2.1. SYSTEM ELEMENTS AND OPTIONS RESULTING FROM THE HANDLING  
OF SELECTION PROBLEMS 
First, let us look at selection resulting from choice of provider and its pos-
sible management. There is no selection problem in a fully liberalised annuity 
service system, as the clients’ unlimited choice is also coupled with unlimited 
possibility for differentiation on the part of the providers (including the refusal 
of the potential client). However, if the regulation restricts provider options, 
meaning (apart from a few other parameters) differentiation is forbidden, then 
the corresponding rule on the part of the clients is that regulations do not af-
ford them the opportunity to choose the provider. If the client does so regard-
less, the loss must be spread among the providers. 
So the possibilities are as follows: 
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Table 3: Possible selection problems arising from the free choice of the provider 
and differentiation possibilities 
Selection problems due to choosing the provider  
Differentiation amongst insured individuals  
Unlimited opportunity Limited 
Insured  
individuals  
May not choose between 
providers 
No selection problem 
No selection 
problem 
May choose between  
providers 
No selection problem 
Selection 
problems! 
 
Hereinafter I do not analyse the possibility that unlimited differentiation 
among the insured individuals is possible,58 as according to the above this 
possibility does not exist in the majority of countries. Although if differentia-
tion among insured individuals is limited, the question arises whether clients 
may choose the provider, or in other words: are there competing providers on 
the market? 
There is no selection problem if there are no competing providers on the mar-
ket. This may happen in two cases: 
1. There a single, central provider, 
2. There are several providers, but they are distinct and it is clearly de-
fined which clients belong to which provider. 
 
However, if there are competing providers on the market then the selection 
problem caused by the prohibition of differentiation may be equitably man-
aged in two different ways: 
1. Through consolidation, via an obligatory and centrally organised pool, 
2. By dividing the product(s) into two parts and transferring the risky part 
to another provider. 
 
Equitable means that theoretically regulations may transfer the management of 
problems generated by the regulation itself to the provider, so the legislator 
may say that the negative consequences of regulation should either be covered 
by solvency capital, or if the provider is able, it may pass them on to the cli-
ents. Naturally the legislator may only allow this latter solution to a certain 
extent, so if at the very beginning the problem is not managed the legislator 
may find itself in a spiral of regulation similar to that described above, and the 
result may be haphazard regulation without clear incentives, or it may lead to 
restricting providers, which in turn motivates them to leave the market. So I 
hereafter do not raise this possibility in either of the solutions. 
                                                          
58 Although a regulation based upon such a principle will certainly work with much 
fewer restrictions, so such regulations could be easily created based on this present 
study. 
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There may be two types of pool: 
a) Minimal (premium equalizing mechanism). This may be applied if in-
dexing is based on the refund of excess return, through which mortali-
ty loss is (partly or wholly) transferred to the clients, 
b) Maximal, in which case annual mortality results are distributed 
throughout the entire term. 
 
If the annuity is split in time into a temporary and a deferred annuity part, then 
the selection risk is not identical in the two parts. If the duration of the tempo-
rary annuity (i.e. the deferral period of the deferred annuity) is small, the vast 
majority of the selection risk appears at the deferred annuity. The proportion 
between the two may be changed by increasing the duration of the temporary 
annuity. In such a case the selection risk of the deferred part decreases. How-
ever this can be eliminated totally from the temporary part if instead of tempo-
rary life annuity, the temporary part is converted into an annuity certain (or 
into a phased withdrawal, which is identical from this aspect).59 Naturally, the 
price of this it is that annuity payments would be somewhat smaller, and to an 
increasing extent the longer the temporary part.  
So via the phased withdrawal + deferred annuity facility, whereby the de-
ferred annuity is transferred to another provider, we can eliminate selection 
risk for the term of the annuity certain. The deferred annuity can basically be 
transferred to two types of organisation: 
1. To a central provider, 
2. To a well-capitalised market player. 
 
So we acquire the following possibilities: 
1. Central provider, 
2. Closed providers, 
3. Competing providers 
a. Organised into a mandatory pool, the entire annuity is paid by the 
various providers 
i. Minimal pool: premium equalising mechanism (plus transfer-
ring the mortality profit to the clients via indexing), 
ii. Maximal pool. 
b. Competing providers may only pay temporary annuity and the de-
ferred part of the life annuity is transferred to a well-capitalised 
market player, 
c. The same as above, only the deferred part is transferred to a central 
provider. 
                                                          
59This is to all intents and purposes a life annuity with a guaranteed period at the be-
ginning (front-end). 
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From among the above, the possibility for a closed provider exists only prior to 
the establishment of a private pension system, and since the legislators in-
volved generally did not come to such a decision I will not elaborate on it 
further. However, in this case the statements concerning the central providers 
are in essence valid, since the closed provider performs its activity as a central 
provider from the aspect of its own well-defined range of clientele.  
So, from the aspect of annuity models the following possibilities exist so far: 
 
Table 4: Possibilities from the aspect of annuity models 1 
Competing or 
non-competing 
providers  
Central 
provider   
Competing providers  
Does it provide 
the full annuity or 
only the first part 
of it (phased 
withdrawal)? 
Full 
annuity  
Full annuity Only the first part  
Managing pro-
vider selection 
problems 
Non-
existent  
Via a 
premium 
equalisation  
mechanism 
In a 
mandatory 
maximum 
pool 
The deferred 
annuity is 
transferred to 
a central 
provider  
The deferred 
annuity is 
transferred to a 
well-capitalised 
market player  
 
According to the above, selection as a consequence of choosing the annui-
ty type cannot be managed, in other words if there is such a possibility it 
must be eliminated (if such an option already exists, and if it doesn’t then it 
should not be offered at all), and instead a precise definition of the type of 
annuities on offer is required. More than one type of annuity is only possible 
if no choice is possible, meaning who can purchase the various annuities is 
pre-defined. In practice this is a single life annuity for single individuals, and 
the joint lives annuity for married couples, both of which are of course well-
defined. But the choice made by the legislator between these options has an 
equal impact on every annuity model, or in other words it can be freely cho-
sen (except that such a choice must not be allowed!), and so I have not indi-
cated it in the table, since this does not separate the possible models.  
Similarly, selection possibilities as a result of choosing the rate of indexing 
can also not be managed, and consequently must also not be offered. This 
means predefining the indexing rate for the entire market with respect to index-
ing strategies for investment in index-linked bonds, and pre-determining the 
technical interest rate for the whole market with respect to return-refund index-
ing strategies. (Just a reminder: in this case liberalisation would be formal, be-
cause due to competition the providers would be forced to apply the lowest pre-
mium and accordingly the lowest possible rate of indexing [the highest technical 
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interest rate]. In the case of a central provider, the choice between various kinds 
of indexing would result in certain loss for the provider.) 
In view of the above, a free the choice with regard to starting the annu-
ity may only be allowed if this is an annuity with a guarantee period at the 
beginning, or more generally if the annuity is made up of two parts: a life 
risk-free part up to a determined age (annuity certain or phased withdrawal), 
and a deferred life annuity part. Accordingly, the key is whether the annuity 
is a simple life annuity (one part, commencing immediately), or a phased 
withdrawal + deferred life annuity, i.e. one of the above-mentioned ways in 
which we manage selection that results from choosing the provider. In this 
latter case the commencement of the phased withdrawal can be delayed arbi-
trarily, its payment can be suspended, and naturally this part can also be left 
as a legacy. 
At the same time, it is true in both cases that: 
1. Concluding a contract for simple (immediately starting) life annuity 
and deferred life annuity may not happen at a time selected by the cli-
ent; that must be tied to a general rule (expediently: the date of retire-
ment), 
2. The suspension of the already started annuity may be allowed; that does 
not cause adverse selection. 
 
Accordingly, below I assume that the first criterion is met and there is a possi-
bility for suspension, and I do not indicate this separately. Although the possi-
ble models are divided according to whether the possible annuity is simple or 
deferred (in this latter case it operates as a phased withdrawal until the maturi-
ty of the deferral and is regulated separately!). Naturally, where such a division 
of the annuity already was introduced above, this problem is also handled by 
that, however the splitting of the annuity is also a possible issue with respect 
the other models, due to this problem. 
So, from the aspect of annuity models the following possibilities exist so 
far: 
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Table 5: Possibilities from the aspect of annuity models 2 
Competing or 
non-competing 
providers  
Central 
provider   
Competing providers  
Does it pro-
vide the full 
annuity or only 
the first part of 
it (phased 
withdrawal)? 
Full  
annuity 
Full annuity 
 
Only the first part 
Managing 
provider 
selection 
problems 
Non-
existent  
Via a premi-
um equalisa-
tion  mecha-
nism 
 
 
In a manda-
tory pool  
Transfers 
the de-
ferred 
annuity to 
a central 
provider  
Transfers the 
deferred 
annuity to a 
well-
capitalised 
market player 
Is the annuity 
composed of 
one or two 
parts? 
one  two one two one two two two 
4.2.2. WHO BEARS THE MORTALITY LOSS (INCLUDING THE LOSS DUE  
TO INCREASED LONGEVITY)? 
Either the client or the provider may bear the mortality loss (i.e. what remains 
despite the pool), or they may share it among themselves. However, the pro-
vider may only bear the loss if its ownership does not coincide with its client 
nature, since if it does, the loss is still born by the clients – it will be redistrib-
uted among different groups of clients in an unfair manner. So the bearer of the 
mortality loss depends on whether or not the owners of the provider are sepa-
rate from the clients. The former case describes for-profit providers who bear 
the loss directly against the mandatory solvency capital. In the second case 
there is no rationale to for-profit orientation or required solvency capital 
(which, for instance, is not even a requirement according to Hungarian fund 
regulations, consistently with itself). 
So the possibilities are: 
1. The provider is a for profit organisation and 
a. fully bears the (final) mortality loss, 
b. the mortality loss is shared between the provider and the client. 
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2. The provider is a non-profit organisation (i.e. owned by the clients60, 
meaning it is owned by its “members”, has no capital, or is a central 
provider). In this case the (final) mortality loss is born entirely by the 
client. 
 
In a consistent regulation the mortality profit naturally also belongs to the 
person who bears the mortality loss, e.g. in case 1/a it belongs to the provider 
and in case 2 it belongs to the client. According to the above, case 1/b is ra-
tional if the traditional, return-refund technique is applied and if the index is 
the combined investment-mortality return index. In this case the provider guar-
antees that the annuity remains unchanged at nominal level, and it is in this 
(and only this) that it shares the mortality loss with the client. This also applies 
to the case of the minimum pool, which accordingly should only be used in the 
case of for-profit providers (the maximum pool is much more expedient in the 
case of non-profit providers).  
In the second case it is useful to apply the buffer technique in order to moder-
ate annuity fluctuations. This might also be considered in case 1/b. 
Having a central provider is not expedient if it is a for profit organisation, 
and so in that case the logical solution is for the clients to bear the mortality 
loss (although it is at its lowest in this case, because this is where the diversifi-
able part of the mortality risk is most balanced and only the systematic part, 
the “trend”, remains). 
Theoretically both competing for-profit and non-profit providers might 
transfer the deferred annuity to either a central or a well-capitalised provider if 
the annuity is split into two parts, but non-profit providers tend to transfer it to 
the central provider, while for profit providers usually prefer to transfer it to 
well-capitalised market players, so – for the sake of simplicity – this is what I 
presume hereinafter. 
So, from the aspect of annuity models the following possibilities exist so 
far: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
60 At least if the regulation is consequent. 
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Table 6: Possibilities from the aspect of annuity models 3 
Competing or non-
competing providers 
Central 
provider 
Competing providers 
Does it provide the full 
annuity or only the first 
part of it (phased 
withdrawal)? 
The full 
annuity 
The full annuity 
Only the first part of the 
annuity 
Managing provider 
selection problems 
Non-existent  
Via a 
premium 
equalisation 
mechanism  
In a mandatory pool  
Transfers 
the 
deferred 
annuity to 
a central 
provider  
Transfers the 
deferred 
annuity to a 
well-
capitalised 
market 
player  
Is the annuity composed 
of one or two parts? 
one two one two one two two two 
Is the provider a for-
profit or non-profit 
organisation? 
non non for for non for non for non for 
 
A logical question with respect to a central (and so obviously non-profit) pro-
vider is whether it should be identical to the Social Security (hereinafter: SoS) 
organisation, which pays the benefit from Pillar I of the pension system. As the 
SoS is not engaged in investment, since a pay-as-you go system is in place, 
there is no great advantage if the central provider and the SoS are one and the 
same and accordingly I do not deal with this possibility, with one exception. 
Namely, it is conceivable that the insured individual is not entitled to receive 
SoS and private pension parallel to each other, but one comes after the other in 
such a way that the SoS pension is payable at an older age than the insured 
party’s current age. This is practically speaking one version of a two-part life 
annuity, where the first part is provided entirely by the private pension system 
and the second part is provided entirely by the SoS system. So this can be 
regarded as the situation in which someone wants to retire at an earlier age 
than the retirement age in force today, in which case they should accumulate 
savings and use them to bridge the gap until their SoS pension is due, when 
they officially retire. So the table may be modified as follows: 
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Table 7: Possibilities from the aspect of annuity models 4 
Competing or non-
competing providers 
Central 
provider 
Competing providers 
Does it provide the 
full annuity or only 
the first part of it 
(phased withdrawal)?  
withdrawal) 
The full 
annuity 
The full annuity 
Only the first part of the 
annuity 
Managing provider 
selection problems 
Non-existent  
Via a 
premium 
equalisation 
mechanism  
In a mandatory pool  
Transfers the 
deferred 
annuity to a 
central 
provider  
Transfers the 
deferred 
annuity to a 
well-
capitalised 
market 
player  
Is the annuity 
composed of one or 
two parts? 
one two one two one two two two 
Is the provider a for-
profit or non-profit 
organisation? 
non for non for non for non SoS for 
 
We can conclude from case 1/b that the question of who owns the mortality 
risk is also related to the indexation technique. 
4.2.3. POSSIBLE INDEXING TECHNIQUES 
Two of the possible indexing and investment techniques (in close correlation) 
may be considered in the case of mandatory annuities: 
1. Indexing to inflation 
2. Indexing based on extra return. 
 
In the case of indexing to inflation the investment may exclusively be made 
into inflation-indexed bonds, whose maturity structure is identical to the antic-
ipated maturity structure of the annuity portfolio. In these cases the regulations 
prescribe indexing to the exact level of inflation (or perhaps inflation + a pre-
determined %), and does not permit providers to change this rate of indexing. 
In these cases it is not necessary to fix the technical interest rate, as that fun-
damentally depends on the (fixed) return of bonds above inflation and on the 
cost level of the provider. In the case of indexing to inflation the provider 
cannot abuse the fact that the client is linked to it, and therefore there is no 
reason for the regulator to allow the client to change provider in the annuity 
phase. Indexing to inflation does not go well with delegating mortality loss to 
clients, as this can basically be achieved through changing the indexation, so 
the basic presumption here is that the mortality profit belongs to the provider. 
If still there is a need to delegate mortality loss to the clients, it is appropriate 
to apply the buffer technique. 
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In the case of indexing based on extra return, the rate of the index depends 
on the extra investment return achieved by the annuity provider. It is not expe-
dient to set a required minimal return, because that would impose on the pro-
vider a guarantee which is very expensive and altogether probably not worth 
paying for the client. Furthermore, only for-profit providers with actual capital 
can have this set as a requirement, so I assume that with this indexing method 
there is no set minimal rate for the indexation.  
In this case, the technical interest rate must be fixed. If the regulator finds it 
important that there should only be a minimal chance for indexing below the 
level of inflation, then this fixed rate is small, for example 0%. In this case, the 
starting annuity payment provided for identical capital will be smaller than in 
the case of a higher technical interest rate, though the annuity increases more 
rapidly, which is more advantageous for annuitants with a longer life expec-
tancy than for someone with a shorter expected lifetime.  
As the client in this case is exposed to the annual investment performance 
of the provider, it is important that providers also compete for already acquired 
clients, so in this case it is reasonable to provide clients with the possibility of 
changing providers during the period of maturity. We might think that by set-
ting a higher technical interest rate one may at least partly protect oneself 
against a lower return, but from the point of view of the provider it is no dif-
ferent from the requirement of a high indexation level; both the required guar-
antees and the same arguments against them are valid as in the case of a man-
datory high indexation rate. The possibility of changing the provider during the 
term is coupled with having to prescribe the technical interest rate61 and the 
mortality tables used for reserving (i.e. this is the second argument in favour of 
setting the former).  
The technique is in harmony with making the mortality profit part of index-
ing. In the case of a non-profit provider the entire mortality loss must be dele-
gated to the insured individuals, so the annuity could even decrease nominally, 
while it is reasonable to set restrictions on this, e.g. to prescribe that the annui-
ty may not decrease nominally, in which case the mortality loss is shared.  
                                                          
61 Certain experts think (e.g. Ferenc Csordás) that changing provider during the term 
does not require the standardisation of the product, since in a technical sense that is a 
product-revision. Though this may be technically true, I still do not deem it an adequate 
solution, because it is too complicated and not transparent for the clients, as well as 
making changing provider practically impossible. The lack of standardisation also 
poses a danger to client, namely that the magnitude of the provision is uncertain, e.g. if 
one of the providers deducts a large cost from the premium and does not put it into the 
reserve, and does not transfer it either, then the new provider regards the transferred 
reserve as premium and deducts the cost from that again. So by changing provider the 
client’s moneys and annuity might quickly run out.  
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Of the two indexing techniques, one (inflation-linked) places the emphasis 
on the security of pensions, the price of which is that the pensioner does not 
receive the benefits of an economic upturn, while the other (return refund) 
concentrates on sharing the results of economic growth with pensioners at the 
expense of some security. A consequence of this is that when the economy is 
weak pensioners are better off because the interest on bonds is higher, while in 
a period of economic boom pensioners are worse off, since the state does not 
have to pay as much for loans. So indexing to inflation protects pensioners 
against economic fluctuations, but at a cost of not sharing the benefits of an 
economic upturn. 
In the case of competing services the mandatory pool is not compatible with 
indexing to inflation, since it leaves no room for competition, so in this case I 
assume indexing based on extra return.  
So, with respect to annuity models the following possibilities exist so far: 
 
Table 8: Possibilities from the aspect of annuity models 5 
 
4.3. Possible annuity models 
Based on the final table above we may distinguish between 14 annuity models, 
although it is expedient to merge some models (and to handle the internal 
branches as internal alternatives). I think that wherever the annuity may consist 
of one or two parts, and where both indexing methods may be considered, 
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these should be looked at as internal alternatives, so I would add these two 
rows to the end of the above table: 
 
Table 9: Possibilities from the aspect of annuity models 6 
Competing or non-
competing providers  
Central 
provider  
Competing providers  
Does it provide the 
full annuity or only 
the first part of it 
(phased withdrawal)? 
The full 
annuity  
The full annuity Only the first part of it 
Managing provider 
selection problems 
(pool or transfer of 
deferred annuity) 
Does not exist  
Minimal 
pool 
Maximum  pool 
Transfers to a 
central provider  
Transfers to a 
well-capitalised 
market player  
Is the provider a for-
profit or non-profit 
organisation? (Who 
ultimately bears the 
mortality loss?) 
non for non for non SoS for 
Is the annuity com-
posed of one or two 
parts? 
Both are 
possible  
Both are 
possible 
Both are possible two two 
Indexing Inflation  
Extra 
return  
Extra return Both are possible 
 
This reduces the choice to seven models, each of which has one (and according 
to the above only one) internal alternative either from the point of view of 
splitting the annuity or from the point of view of indexing. For the sake of 
further simplification I also unite the two maximum pool models, i.e. cases 
when the service provider is non-profit and for profit. These models may be 
given the following names (further details to follow): 
1. The central provider model 
2. The insurer annuity model 
3. The central pool model (with pension funds or fund managers) 
4. The pension fund annuity model 
5. The alternative SoS model 
6. The OECD model 
 
Missing from among the possibilities, at least in its pure form, is the Chilean 
model promoted by the World Bank, which combines indexing to inflation 
with competition between for-profit providers. The reason this is possible in 
Chile is because differentiation according to gender is not prohibited there, so 
the selection problem that requires handling does not arise to begin with. The 
selection problem can be managed either by the (minimum or maximum) pool, 
and consequently through indexing based on extra return, or by splitting the 
annuity. Naturally, if indexing to inflation is applied then the OECD model 
may also be regarded as a special version of the Chilean model.  
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The name “OECD model” is slightly misleading because the OECD mostly 
recommends spitting the annuity such that there is only phased withdrawal 
until a high age (they mention 80-85 years), followed by the deferred annuity. 
So, all models that apply this kind of splitting, could be called an “OECD 
model”. I did not do so because, at least in my view, my other models include 
some that are more “striking” than splitting the annuity, so I stuck to this char-
acteristic when naming them. This is partly true for models 3 and 4, as both (or 
rather the non-profit version of model 3) could be called “pension fund” annui-
ty models, although in the case of model 3 I found the central pool to be a 
much more important characteristic than the fund’s participation in the annuity 
service.  
Below I investigate these models individually in greater detail (not in the 
order listed above!). I will also examine certain general problems that are true 
with respect to several models. These will be examined at the model descrip-
tion where they first occur. 
4.3.1. THE CENTRAL PROVIDER MODEL 
Based on the above, I will first of all summarise the most important elements 
of the model and their internal relationships in the following table: 
 
Table 10: The most important elements of the central provider model 
Competing or non-
competing providers? 
There is a single central provider, so selection problems resulting 
from choosing the provider do not occur.  
Does it provide the full 
annuity or only the first 
part of it (phased with-
drawal)? 
Naturally, the sole provider is “forced” to provide the full annuity.  
Is the annuity composed 
of one or two parts? 
The single provider does of course not mean that the annuity 
cannot be split into two parts, not because of selection considera-
tions, but to allow insured individuals opportunities for legacy and 
deferral.  This, however, is an alternate option here; both are 
possible but one of the two must be chosen, so one or the other 
option applies to all of the insured parties. This means that when 
they retire they both receive a uniformly or immediately commenc-
ing annuity (which may, however, be suspended), or a deferred 
annuity plus the opportunity for phased withdrawal, which can be 
handled flexibly within a predetermined, broad framework. 
Is the provider a for-
profit or non-profit 
organisation? (Who 
ultimately bears the 
mortality loss?) 
It is expedient for the central provider to not be privately owned, 
so the mortality loss (or the entire mortality gain) must ultimately 
be borne by the clients themselves. Since indexing based on extra 
return should be excluded in the case of a central provider, mortali-
ty returns cannot be spread among annuitants via regular indexing 
The possibilities: 
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• Loss and profit is accumulated against the capital of the 
central provider for a period, and therefore the service is ad-
justed from time to time (less frequently than annually) 
• The buffer technique is applied, thanks to which the above 
solution need only be applied rarely, or not at all 
• An option premium is paid to the state, which assumes 
this risk  
Possible indexing  
From among the two possible indexing techniques, the one where 
the index is not pre-set, but is a post factum value depending on the 
investment performance should be excluded, because with a cen-
tral provider in a monopoly position the client loses every possibil-
ity to stimulate the provider to achieve the best possible perfor-
mance. Therefore, only indexing based on investment in bonds 
with yield indexed to inflation should be applied in this case. 
 
The above options can be presented in the following diagram: 
 
Diagram 6: The internal relationship between the elements of the central  
provider model  
 
 
If there is a single central provider, it cannot be a for-profit, privately owned 
provider. It would be difficult to justify the transferring of a monopoly to a 
market player, especially when, as is the case throughout practically the whole 
of Central and Eastern Europe, no market players even exist yet. In this situa-
tion the monopoly would be given to a market player, tasked with developing 
the service, which has not yet proven that it deserves this privileged position. 
Another argument against the state commissioning a market player to develop 
Differentiation of 
annuitants is not 
allowed
Selection problems 
amongst the 
providers
A single 
provider
The whole annuity is 
provided by  a single 
provider
A single provider
The 
provider is 
non-profit
The insured person 
ultimately bears 
the mortality loss
A single provider
Clients cannot protect 
themselves against the 
provider's bad investment 
policy
Indexing cannot be 
based on 
investment return
Inflation-
based 
indexing
If it is important that the 
insured party has the 
opporunity to defer 
payment of the annuity
Spliting the annuity 
into two parts
The annuity is 
partly inheritable
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a monopoly (via preliminary tendering, for instance), is that in such a situation 
the state would intrinsically find itself being blackmailed in view of the fact 
that it cannot act particularly forcefully against the provider if, for instance, it 
does not provide a service of acceptable quality or provides the service at high 
cost, because the provider could threaten to withdraw itself from the market, 
which would put the state in a difficult position as being responsible for the 
service but having no means to provide it. So we can predict that the state 
would have difficulties regulating a market player with a monopoly, and ac-
cordingly this situation should be avoided. In view of these arguments I hereaf-
ter assume with regard to this model that the central provider is not a profit-
orientated organisation.  
There are still alternatives with regard to ownership. The owner may be: 
1. The clients, as in the case of Hungarian pension funds, or 
2. The state. 
 
If the state is the owner, it is logical to ask whether the central provider should 
be established by extending the activities of an existing state-owned organisa-
tion, or should instead be a new, independent provider. In the first case the 
logical candidate is the actual SoS, the pay-as-you-go system. Both solutions 
are reasonable, but the SoS can only be a solution if the central provider is not 
required to perform investment activities (see “alternative SoS model”). If it 
must conduct investment activities too, there is no advantage in building it into 
an existing organisation, it is better to have a separate organisation.  
Although if a separate organisation is established, one should consider al-
lowing the stakeholders to monitor it, so there should be a kind of Hungarian-
type pension fund that provides stakeholders with at least a theoretical oppor-
tunity to have a direct say in the management of their affairs. An argument 
against this solution is that according to experience the activity of members of 
Hungarian pension funds (voluntary and private funds alike) is minimal, so the 
opportunity to have a say may be illusory, in addition to which is creates the 
theoretical possibility for an active minority to acquire control over the organi-
sation.  
Managing mortality loss is basically similar in both ownership structures, 
since in each case its final bearer is the insured individual. If the state has 
ownership the ultimate bearer of the loss could theoretically be the state, i.e. 
the taxpayers, but this is not an equitable solution regardless of whether the 
state gains or loses overall as a result. In every case it is in principle also pos-
sible to distribute the loss among different generations of annuitants, but this is 
also not an equitable solution and therefore not a solution that should be pro-
posed. 
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A state-owned provider (including centralised providers that are owned by 
the members) means the nationalisation of the private pension model. This 
would seem to be a step backwards in a situation in which the accumulation 
phase is based on the competition of non-state-owned providers. Therefore it is 
expedient to examine when and why the idea of a central provider may be 
raised. In two major cases: 
1. If it is more expedient for the state to organise the service rather than 
have it operate in the form of competing market providers, 
2. If, due to a lack of competing market players, the state is forced to or-
ganise the service itself. 
 
Breaking down the above cases even further: 
It is more expedient for the state to organise the annuity service if 
a) it was in fact already not expedient to entrust the service to non-state-
owned, competing providers during the accumulation phase, 
b) the annuity payment phase differs from the accumulation phase in this 
respect. 
 
At the time, when the private pension asset accumulating institutions were 
established practically everywhere throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the 
main goal was to somewhat mitigate the unavoidably threatening de-
mographics-related financial pressure on the pay-as-you-go system by partly 
capitalising the pension system. The capitalisation brought forward the deficit 
that would have appeared later in the pay-as-you-go pension system, as well as 
spreading it over a longer period of time, thus giving the state a better chance 
to better manage it. The state exploits this chance properly if the capital within 
the capitalised system does not fundamentally mean its own debt bonds (or at 
least not bonds newly issued because of the establishment of the new system). 
If this is the case it means the state did not in fact exploit this opportunity, or 
with a little more good will one might say that it hasn’t fully exploited the 
opportunity “for the moment”. This also means that nothing happened with 
respect to the main goal: an implicit sovereign debt was simply replaced by an 
explicit one, which in many respects is a worse situation than the starting 
point.62 If this happens, as was also the case in Hungary, then to all intents and 
                                                          
62Just as a matter of interest: even if the state made it mandatory for private pension 
capital accumulation institutions to invest in their own government bonds, it would be a 
total own goal. There are of course international examples that aren’t own goals: some 
African countries have made it compulsory for pension institutions to invest the capital 
of pensioners (e.g. civil servants) into government bonds that have a relatively low 
return compared to inflation. From the state’s perspective this is equal to robbing pen-
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purposes all criticism of the private pension system with regard to the fact that 
it was established unnecessarily, is justified. But at the same time, in this case 
the problem is not with the competition itself (although competition is natural-
ly restricted), but with Pillar II, the mandatory funded system itself: if it was 
created in this way then there was no point establishing it at all. 
The system would also have been no better had a single, state-owned pro-
vider been established. However, if we say that in the long term private pen-
sion institutions do not invest in their own government bonds (i.e. they can 
invest in foreign ones), then it is justified to suggest that the clients, who bear 
the investment risk, should have an opportunity to choose in exchange for 
assuming this risk.  Choice can of course not only be offered by competing 
providers, but also by a single provider, but there is no cost pressure on it in 
this case. Consequently, it is expedient to entrust competition to competing 
providers rather than to differing portfolios within a single provider. Addition-
ally, it is not a good idea for the state to be the (majority) owner of competing 
providers, so I think that at the time it was the right decision (in Hungary, for 
instance) to entrust the service to non-state-owned, competing providers during 
the accumulation phase.  
This is of course a very general statement, because it does not take into ac-
count 
a. what precisely the competing providers are competing in, and 
b. whether it is in fact worth requiring competition with regard to every 
single component of this activity? 
 
In the accumulation phase, there are two areas of competition (assuming that 
the provider does not provide a guarantee on the return, as also occurred in 
Hungary in the case of private pension funds): 
1. Net returns achieved by the provider 
2. Costs charged for by the provider 
 
Private pension funds sometimes also name a vague third factor “the quality of 
the service”, but this cannot really be operationalised because the service is 
clear, so the basic functions (records, notification of members, etc.) can in 
essence only be performed in one of two ways: well or badly, but the fact that 
the provider should perform these services well is a fundamental requirement. 
The second field of competition is the costs charged by the provider, which 
basically means administration, and organising and operating the membership 
records system. This is characterised by increasing returns to scale because the 
fixed costs are high. This means the larger the provider, the lower the costs 
                                                                                                                               
sioners, so it has a specific goal, but in my study I have excluded such motivations from 
my sphere of examination. 
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charged. This may result in a provider having a clear competitive advantage 
with respect to the investment, but not necessarily within the field of admin-
istration. Consequently, we cannot know if it was justified to set up a system 
(as occurred in Hungary in 1997) in which every element is open to competi-
tion; it is possible that a model with a centralised membership records and 
administration and competing investment providers would have been more 
expedient.  
Within the annuity payment phase, the possible fields of competition (de-
pending on how the law defines annuity services) are: 
1. Net return achieved by the provider 
2. Costs levied by the provider 
3. The “tailor-made” nature of the annuity provided  
4. Longevity risk management 
5. The long-term solvency of the provider 
 
So competition can potentially extend to many more fields in the annuity pay-
ment phase than in the accumulation phase. However, there are a great number 
of arguments in favour of the state restricting competition within these fields 
via regulation. In the annuity payment phase (in contrast to the accumulation 
phase) it is much more important to have a calculable return adjusted to infla-
tion than for the provider to achieve a high return. In a mandatory system there 
cannot exist an endless variety of annuities, so regulations should probably 
severely restrict the range of possible varieties, and accordingly competition 
between “tailor-made” annuities (which, as I have already indicated above, are 
aimed at avoiding competition rather than enabling it).  
Regulations often transfer longevity risk to the provider, which it then com-
pensates in its costs, so competition in this field is transferred to cost competi-
tion. The long-term solvency of the provider is much more important in the 
annuity payment phase than in the accumulation phase because in this latter 
case there is no commitment, while in the payment phase there is a commit-
ment, which the provider may eventually be incapable of fulfilling. So we are 
left with cost competition and competition with regard to long-term solvency. 
The returns to scale discussed in the context of the accumulation phase are also 
applicable with relation to costs, or rather the administration charge, meaning 
its central management should also be considered in this case.  
Long-term solvency is influenced in a positive way if: 
1. the organisation is backed by a solvent owner or sponsor such as the 
state, 
2. if the risks are in a single pool, so the random risk fluctuations cancel 
each other out. 
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So, in the case of annuities a central provider is a logical alternative that does 
not contradict the goals of the private pension system. However, one argument 
against it is a politically-related factor and this is if the population has exag-
gerated expectations with respect to the national budget as an instrument of 
welfare, which in turn has a detrimental effect on economic growth. From this 
perspective it is expedient to mitigate the national budget from a proportion of 
welfare expenditure (i.e. the pension system). This mitigation exists in the 
model of competing non-state-owned providers, but not in the central provider 
model; whatever the regulations, the central provider becomes, both practically 
speaking and in wider sense, a part of the national budget. In addition, com-
pared to the system of competing providers, it also makes it much more possi-
ble for the private pension system to become a stage for irresponsible political 
promises, as we have seen on many occasions with respect to the SoS pension 
system. 
Naturally the central provider model does not only emerge if the legislator 
finds it more expedient, but also if there aren’t a sufficient number of enter-
prises that are prepared to rationally organise the private pension annuity, so in 
the case of a mandatory private pension system the state may be forced to set 
up a central provider. Such a constraint is better avoided; if the state establish-
es a central provider it should do so because it is more expedient and not be-
cause it has no other option. So the state should avoid becoming its own reason 
for there being no voluntary annuity providers. The state may cause this if it 
poses inconsistent and therefore infeasible requirements on providers.  
An example from the, otherwise inconsistent, Hungarian annuity legislation 
in force until 2009: it is (should have been) compulsory for the provider to 
increase the level of annuity payments annually at least in correspondence with 
Swiss indexation. As there is no capital market facility whose return is easily 
correlated with this index (and within this, with the wage index), providers 
could only have met this requirement if they establish an extremely high safety 
reserve, i.e. by setting a very low starting annuity. As the legislator requires 
not only an adequately indexed annuity but also one of adequate level, in this 
situation the legislator’s solution could have been to choose cost-maximising, a 
constraint which, together with the inadequate indexation rule, makes it almost 
impossible for prudent providers to enter or remain on the market. 
In the central provider model the premium reserve is invested exclusively 
into bonds, whose return is dependent on inflation. Naturally this investment 
and indexing technique may not only be used in this model, but wherever we 
use it the problem of nationalisation emerges, although somewhat differently 
than in the case of institutional centralisation via the establishment of a central 
provider. Specifically in the case of Hungary (and many other countries), in-
vestment in inflation-linked bonds means mandatory investment into govern-
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ment bonds for the foreseeable future, i.e. the cloaked nationalisation of annui-
ty service. Therefore, the question is raised whether, instead of cloaked nation-
alisation, it would not in fact be more expedient to openly nationalise annuity 
service, i.e.to set up a central annuity provider? 
The consistent models I found ultimately suggest that the answer is yes, be-
cause I only regard indexation to inflation feasible (beyond indexing to the 
excess return refund, as an alternative) in models where the annuity is split and 
the deferred annuity, meaning the peak risk, is either transferred to a central 
provider or to a strong market player. In fact in this latter case it is somewhat 
doubtful whether it is logical and consistent to “also” apply inflation indexing.   
Nevertheless it is possible that in the long term investing in inflation-linked 
bonds might not mean investing in government bonds, or at least not in the 
given country’s own government bonds, as 
• In theory all EU Member States will eventually join the Eurozone and 
accordingly they will have access to the foreign (Euro-based) inflation-
linked sovereign securities and company bond market, 
• It is possible that, following the example set by the state, the market 
will also begin to issue inflation-linked bonds of adequate quantity and 
quality, as happened in the case of Chile. 
 
Naturally, Eurozone inflation-indexed bonds would not necessarily solve the 
problem, since the rate of the inflation may differ within the various countries 
of the Eurozone. Within a common market there is of course a tendency to 
equalise inflation rates if the level of development of the different countries 
doesn’t differ to a significant extent. But until a country catches up to the Eu-
rozone average (like most Central and Eastern European countries that have 
implemented private pension reforms) prices there will remain characteristical-
ly lower than in the more developed countries, which in turn means that prices 
catch up too, so for a prolonged period in these countries the rate of inflation 
will be also be higher than in the more developed countries of the Eurozone. 
Indexing to inflation within the pension system should be linked to domestic 
inflation and as a result using the inflation-linked bonds of other countries 
could cause a (not necessarily irresolvable) problem.  
It is also important to note that in the case of investing in inflation-indexed 
bonds requirements not only include the fact that the yield of these bonds 
should be linked to inflation, but also that 
a. they must be denominated in the same currency as the liability, i.e. the 
currency in which the annuity is paid, 
b. the maturity structure of the bonds must correspond to the maturity 
structure of the annuities (asset-liability matching), meaning they can-
not be of any kind of maturity, only short term bonds. (However this 
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strict ALM requirement can be mitigated if the state engages in the 
long-term issuing of such bonds in adequate quantities). 
 
This latter requirement is needed so that the market fluctuations in bond values 
can be completely disregarded during the evaluation of annuity provisions and, 
to all intents and purposes, only bonds that are kept until maturity are included 
in the investment portfolio.  
The notion of the central provider emerged only recently in English lan-
guage literature, often only as an idea to be rejected. For the World Bank 
[1994] it was still clear that a decentralised savings system also requires pri-
vate annuity providers. Examining the institutional structure of the annuity 
market, Blake [1999] already mentions the state monopoly as a possibility. In 
his view, this could solve a number of problems he brought up, its advantages 
being: returns to scale, being more capable of bearing improvements in mortal-
ity, indexing and that the interest cycle could be better balanced. He mentions 
as the major disadvantage that there are few international examples of effi-
ciently managed state-owned institutions. This may over-compensate the ad-
vantage of the increased return to scale.  
For the authors of the OECD, who collected ideas from many countries that 
were preparing to introduce an annuity system, the idea of a central provider 
also emerged. In 2007, Fiona Stewart only raises the fact that the state could 
itself sell annuities as a possible option. A year later Pablo Antolin is also 
looking for a suitable provider, and since he finds that insurance companies, 
who would be best prepared to provide such a service, are not really interested 
in the possibility, he raises the idea of a single national provider, although in 
his view this could result in private providers being pushed out of the market 
(Antolin [2008a] and OECD [2008a]). In his next study (Antolin [2008b] and 
OECD [2008d]), he adds that its disadvantages include making the taxpayers 
the final guarantor and that in such a scenario the state reassumes the invest-
ment and longevity risk that it had previously left out of its portfolio. In addi-
tion there is also a political risk, which is more difficult for a state provider to 
withstand than for private providers. 
In the Hungarian market the idea of a single central provider was raised by 
János Stahl in 2000 (Stahl  [2000]), and at the time only as a possibility to 
solve problems caused by the unisex table, although in 2005 it was raised as a 
complete concept (Stahl  [2005]). In 2000, he still found it necessary that the 
idea of a central provider and the NDC-based reform of Pillar I are kept sepa-
rate from each other, stating that (page 221): “The fact that the previously 
envisioned system is modified so that there is only a single provider, which is 
most certainly some kind of state institution, is naturally not identical with the 
idea that everyone’s pension contribution is kept on denominated accounts, 
186  4. MODEL OPTIONS FOR MANDATORY OLD-AGE PENSION BENEFITS 
and the interest is based on the yield of some government bond.” In other 
words: this is a warning that having a single provider does not mean that the 
reserve is mandatorily invested into government bonds and certainly not that 
this is done explicitly.  
In 2005, he already considers who that central provider might be and thinks 
(Stahl [2005]) that such a provider could be established jointly by the pension 
funds or that it might be created based on a Guarantee Fund which has lost its 
function. In the debate that began with Stahl’s article [2005], György Németh 
(Németh [2006]) finds Stahl’s proposal for a central annuity provider to be 
justified, but in his view it needs refinement. During the course of this “re-
finement” Németh proposes a completely different concept, which I discuss 
later under the name “central pool model”.  
The notion of the central provider was considered as a “theoretically possi-
ble, but practically out of question” possibility right up until the summer of 
2009. Then, at a session of the Ministry of Finance Working Group set up to 
regulate annuities, the idea was unexpectedly embraced by Péter Holtzer (who 
represented for-profit providers in the committee and at the time was President 
of the Roundtable for Pension and Old-age Affairs, a government-established 
body). It was thanks to his influence that the bill, which included (though not 
as he had originally recommended) this proposal for the annuity model, along 
with another one, was put before Parliament in 2009. He had originally sug-
gested full renationalisation as the right solution (in fact to all intents and pur-
poses the version about which Stahl warned did not properly fulfil the role of 
central provider!), where the single annuity premium is paid into the budget 
and, much like in the case of Pillar I, the annuity is then paid directly from 
there. According to his vision there is no investment, no printing of govern-
ment securities, no separate apparatus, and in essence not even a central pro-
vider, only a central service. The solution, from a certain perspective, would 
no doubt have been cost-effective, but would have re-included in the system 
the political risk that had been previously eliminated by the establishment of 
the private pension system (Pillar II), and would have circumvented the possi-
bility of investments being made in non-government (foreign) securities at 
some time in the future, i.e. the chance that the Hungarian state would not even 
be involved in the private pension system via government debt. (Of course, a 
certain level of state involvement is necessary to the central provider model.) 
4.3.2. THE OECD MODEL 
Based on the above, the model’s most important elements and their internal 
relationships are as follows: 
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Table 11: The most important elements of the OECD model 
Competing or non-
competing providers  
Clients may choose, with certain restrictions, from among several 
competing providers. 
Does it provide the full 
annuity or only the first 
part of it (phased with-
drawal)? 
Competing providers only provide the first part of the annuity 
within a phased withdrawal structure that clients are relatively free 
to organise (i.e. not, or not necessarily within a life annuity frame-
work). This partly solves selection problems between competing 
providers that result from the prohibition of differentiation. 
Is the annuity composed 
of one or two parts?  
As a consequence of the previous point, the annuity is composed of 
two parts, where the first part is a phased withdrawal that allows 
insured individuals to defer commencement of the annuity with the 
majority potentially left as a legacy (providing they do not live it 
up in the meantime), i.e. ”the client’s money is fully at his/her 
disposal”. However, the insured individual must immediately 
purchase the deferred part of the annuity on retirement. 
Managing provider 
selection problems 
The remaining selection problems, which are intrinsically fewer 
than if the provider sold the client an immediately commencing life 
annuity in itself, and which are borne by the deferred part of the 
annuity, are transferred by the provider (via transference of the 
deferred annuity) to a well-capitalised market player and as a result 
it is fully exempt from them. 
Is the provider a for-
profit or non-profit 
organisation? (Who 
ultimately bears the 
mortality loss?) 
Based on the above, (by passing the deferred annuity to a central 
provider instead of a well-capitalised market player) the provider 
could also be a non-profit entity, but this is such a significant 
characteristic that it paves the way for another annuity model. So 
in this model the provider is a for-profit company (e.g. from the 
possibilities available according to the previous Hungarian envi-
ronment63 a pension fund transformed into a joint-stock company). 
Accordingly, the mortality loss, which appears exclusively at the 
deferred part of the annuity, is fundamentally borne by a well-
capitalised provider at the expense of its solvency capital, which is 
charged as a kind of option fee in the first part of the premium. 
Indexing  
Theoretically it can be solved via both indexing techniques and 
there are arguments for and against both solutions.  An argument 
for indexing to inflation is that the two annuity parts can be rela-
tively seamlessly adjusted to each other, and that with respect to 
the deferred annuity part it is difficult to change providers mid-
term, but then again, without this indexing technique “already 
acquired” clients would be vulnerable to their providers, who from 
their perspective are in a monopoly position. An argument against 
inflation-linked indexing is that it negates the need to set up com-
peting providers, meaning it is only raised if competing providers 
can already be taken as given.  
 
 
 
                                                          
63In 2009, Hungary’s Parliament adopted an act that included this possibility, but 
this act eventually never took effect. 
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The abovementioned relationships are represented in the diagram below: 
 
Diagram 7: The internal relationship between the elements  
of the OECD model  
 
 
The essence of the model is that clients retain a high level of control over 
their accumulated money, including the possibility of leaving the as yet 
unused portion of the annuity as an inheritance (in the case of annuity cer-
tain or phased withdrawal), while this autonomy does not endanger their 
livelihoods at a potentially very old age, because they are obliged to pur-
chase a kind of “emergency cover” from a portion of the money in the form 
of a deferred annuity. The division of the money into temporary and de-
ferred annuities depends on the possible age at which the deferred annuity 
eventually commences. Below I present a few calculations for the approx-
imate proportions. 
In the OECD model, but not only in that, an important element of the model 
is that each immediately commencing lifelong annuity may be divided into two 
parts, a so-called “temporary” annuity that lasts for a determined period of 
time, and a deferred annuity, where the period of deferral corresponds to the 
term of the temporary annuity. Together, the two annuities form precisely an 
immediately commencing, lifelong annuity.   
According to the above, the formal splitting of the annuity is expedient if: 
1. the two annuity parts are managed differently, i.e. they are performed 
by different organisations or different providers, as in the case of the 
OECD model, or 
2. if the intention is to keep a portion of the annuity at the disposal of the 
clients, so a guaranteed period annuity is the general rule rather than an 
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immediately commencing simple life annuity. In such cases the annuity 
part can be managed separately and relatively “liberally” during the 
guaranteed period. 
 
For the provider, the biggest risk that needs to be managed with respect to the 
annuity is the longevity risk. If the original annuity is split, the original longev-
ity risk is also split, but it is not spread equally between the two parts of the 
annuity. It is easy to recognise that the longevity risk is mainly related to the 
deferred part of the annuity, as its extent cannot be precisely defined, because 
annuitants could live for a very long time compared to the provider’s original 
plan. In contrast, during the temporary part of the annuity the extent of the 
provider’s possible losses are limited in this respect: the worst that can happen 
is that annuitants do not die during the term of the annuity, in which case the 
life annuity behaves like an annuity certain. To demonstrate the possible extent 
of loss, I indicate the relationship between the net premiums of temporary 
annuities certain and temporary annuities using the 2000 and 2006 Hungarian 
male and female population mortality tables for the calculation: 
 
Table 12: The single net premium of a temporary life annuity as a percentage  
of the guaranteed annuity for entry age 65 years 
Life table  2000 2006 
Technical 
interest rate  
0,0% 2,9% 0,0% 2,9% 
Period/maturity  15 20 15 20 15 20 15 20 
Male 71% 61% 73% 65% 74% 64% 76% 68% 
Female 83% 74% 85% 78% 86% 78% 87% 81% 
 
It is obvious that the higher the mortality the higher the potential mortality loss 
(i.e. the difference between the premiums of the two types of annuity), namely 
it is higher for men than for women and higher when calculating with the 2000 
mortality table than with the 2006 mortality table (which shows an improving 
trend compared to 2000). As the annuity is expectedly calculated using a sig-
nificantly more favourable mortality table than the population mortality table, 
the possible loss will probably be even smaller in the temporary part. 
In addition, the longevity risk may be totally eliminated in the temporary 
annuity part if we calculate with annuity certain from the start and not with a 
temporary life annuity. If the two annuity parts are viewed together, this is 
nothing more than the supposition of life annuity insurance with a guaranteed 
period at the beginning. The possible annuity payment is of course smaller 
than in the case of a pure life annuity, but the better the mortality the smaller 
the decrease, as is also indicated by the table.  
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The relative weight of the two annuity parts is shown in the table below, in 
which I present the proportion of the premium of the deferred annuity parts, 
which primarily bear the longevity risk, within the premium of the original 
annuity.  
Table 13: Deferred life annuity premiums as a percentage of the simple life  
annuity for entry age 65 years 
Life table  2000 2006 
Technical  
interest rate  
0,0% 2,9% 0,0% 2,9% 
Deferral 15 20 15 20 15 20 15 20 
men 18% 7% 13% 4% 20% 8% 15% 5% 
women 25% 11% 19% 7% 27% 12% 20% 8% 
 
It can be stated that the better the mortality conditions the higher the relative 
premium of the deferred annuity. So in the case of women it is better every-
where than in the case of men, and in the case of a generally better mortality 
table (as in the improvement in 2006 compared to 2000) it is higher than in the 
case of a generally worse mortality table. However, the higher the technical 
interest rate the smaller this proportion (since as time passes the higher tech-
nical interest rate makes the further elements progressively less valuable dur-
ing the cash-flow phase), and it is naturally also lower the longer the deferment 
(so lower at 20 years than at 15 years). However, even in the extreme case 
presumed within the table (i.e. assuming the 2006 female mortality table, a 0% 
technical interest rate and 15 years of deferral64), the deferred annuity still only 
corresponds to 27% of the premium. True, this is an underestimated value to 
the extent that the actual annuity will probably have to eventually be calculated 
using a (from a mortality perspective) better projected mortality table than the 
2006 mortality table.  
An obvious tool for consuming private pension savings is to prolong the 
temporary annuity. But this has different types, which raises the question of 
precisely what kind of annuity it should be, and also whether this consump-
tion should necessarily be made in the form of an annuity (and, of course, 
whether it is necessary to consume the savings at all). The following options 
result: 
 
 
                                                          
64 So the insured individual would begin receiving the annuity from one of the pro-
viders at the age of 65 and it would last for 15 years, until the age of 80, providing the 
annuitant survives until that age, after which another provider begins paying the de-
ferred annuity, which now lasts until the end of their life. 
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• Temporary life annuity 
• Temporary annuity certain  
• Phased withdrawal 
• Withdrawal in a lump sum  
 
The different possibilities have the following advantages and disadvantages: 
 
Table 14: Possible variations in temporary annuity 
Possibility  Advantage Disadvantage 
Temporary life 
annuity  
• since the reserve of the previous-
ly deceased is distributed among 
the still living annuitants, this as-
sures the highest level of annuity 
payments among all the possibili-
ties   
• it schedules the consumption of 
monies by the insured individuals 
and thus diminishes the risk that 
they will consume ahead of time 
(presuming undisciplined pen-
sioners with restricted foresight, 
or who are under increasing fi-
nancial pressure)  
Inflexible, meaning: 
• it is non-inheritable (since 
the money of the deceased 
is divided among the re-
maining insured individu-
als) 
• the possible dates of the 
retirement should be re-
stricted in view of the dan-
ger of adverse selection 
• may only be provided by an 
insurer-type institution 
Temporary 
Annuity 
certain   
• flexible, meaning: 
o inheritable without prob-
lem   
o there is no danger of ad-
verse selection, so the date 
of retirement may be cho-
sen totally flexibly 
• it schedules the consumption of 
monies by the insured individuals 
and thus diminishes the risk that 
they will consume their savings 
ahead of time  
• it may be provided by any kind of 
financial provider  (e.g. today’s 
Hungarian private pension funds) 
• since the money of the 
deceased is not distributed 
among the remaining annui-
tants, it provides a some-
what lower level of annuity 
compared to temporary life 
annuity   
Phased with-
drawal   
• even more flexible than a tempo-
rary annuity certain, permitting 
more possibilities for change dur-
ing consumption 
• it may be provided by any kind of 
financial provider (e.g. today’s 
Hungarian private pension funds) 
There is no default schedule 
during the consumption phase, so 
there is a danger that the insured 
person will experience certain 
periods of financial shortages 
(assumes a relatively disciplined 
pensioner)  
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Withdrawal in 
a lump sum   
• the most flexible solution since 
anything can be done with the 
savings e.g. annuities (even in-
cluding lifelong annuities and an-
nuities that are differentiated ac-
cording to gender) can be bought 
on the free market or one can 
start up an enterprise, etc. (i.e. it 
assumes a disciplined pensioner 
with adequate foresight, or who is 
not living under increased finan-
cial pressure)  
• it may be provided by any kind of 
financial provider (e.g. today’s 
Hungarian private pension funds) 
• if the pensioner is not 
disciplined enough, they 
may easily run out of mon-
ey before the commence-
ment of SoS (Pillar I) an-
nuity payments 
• there may be pressure on 
the pensioner from their en-
vironment to not use the 
money received as a lump 
sum to cover their own 
needs but, for example, 
their children’s needs  
 
The regulator may decide which of the above possibilities to impose from top 
to bottom. The rule is that possibilities before the imposed ones must also be 
allowed, while those after it must not. So if the regulation prescribes temporary 
life annuity, all other possibilities must be excluded. If, however, the regula-
tions allow for the withdrawal of the money in a lump sum, there is no reason 
to prohibit the other possibilities.  
In the OECD model and in the other models that split the annuity into two 
parts, allowing phased withdrawal, with certain restrictions, is the default, 
which accordingly permits both temporary annuities certain and life annuities, 
if the insured party so choses, but excludes withdrawal in a lump sum. The 
latter, for instance, if the legislator wishes to homogenize the annuity, may be 
permitted above a certain amount. A possible and expedient rule for phased 
withdrawal could be that each year following retirement the annuitant can 
withdraw a proportion of the value of the reserves at the beginning of the year 
corresponding to how many years are left before the commencement of the 
SoS pension. The advantage of this solution is flexibility, which does not en-
danger the potential livelihood of the pensioner (that could arise due to lack of 
discipline, financial requirements or pressure from their environment) while 
leaving open the possibility for inheritance, which according to Hungarian 
experience is a widely known and required feature of the private pension sys-
tem, its main attraction, one might say. A further advantage is that providers 
may retain existing pension funds (providing such institutions exist of course – 
this is the pension fund annuity model!), so there will be default providers on a 
systemic level, contrary to the case in which life annuity is prescribed by law. 
Because if life annuities are made compulsory the pension funds must either be 
transformed into insurance company-like providers (with actual owners and 
solvency capital), or pensioners must be forced to change providers when they 
retire (i.e. to leave their previous pension funds), which means there will be no 
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default provider and, as a potential danger, there will be no provider at all if 
nobody volunteers to enter the market. 
Contrary to the alternative SoS model, where the duration of the temporary 
annuity is tied to the ratio of Private Pension Pillar to SoS Pillar, this is totally 
optional in the case of the OECD model and in the case of every model where 
capital is transferred within the private pension system. However a few con-
siderations should be made when choosing the option, the most important 
being what magnitude of loss the annuity system is able to absorb as the price 
of free choice and the opportunity to inherit. A temporary life annuity is 
“cheaper” than an annuity certain (or phased withdrawal, which has a similar 
character) in the sense that the reserve of the deceased annuitants goes towards 
the annuity of the remaining insured parties and is not inherited, so it “stays in 
the system”. The longer the temporary annuity certain, the more money leaves 
the system, so the assessed temporary annuity certain may be smaller in ac-
cordance. Table 12 provides an idea about the magnitude of this loss. It is 
worth noting with reference to the table that it probably overestimates this loss, 
because the annuitant mortality table would probably be more favourable than 
the 2006 population mortality table, meaning the difference between tempo-
rary life annuity and annuity certain will in fact be smaller than in the above 
table.  Based on this I think we may consider a 15-year temporary annuity 
without any problem, but a longer duration might also be considered.  
A further question is whether the term of the temporary annuity should be 
optional, or whether the provider should set the term.  Furthermore, if this is to 
be regulated, then should we define the term of the temporary annuity or the 
age of commencement of the deferred annuity (e.g. how old the annuitant will 
be when the deferral comes to an end)? The clear answer to this latter question 
is that determining the age of the commencement of the deferred annuity is 
more in harmony with the client’s right to choose, since, if the regulation al-
lows the most flexible version, phased withdrawal, which can be suspended 
and restarted, the term of the temporary annuity cannot be clearly defined.   
So the question regarding the term of the temporary annuity can be reword-
ed to state: should the client be able to choose the starting age of the deferred 
annuity, or is it expedient for it to be fixed by legislation for the entire market. 
In favour of this predetermination of the starting age (e.g. uniformly at the age 
of 80 or 85) is the fact that this would to a great extent eliminate the risk of 
adverse selection,65 which would result in an increase in the premium of de-
ferred annuities. 
                                                          
65 I note that the trend of adverse selection is not quite clear. Arguments support that 
primarily those might choose a high age for the commencement of the deferred annuity 
who expect a long life, since the protection of the deferred annuity will be effective 
from a higher age in their case. However, people with a shorter life expectancy may 
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I have already stated that (to prevent adverse selection) the annuity must be 
defined at the time of retirement.  Apart from this, in this model as well as in 
any other model in which the annuity is split, regulation should set two objec-
tives: 
1. It must assure that the two annuity parts are connected so that dur-
ing the entire period of retirement the pension paid from the private 
pension pillar should as far as possible be balanced in real terms, or 
at least should not decrease. 
2. It must assure that in the temporary annuity phase, when the annui-
tant has a wide scale of choice, this does not result in the consump-
tion of the major part of their savings during the first part of the 
phase.   
The first objective may be achieved partly via indexing regulations and partly 
by rules concerning the calculation of annuity payments. In the case of the 
latter, the goal of regulation should be to assure that when the annuity com-
mences the benefits from the two annuity parts are still in harmony, while the 
former must assure that this harmony continues and the two parts of the annui-
ty do not “slide apart”. 
The obvious rule when calculating the level of annuity is to calculate the 
annuity payment as an immediately commencing life annuity at the time of 
retirement with respect to the full capital.  After this, the so determined month-
ly annuity payment is used to calculate the capital portion to be used for the 
deferred annuity.  The question of course arises: what kind of annuity should 
this be? There are two possibilities: a simple life annuity and an annuity with a 
guaranteed period at the beginning (front-end), where the term of the guaran-
teed period is identical to the period of deferral of the deferred annuity.  
The other question, if the client may otherwise choose what annuity to pur-
chase during the period of deferment, i.e. during the term of the temporary part 
of the annuity, is whether this decision should effect whether the annuity pay-
ment is calculated on the basis of a simple annuity or a guaranteed period an-
nuity, or whether it should instead be calculated on the basis of one or the 
other independently from this decision. In other words: should the immediately 
commencing annuity calculated at the time of retirement always have no guar-
anteed period, or should this depend on whether the insured person chooses a 
temporary annuity, a guaranteed period annuity (so smaller payment at the 
beginning) or an immediately commencing annuity? 
                                                                                                                               
think about minimising the amount spent on deferred annuity because they would end 
up not using it, so they might want to instead maximise the capital they leave as an 
inheritance. 
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Since, as in the case of almost every choice, the problem of adverse selec-
tion emerges, it is expedient for the insured person to again not have the oppor-
tunity to choose in this case. Though if the regulator does not give annuitants 
the right to choose, then it must decide itself which immediately commencing 
annuity should be used as the basis for the annuity payment. In the case of 
simple annuity, a higher annuity payment will be determined for a higher age, 
and if the client chooses phased withdrawal, the monthly annuity payment will 
be smaller than this during this withdrawal phase, so this solution places great-
er emphasis on security at a very old age. In the case of guaranteed period 
annuity, however, if the client chooses temporary life annuity during the defer-
ral period, the level of annuity payments could decrease when the deferred 
annuity commences. 
If the client chooses a temporary annuity that was presumed at the calcula-
tion of the deferred annuity payment, the magnitude of the two annuity parts 
are in harmony with each other at the beginning. So the rules of indexing must 
prevent the shifting apart of the two annuity parts that are in synch with each 
other at the start. This occurs automatically with inflation-linked indexing, at 
least in the event that the insured individual chooses a temporary life annuity 
or an annuity certain in the first annuity phase, since by choosing they under-
line the fact that the schedule determined by the insurer for the withdrawal of 
their money is important to them. Nevertheless, indexing to inflation is contra-
ry to the logic of phased withdrawal as in this case the insured individual sup-
ports the option of free choice, but this is significantly impaired by the re-
striction of the investment, as is characteristic of inflation-linked indexing. So 
in this case the regulator must decide what it views as more important: the 
seamless joining of the two annuity parts or the free choice of the insured indi-
vidual.  
At the same time, the suitable joining of annuities can also be assured via 
return refund indexing if the reserve of the deferred annuity is not immediately 
transferred to the well-capitalised provider, but the provider of the phased 
withdrawal invests it in the same manner and with the same return as in the 
case of the first annuity part. In this case an agreement is only concluded with 
the well-capitalised provider with regard to the tariff and the fact that the re-
serve of the deferred annuity will only be transferred to it if the insured person 
dies (and accordingly it will not have to provide a service), or if the insured 
person survives until the end of the deferral period. 
The second objective, that the insured person does not consume the entire 
reserve during the initial period, can be assured by a few simple rules. In the 
case of temporary life annuity and annuity certain it is sufficient to assure that 
these annuities cannot be annuities that diminish with time, and cannot come to 
an end before the deferred annuity commences. It is not important to prescribe 
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that they may not come to an end sometime later; it will probably not be im-
portant to a reasonably-minded annuitant if they receive two different types of 
private pension annuity at some point in the middle of their retirement. It is 
also not important to define the starting date; it can occur at any time following 
retirement. In fact, if the insured person has sufficient accumulated capital it 
may even begin prior to retirement.  
The case of phased withdrawal is a little more complicated. The same ap-
plies to the start as to temporary life annuities and annuity certain. Since the 
point here is that the annuitant may voluntarily suspend and restart it, and the 
withdrawal of money does not necessarily have to take place on a monthly 
basis or in equal amounts (although these will probably be the default), more 
general rules are required than in the cases above. Disregarding the fact that 
the capital may fluctuate significantly during the term depending on the per-
formance of the investment, so if (apart from money withdrawal) we assume 
an unchanged (or uniformly increasing) level of capital, the regulator has the 
following possibilities at its disposal, depending on what it would like to 
achieve: 
1. If the objective is that the money that can be withdrawn should not di-
minish from one month to the next, a possible rule is that the annuitant 
cannot withdraw more money from the capital during a given month 
than the balance at the beginning of the month divided by the number 
of months remaining until the commencement of the deferred annuity. 
If someone regularly withdraws the same amount and never interrupts 
the withdrawal, this rule to all intents and purposes provides them with 
an annuity certain. If they interrupt the withdrawal at some point, the 
money thus saved may be withdrawn uniformly over the remaining 
months. The disadvantage of this solution is that it makes it impossible 
for someone to withdraw a large amount all at once, for example after 
having not withdrawn anything for a long time.   
2. If the objective is to enable the withdrawal of the (indexed) level of the 
starting annuity payment each month, then a possible rule is that the 
annuitant may at any time withdraw a sum corresponding to the differ-
ence between the existing capital and the following product: the start-
ing level of the deferred annuity indexed according to the investment 
return achieved until that time, multiplied by the remaining number of 
months. This rule also permits one-off, larger withdrawals.  
 
So, if the second rule is accepted the insured party may be allowed to withdraw 
larger amounts as a lump sum from his/her account from time to time, by sus-
pending the withdrawal of money and thus accumulating adequate “savings”. 
The question is whether the withdrawal of larger amounts of money is already 
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possible at the time of retirement. As this question is a general one and appli-
cable to every pension model, I will provide the answer in the general section.  
Another question is whether temporary annuities that have already commenced 
can be changed within the three possible types. There is no theoretical obstacle 
(at the most administrative and cost-related obstacles) to shifting (back and 
forth) between annuity certain and phased withdrawal. However, ongoing 
temporary life annuities cannot be converted into the two other annuities be-
cause of the danger of adverse selection. This danger is much smaller in the 
case of a reverse shift, so theoretically there is not obstacle to shifting from an 
annuity certain or from a phased withdrawal to a temporary life annuity (alt-
hough few people will be interested in this possibility). 
This model emerged in Hungary much earlier than it was published by the 
OECD as a somewhat spontaneous “popular requirement” and the possibility 
arose independently in various forms both in Hungary and abroad. I formulat-
ed it in 2007, when I observed that a broad expectation with regard to private 
pension funds is that they should be inheritable, and the possible smallest part 
of it should be shared in risk community with others. At the time, many people 
said that in their view phased withdrawal is a self-explanatory solution, which 
they regard as a direct consequence of the logic behind private pension funds, 
and they could not imagine any other type of annuity. The “experts” “translat-
ed” this into a feasible system by adding deferred annuity to the phased with-
drawal as an “emergency cover”. 
This formally appeared in Hungarian literature via Kolos Ágoston (Ágoston 
[2008]), and in international literature it is mostly advocated by the OECD. 
With regard to the OECD this model is also an official recommendation for 
countries that are still only designing the annuity system of their private pen-
sion pillar. This was officially put forward in Paris on 12 November 2008 at 
the OECD Seminar on “The Payout Phase of Pensions, Annuities and Finan-
cial Markets”, and can be found in the related publications (Antolin [2008a] 
and OECD [2008a]). According to these, two important risks must be man-
aged: the risk related to the timing of the conversion into annuity and the lon-
gevity risk. The most important payment options with relation to the accumu-
lated capital are lump sum, scheduled withdrawal and life annuities, and their 
combinations, between which a balance must be found between flexibility and 
protection. Therefore, the OECD believes the best solution is to combine 
phased withdrawal with a deferred annuity (purchased at retirement). This 
latter would commence at about the age of 85 and would require about 15% of 
the accumulated money. 
Although Antolin does not cite antecedents, the idea has a short history in 
technical literature, although the Canadian Moshe A. Milevsky did not propose 
his idea of Advanced-Life Delayed Annuities (ALDA) as a model of payment 
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of formal DC systems. This may be regarded as a new idea because in 1999 
even Blake said (Blake [1999]) that the deferred annuities market is so small, 
especially in case of a very long deferral, that in practice the market doesn’t 
even exist. If these are nevertheless available for purchase, then the conditions 
are generally extremely bad. Furthermore, the market is also shrinking as a 
result of mortality uncertainties.  
In his article “Real Longevity Insurance with a Deductible: Introduction to 
Advanced-Life Delayed Annuities (ALDA)” (Milevsky, Moshe [2005]) 
Milevsky mentions J. B. Stephenson’s 1978 article as an antecedent (“The 
High-Protection Annuity. Journal of Risk and Insurance 45(4): p. 593-610”). 
In his article, Milevsky proposes a deferred annuity with an ultra-long defer-
ment period, which in addition would also be a regular premium and would be 
indexed to inflation. In his view, its targeted community could be members of 
the North American population who do not have a traditional DB pension.  He 
shows that with a monthly payment of USD 1 during the pension savings peri-
od the client would receive a monthly benefit of USD 20-40, provided that the 
waiting period (deductible) is long enough. In the long term this could dimin-
ish the psychological obstacles to purchasing a voluntary annuity in an envi-
ronment in which promoting DC plans at the expense of DB plans and the very 
low level of voluntary annuity purchases call for a new solution. Annuity pay-
ments would commence at a very high age of 80, 85, or 90.66 He mentions that 
one of the novelties of the idea is also the regular nature of the premium, as 
this product already existed as a product with a one-off premium, but was a 
commercial failure. 
Milevsky’s idea evoked a range of literature. According to Gong-Webb 
[2007] the product has 3 major advantages: 1. households maintain their li-
quidity until its commencement, 2. it is preferred by households, and 3. with its 
help the consumption of the capital can be managed using simple rules of 
thumb. However, in their view it is still questionable whether this product does 
in fact diminish people’s aversion to converting to annuities. Therefore they 
propose that ALDA should be made the default in 401(k) plans, which is prac-
tically the same as the OECD model. However, they note that this solution is 
disadvantageous for people with relatively short life expectancies. 
                                                          
66 My own idea: unforeseen changes in mortality could be managed by adjusting, i.e. 
increasing, the starting age. 
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4.3.3. THE ALTERNATIVE SOS MODEL 
Based on the above, the model’s most important elements and their internal 
relationships are as follows: 
 
Table 15: The most important elements of the alternative SoS model 
Competing or non-
competing providers  
The service is provided by several competing providers, between 
whom the clients may choose (with certain restrictions). 
Does it provide the full 
annuity or only the first 
part of it (phased with-
drawal)? 
The competing providers only provide the first part of the annui-
ty, mainly as a phased withdrawal that is relatively freely deter-
mined by the clients (so not, or not necessarily, as a temporary 
life annuity). However, this first part is the first part of the whole 
SoS system annuity, so no annuity is received parallel to it from 
the SoS system. However, the deferred annuity is fully provided 
by the SoS, so no more annuity is received from the private 
pension system during its term. This structure among the compet-
ing providers completely manages selection problems that arise 
from the prohibition of differentiation (or rather some level of 
selection problems may remain if the clients can choose tempo-
rary annuity instead of scheduled withdrawal). 
Is the annuity composed 
of one or two parts? 
As a consequence of the above, the annuity (which in this case is the 
total mandatory old age pension) is composed of two parts, where the 
first part is phased withdrawal from the private pension capital that 
permits annuitants to defer the commencement of payments, and 
potentially enables the majority of the capital to be left as a legacy 
(providing they do not consume it in the meantime). (This is often 
referred to as “the client has full control of his/her assets”.)  
Managing provider  
selection problems 
In this structure there are no remaining problems with relation to 
choosing between providers. 
Is the provider a for-profit 
or non-profit organisa-
tion? (Who ultimately 
bears the mortality loss?) 
The issue of mortality loss is not raised in the case of this model 
with respect to the fact that deferred annuity is a pay-as-you-go 
product, with relation to which this question is not usually exam-
ined. Competing providers may be both for-profit and non-profit 
providers, but in a situation where non-for profit providers al-
ready exist, there is no reason for them to be replaced by profit-
orientated providers according to this model. 
It must, however, be noted that not examining the mortality loss is 
not a self-explanatory feature of pay-as-you-go systems. Pay-as-
you go systems with (primarily NDC-type) individual accounts are 
capable of raising the question of managing longevity risk, and the 
fact that this must always be charged to the given cohort. 
Indexing 
Theoretically it can be solved using either indexing technique. 
There are arguments for and against both solutions. It is in fact 
also possible that the insured individuals are allowed to choose 
the investment, and in turn the indexing technique. However, in 
the case of this model it is almost certain that the two annuities 
“shift apart” to some extent, since indexing almost certainly 
occurs according to different principles with relation to the two 
annuity parts. 
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The abovementioned relationships are represented in the diagram below: 
 
Diagram 8: The internal relationship between the elements  
of the alternative SoS model 
 
 
 
The essence of the model is that the state pension (SoS annuity) and the private 
pension (mandatory annuity) do not exist in parallel, but the two annuities 
follow one another, meaning a pensioner receives annuity from one only 
source at a time and not from two sources simultaneously. Naturally either the 
SoS or the mandatory annuity could be the first of these annuities, but I ex-
clude one of these possibilities to all intents and purposes. Although it is theo-
retically possible for the SoS annuity to commence immediately after retire-
ment, last for a certain period or until a certain age, and then (if the pensioner 
is still alive at the time of maturity) be replaced by the private pension annuity, 
but this would be an inexpedient solution. Not so the other possibility, i.e. its 
reverse, when pensioners first consume their private pension savings after 
which, from either a pre-determined age or at the end of the term, the SoS 
annuity commences. Naturally, this pre-determined age is higher than the actu-
al age of retirement and the usual official age of retirement.  
The above two options are not symmetrical because the point of splitting the 
annuity is for the longevity risk to be either partially or fully assumed by the 
provider that provides the deferred annuity. From this perspective, we can to 
all intents and purposes exclude the first possibility, i.e. that this is the provider 
that provides the private pension annuity (insurance companies, funds and 
competing providers in general), because the SoS, backed by an explicit or 
implicit state guarantee, is capable of bearing the longevity risk to a much 
better extent, and more importantly at a much lower cost, than competing mar-
ket providers. For them (and ultimately for their clients), assuming the longevi-
ty risk is much more expensive, in addition to which it is also uncertain wheth-
er all of them will be capable of bearing this risk, i.e. whether one or more of 
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them might go bankrupt, leaving behind old people without care, who will 
eventually end up requiring the assistance of the state after all. 
So in the alternative SoS model I assume that the pension assured by the SoS 
system (e.g. by the mandatory pay-as-you-go and funded systems together) is 
composed of two parts: following retirement, pensioners first consume (or not 
as the case may be, it’s their decision!) their private pension savings, after 
which the SoS pension commences from a later age and lasts until the end of 
their life. 
The question naturally arises: how long should the private pension last and 
when should the SoS pension begin? Should the transition between the two be 
defined according to age or according to the duration of the private pension? 
The two theoretical possibilities are as follows: 
• when the annuitant reached a pre-determined age, e.g. at the age of 75, or  
• at the end of the pre-defined, fixed duration of the private pension an-
nuity. 
 
After a short analysis it can be easily recognised that it is only expedient to 
select the first option, in view of the fact that transition at a pre-determined age 
has the following advantages: 
• it saves the SoS annuity (and in fact the whole system, if the temporary 
annuity is an annuity certain) from adverse selection on the part of the 
pensioner (i.e. with respect to the date of retirement). 
• private pension annuity fits in well with various types of SoS system, in 
contrast to a pre-defined transition based on the term, which only fits in 
well with SoS systems that maintain individual accounts (NDC, or 
point system), because otherwise equity problems (and via this incen-
tives problems) may arise. The essence of the equity problem is that 
people who select a later date for retirement should benefit from a suit-
able increase in their SoS pension, but this can only be achieved 
through the accurate calculation of entitlements, i.e. via an individual 
account. (Naturally, despite this it is worth making the SoS system an 
individual account system “in all events”, i.e. even in the case of a pre-
defined transition, because of the advantages of such systems.) 
 
In the case of both transition times it is true that the system promotes a later 
retirement (since until retirement money is accumulated on the private pension 
account, and can be inherited). If the ratio of the funded pension is sufficiently 
high within the system, the transition defined according to age will in all 
events take place at an age at which the majority of the pensioners actually 
retire, so whether or not the system promotes the deferral of the SoS pension is 
unimportant, meaning that in this case there is again no advantage to a transi-
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tion time determined according to term. However, a major disadvantage of 
determining the time of transition according to when the term of the private 
pension ends is that this cannot be fitted well to the SoS pension. By fitting I 
mean that the transition from one annuity type to the other should not result in 
pensioners experiencing a change in their level of annuity payments, or at least 
not a major jump. If we suppose that each annuity part is actuarially correct, 
then in the case of a transition defined according to age the SoS annuity can be 
foreseen relatively well by the pensioner. If they decide not to begin consum-
ing their private pension savings, then their (potential) private pension annuity 
will increase continuously compared to the SoS annuity, but this is not a prob-
lem because they are not required to consume it. If, however, the turning point 
is defined according to the term of the private pension annuity, then we must 
assume that the pensioner will consume their private pension savings (begin-
ning at some point, which could also be the official retirement age, according 
to the discretion of the pensioner), meaning a private pension annuity level can 
be calculated for them. If the term of the private annuity is pre-predetermined, 
then the annuity level received during this period will not necessarily be in 
harmony with the actuarially correctly defined SoS annuity level, because this 
will be different at different ages.  
Accordingly, in summary I think that the transition between private pension 
annuity and SoS annuity must definitely be determined according to age. The 
next question, of course, is what should this age be? The principle is obvious: 
1. The term of the temporary annuity must be added to the official (mini-
mal) retirement age, 
2. The term of the temporary annuity must be determined so that average 
assets accumulated on the individual private pension accounts roughly 
assure the same monthly annuity (life or certain, depending on regula-
tions), as provided by the deferred SoS annuity based on the accumu-
lated entitlement.  
 
Together with the determination of the transition, the next logical question is 
how to switch to such a system. This problem can be broken down into three 
categories: 
1. Only the SoS pension exists, but the intention is to split it into a tempo-
rary private pension and a deferred SoS pension, 
2. Both private pensions and deferred SoS pensions already exist, and the 
intention is to increase the ratio of private pensions (i.e. to raise the age 
limit at which the SoS pension commences), 
3. Both private pensions and deferred SoS pensions already exist, but par-
allel to each other. 
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We can generally state that transition to this model is greatly facilitated if the 
logic of SoS pensions and private pensions correspond, so if for instance they 
both operate in a DC system, or NDC system in the case of the SoS pension. 
For my part I examine only this case, while noting that if the SoS pension does 
not operate according to an NDC system and we desire such a transition, than 
we should begin by transforming the SoS pension to an NDC system. Then, 
disregarding the other problems that result from the transition, such as the fact 
that those involved need time to get used to the fact that the system they have 
been familiar with until then has suddenly changed, technically speaking the 
transition can take place overnight with respect to people who have not yet 
retired: 
1. The method of transition is that the existing, uniform SoS pension is 
split into two parts at the same time as the entitlements accumulated 
until that time on the individual (NDC) accounts are also split into two 
and according to the same ratio (i.e. as if the originally uniform annuity 
had been split into two parts from the very beginning). The state recog-
nises as explicit sovereign debt the entitlements kept on the NDC ac-
counts until that time and which from then on will go towards the pri-
vate pension, and the state formally issues sovereign debt bonds with 
relation to them (within an adequate maturity structure), which then 
serve as the basis for the private pension annuity. Naturally, in this case 
the private pension annuity can only be a (temporary) life annuity, be-
cause the original SoS annuity, or rather the NDC balances that serve as 
a basis for the new annuity, are only sufficient to this extent.   
2. The logic behind raising the age limit is the same, at least if temporary 
annuity was provided until then. 
3. The transition from existing parallel annuities should also not cause too 
significant a problem with respect of those who have not yet retired, 
providing that the transition to the parallel solution was performed 
properly at the time. This cannot be said, for example, in the case of the 
Hungarian reforms of 1997, since the people who switched to the pri-
vate pension system lost all of their previous entitlements accumulated 
under the SoS system. The consequence is that the relative proportion 
of capital available to the two types of annuity is different at the time of 
retirement for different generations: the older the generation, the lower 
the ratio of private pension capital (assuming of course that everything 
else, e.g. returns, is equal). In such cases the legislator should not de-
termine a uniform transition, but one in which the transition age in-
creases year by year (for a time). 
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If the target of the temporary annuity is an annuity certain rather than a life 
annuity, then the problem of lack of coverage may be solved so that in compar-
ison to the above, the transition: 
• is postponed by a few years after the splitting of the contribution, and 
of course the contribution payable to the private pension fund must also 
be determined at a level that also cover the costs of legacy, or 
• inheritability must be made available gradually: first only for a short 
time following retirement, then later gradually extended to the entire 
term of the temporary annuity.  
 
The two phases of the pension annuity, i.e. the parts of the annuity that are 
derived from the funded system and the pay-as-you-go system, should be har-
monised, meaning they should be determined in such a way that the monthly 
annuity from both pillars is the same. The two parts of the annuity may differ 
from each other for one of two reasons, so these factors should be taken into 
consideration when harmonising them: 
1. The funded and pay-as-you-go annuities defined at the time of retire-
ment are already different, 
2. The two parts of the annuity are indexed differently during the funded 
annuity period, so they “shift apart”. 
 
Harmonisation only appears as a problem if the funded system actually pro-
vides an annuity-type service, though even in the case of phased withdrawal it 
is likely with regard to the majority of people affected. 
At the time of the retirement, the harmonisation of the two annuity parts can 
be achieved by regulating the age of retirement, as I have already discussed. It 
is a great help If the pay-as-you-go system is an NDC one, since at the time of 
retirement (i.e. when payment of the funded annuities commences) the annuity 
of both pillars can be calculated according to the same principle on the basis of 
the accumulated (actual or notional) capital. As the accounts of funded and 
pay-as-you-go systems carry interest according to a different logic until the 
time of retirement, it is not certain that the monthly pension calculated for the 
two pillars will be identical; the starting pension from the funded system may 
be smaller or larger than the later one from the pay-as-you-go system. If the 
pension from the funded system is lower than the one from the pay-as-you-go 
system, it is not a problem in itself I think, because pensioners will experience 
an increase in their pension, which will generally be perceived as a positive 
change. However, if the pension from the funded system, i.e. the starting pen-
sion, is higher we should avoid allowing a pension decrease when the switch to 
a pay-as-you-go pension occurs, which can be realised simply if the system 
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allows pensioners to (at their discretion) withdraw the collateral of the excess 
annuity as a lump sum at the time of retirement, or later. 
The “shifting apart” of the two annuity parts can be prevented if the rules on 
indexing are identical for both pillars. The following indexation possibilities 
may be considered:  
• Indexation within the pay-as-you-go system is to a certain extent a mat-
ter of decision. The most customary indexing is based on the price in-
dex or wage index, or on a combination of the two. The Hungarian pen-
sion system seems to be increasingly moving towards price indexing, 
although this is strongly dependent on politics and therefore uncertain. 
The NDC system attracts wage indexing to some extent, because it al-
lows a fairly simple connection between increased income and in-
creased obligations, since one of the most important factors of increas-
ing income within the system is the wage index. Indexing the NDC also 
depends on whether the target of the NDC system is self-supporting, 
i.e. on whether or not ongoing pension payments and ongoing income 
remain in harmony in the long term.  
• Indexation within the funded system must depend on investment per-
formance. The rate can be linked to some of the macro indexes (wage 
index, price index, growth of GDP, stock exchange index, etc.) if the 
investment itself is fixed and occurs using facilities that result in a level 
of return that depends on the given macro index. From this perspective, 
it seems that in practice there are two kinds of macro indices: 
1. Shares in a composition corresponding to a given stock exchange 
index. However, the stock exchange index is too variable to be a 
suitable basis for the indexation of pensions, not to mention the fact 
that with such indexation the pensions of the funded and pay-as-
you-go systems can certainly not be harmonised, 
2. Inflation-linked bonds. There are currently no bonds whose returns 
are linked to other indices on the international market (apart from 
disaster bonds, which are obviously irrelevant here).  
 
So the shifting apart can be best avoided if indexing to inflation is applied in 
the pay-as-you-go system (which is the usual international practice), while in 
the funded system regulations prescribe indexing to inflation parallel to invest-
ing in inflation-linked bonds.  
This model was raised or “invented” by several experts more or less inde-
pendently from each other, or rather, according to various news sources it is 
being continuously raised and reinvented, generally not in written form. So far 
I have found two sources of such proposals in written form (although these 
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papers are not necessarily the source of the idea and they are generally not 
referred to in this context). 
The model is first mentioned in World Bank [1994], just in the form of a 
short idea (not detailed), who raised it explicitly with respect to the annuity 
problems of the DC system. According to the paper, the remaining lifetime is 
difficult to forecast, even on the level of cohorts, and this is why the providers 
cover their annuity exposure with reserves or life insurances. In their view, a 
possible solution is that private pensions should only be used during the first 
period of the pension, e.g. during the first twenty years, while the national 
pension system would take over at a higher age. In national pay-as-you-go 
systems the cost of a higher life-span is transferred implicitly to the next gen-
eration, which the state can realise via its power to levy taxes. 
The second instance occurred explicitly with reference to the Hungarian cir-
cumstances in Point 20 of the paper written by Barabás-Bodor-Erdő-Fehér-
Hamecz-Holtzer [2006]. According to this, “Annuity payments that last from 
the time of retirement until death may also raise certain questions. This was 
not the case until we had only one national pay-as-you-go social security sys-
tem. Nowadays though, we already have a private pension fund too (and in fact 
other recognised pension products may also become available in future). There 
are very few countries in the world where one can find annuity markets that 
operate competitively and therefore effectively. Hungary is not one of them, 
and we are unlikely to be so lucky in the future. We will have an oligopolistic, 
overpriced, non-transparent annuity market (why should this be the only ex-
ception?), where we will have to convert our pension fund savings into annui-
ties. But then why do we have to force people to buy annuities at all? If we 
think it is unnecessary and allow people to access their capital when they retire 
in the form of a bank annuity (phased withdrawal), then there is no reason at 
all for the social security system and the second pillar to begin annuity pay-
ments at the same time. So we should consider whether we should perhaps re-
think the principle of annuities paid out in parallel and instead switch to a 
system of annuities that are paid one after the other such that the longevity risk 
is covered by the social security system, whose risk community is better quali-
fied for this in view of its size, while with respect to fund payments young 
pensioners should be given the opportunity, within certain restrictions and 
incentives, to schedule their annuity payouts; the general principle of payouts 
from retirement until the time of death remains, but gains a different interpreta-
tion with respect to the various subsystems”. 
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4.3.4. THE INSURANCE (RETURN-REFUND) ANNUITY MODEL 
In the literature, I (Banyár [2007]) drafted this model, and it was approved as a 
regulation concept by the then Ministry of Finance. The Hungarian annuity 
regulations adopted in December 2009 partly include this model (and partly 
the central provider model). The literature presented in the chapter on indexa-
tion, specifically Réti [1999], can be cited as antecedents to the model. In Ré-
ti’s view, indexation can be nothing other than return-based (Réti does not yet 
mention the problems of managing mortality gain, or that this cannot take 
place on the basis of a pension fund). This is also Stahl’s standpoint (Stahl 
[2005]), according to whom indexation should occur on the basis of the com-
bined investment and mortality performance. Although as Stahl also allows the 
nominal decrease of the annuity, his proposal can perhaps be interpreted as 
belonging to the pension fund annuity model.  
Changing providers during the term, which is an important element of the 
model, is also my own concept. The literature only alludes to it in passing. Réti 
[1999] and Augusztinovics-Gál-Máté-Matits-Simonovits-Stahl [2002] also 
raise the idea that the provider may be changed during the annuity payment 
phase, but only as something that would seem to be included in current law; 
they do not discuss the possible problems and consequences. The latter paper 
says only that: “Some of the provisions of the Act suggest that according to the 
intention of the legislator movement among the providers is also allowed dur-
ing the course of annuity payment. This may have an effect of adverse selec-
tion.” The idea is also raised by Stewart [2007], who mentions it among other 
possibilities without elaboration as a possible way of encouraging competition.  
Based on the above, the model’s most important elements and their internal 
relationships are as follows: 
 
Table 16: The most important elements of the insurance annuity model 
Competing or non-competing 
providers  
Clients may choose – with certain restrictions – from among 
several competing providers. 
Does it provide the full 
annuity or only the first part 
of it (phased withdrawal)? 
The providers provide the entire annuity, so selection prob-
lems between providers may emerge, which need to be man-
aged. 
Managing provider selection 
problems 
Provider selection problems are managed at the beginning of 
the term via a central minimal pool (a premium equalisation 
mechanism), while selection problems that emerge during the 
course of the term, e.g. selection effects hidden within the 
mortality loss, are partly transferred to the clients via the 
indexation mechanism.  From another perspective, this also 
means that the mortality profit also belongs to the client, but 
clients only bear the loss up to an extent that it does not 
endanger the nominal value of the annuity. 
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Is the provider a for-profit or 
non-profit organisation? 
(Who ultimately bears the 
mortality loss?) 
The providers are privately owned, for-profit organisations 
(insurance companies, or institutions that operate and are 
regulated similarly to insurers). They could also bear the 
entire mortality risk, but its “option fee” would be too high 
for the clients, so they only bear a part of this risk. 
Is the annuity composed of 
one or two parts? 
Both versions are possible but the regulator must choose, not 
the individual clients. 
Indexing  
Excess return-refund indexing, partly because otherwise there 
wouldn’t be much point in having competing providers, and 
partly to enable the management of the mortality result and 
provider selection problems via indexing. The technical 
interest rate must be fixed in the case of this indexing tech-
nique so that adverse selection occurring due to different 
technical interest rates can be avoided. Since with this index-
ing technique the clients would be exposed to the provider 
who acquired them, because the provider does not promise 
(cannot promise!) a rate of indexing in advance, competition 
for clients must also be maintained during the annuity pay-
ment phase, meaning that changing provider must also be 
allowed in this phase. However, this is only possible if reserv-
ing is standardised, meaning it occurs according to a pre-
defined technical interest rate and mortality table. 
 
The abovementioned relationships are represented in the diagram below: 
 
Diagram 9: The internal relationship between the elements  
of the insurance annuity model 
 
 
We also receive the above model if the starting point is that the market makes 
it difficult to issue bonds that are linked to an economic index (e.g. price in-
dex), or if  such bonds do exists, they cannot be counted on to have an appro-
priately long term or be sufficiently available in future. Accordingly, a fixed 
benefit annuity (indexed to an economic index such as inflation) is not an 
option, only annuities with varying payments. 
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Technically, the annuity operates somewhat differently in small and large 
risk communities. The problem of possibly having a small risk community 
does not arise with respect to the central provider and central pool models (or 
it does, but only for a short time when the whole system is initially launched), 
and its significance is small in models that combine a deferred annuity with 
phased withdrawal. However, in this model the risk community might be 
shared between a great many providers throughout, so the risk community 
could be small (mainly after the launch of the whole annuity system or the 
appearance of individual providers), and so the mortality result could be ex-
treme, meaning the initial premium equalisation mechanism cannot handle all 
the problems that the other solutions can. This means that separate rules are 
required in the case of small risk communities. 
In other words, the “normal” functioning of the system assumes a large risk 
community in which there are no extreme fluctuations in the mortality result. 
In the event of small risk community the highly fluctuating mortality result 
cannot be made part of the indexation, but must belong to the provider, so in 
this case the mortality loss is borne by the provider against its solvency capital. 
This is another reason why it is important that the provider is a for-profit or-
ganisation with solvency capital. 
Below I elaborate on the operation in a “normal” case (i.e. supposing an ad-
equately big risk community) and in the case of small risk community. 
With regard to the “normal” case it is worth first reviewing the most im-
portant technical assumptions with respect to the annuity, which are as fol-
lows: 
• The premiums are unisex, and are only dependent on starting age and 
the sum assured, but reserving is differentiated according to gender and 
education. (As an alternative, differentiation of the premium according 
to education should also be considered; this would be of significant 
help in preventing the system from being accused of pervert redistribu-
tion, i.e. that the poor are subsidising the rich via the annuity. Naturally, 
the reserve would still be differentiated according to education.) 
• The indexing of the annuity depends on the combined investment and 
mortality performance, where only a maximized part can be deducted 
from the gross investment yield to cover the asset management fee. The 
mortality performance is calculated separately for each risk group ac-
cording to gender and education, and is spread within the group.  
• Both the unisex table used for premium calculation and the tables used 
for reserving, which are differentiated according to gender and educa-
tion, are generated centrally. Of these, the use of central tables is man-
datory for reserving. Each mortality table refers to projected mortality.  
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• The central mortality tables are regularly refreshed based on experience 
and changed expectations. The most recent tables must always be used 
for reserving. These tables may also contain future generation effects, 
meaning separate projections are prepared for different age groups, and 
these are adjusted separately. 
• The technical interest rate is determined centrally and it is recommend-
ed to use the 0% rate (or a decreasing rate that eventually drops to 0% 
during the term of the annuity, see above!). 
 
The annuity is recalculated every year, if the insured individual is still alive at 
the beginning of the year. The insured individuals are managed separately 
according to risk group, i.e. according to gender and education, meaning that 
separate mortality tables are applied for them when reserving and the annuities 
of the different risk groups are re-calculated accordingly. The re-calculation 
factors are: 
• The starting point is the individual premium reserve (“annuity ac-
count”) of the insured party (annuitant) at beginning of the previous 
year.  
• This decreases during the course of the year by the annuity payments, 
and it increases by the share of reserve assigned to the annuitant from 
the premium reserve of those who died during the year67. This is how 
the calculated premium reserve is computed by the end of the year or 
by the beginning of the next year. This will be different from the actual-
ly necessary premium, because in the meantime the mortality projection 
will have changed (if modified), and the annuity payment will probably 
also be different from its possible value because of the investment and 
mortality result.  
• If the institute entrusted with preparing them issued a new mortality 
projection at the beginning of the year as required, the reserve required 
for the surviving insured persons is defined on the bases of the actual 
annuity payment, the age of the insured party and the new mortality ta-
ble. If there is no new mortality projection, then it is determined ac-
cording to the previous point.  
• If the required reserve calculated in this manner is higher than the re-
serve available (which has decreased compared to the beginning of the 
previous year because of the paid annuities and increased with respect 
to investment profit, in addition to which the reserve of the deceased 
has now also become available to the surviving annuitants), then the 
                                                          
67Without a 0% technical interest rate, it would increase by the supposed yield of the 
technical interest rate. 
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missing reserve is supplemented by the insurer from its solvency capi-
tal, and the level of the annuity payment remains as it was in the previ-
ous year.  
• If the reserve requirement thus calculated is smaller than the reserve 
available (as will presumably be the case in the majority of situations, 
partly on account of the projection and the 0% technical interest rate), 
then the annuity payment, and naturally also the reserve, must be in-
creased in the given year by a similar ratio. 
 
As the result of the above method, in comparison to the previous year the an-
nuity for the given year increases precisely by the investment yield, if: 
• Precisely as many people died in the previous year as forecast by statis-
tics, 
• The average annuity of the deceased is identical to the average annuity 
of the surviving annuitants, 
• The mortality projection did not change compared to the one used in 
the previous year. 
 
The annuity increases at a higher rate than the investment yield if the number 
of deceased annuitants exceeds the expected number, or if the average of their 
annuities is higher than the average for the total annuitant population, or if the 
mortality projection is modified such that the remaining life expectancy de-
creases, and vice versa if a change occurs in the opposite direction. Naturally, 
these factors may not necessarily move in the same direction within a given 
year, and our final annuity increase will be the resultant of all these. If the 
factors move in an identical direction, e.g. if the investment yield was low, the 
actual mortality has decreased, especially among those with higher annuity 
payments, and the projected mortality also decreased, then it may happen that 
the annuity decreases compared to the previous year (if there is no solvency 
capital).  
In case of a small risk community, the system operates a little differently. 
Every differentiated sub-group of the risk community (according to gender and 
education) must achieve a certain minimal number of members at a provider, 
or if some of the providers decide to unify their annuitant portfolios, i.e. to 
organise a pool, then this is applicable to the entire pool.  
If all the insured individuals of a provider or a pool together do not achieve 
the minimum number of members in a given year (as characteristically occurs 
at the launching of an annuity system or if a new provider enters the market at 
a later date), then in that given year the total mortality result belongs to the 
provider, i.e. the loss will not be settled against the reserve of the clients, and 
the profit is not distributed between them. If this results in a reserve deficit, it 
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must be covered from the provider’s solvency capital.  The reserve of clients 
belonging to different risk groups must also be calculated using the proper 
differentiated mortality table in such cases.   
If the total number of insured individuals of a provider (or pool) exceeds the 
minimum, but it has a risk group whose numbers are lower than the necessary 
minimum, then the smallest differentiated sub-group must be temporarily 
combined with the second smallest (and third smallest and so on) subgroup 
until their total reaches the minimum number. If at this point there is still one 
or more subgroup(s) in which the number of members reaches the required 
minimum, then that (those) must be managed according to the normal condi-
tions, while the combined, small sub-groups must be managed in a consolidat-
ed manner, which means that the mortality result of the consolidated group 
must be handled together, while the separate mortality tables continue to be 
used for reserving.  
The above examination must be conducted every year, and on these grounds 
the consolidated group may cease to exist, or there may be a need for consoli-
dation in the following year. 
In view of the competition that exists during the annuity payment phase, i.e. 
in view of the opportunity afforded to the client to change providers, it is im-
portant that the various annuity-related activities of the different providers be 
harmonised in a timely manner, i.e. that what providers do and when during 
the course of the year should be pre-determined. It also follows from this that 
we must think in terms of calendar year rather than insurance year, because the 
former is uniform for everyone. 
A possible schedule for annuity-related activities is as follows. The signifi-
cant changes generally take place in the first quarter of the calendar year: 
• In the first two months of the year the insured persons must report their 
intention to move to another provider, and this transfer will coincide 
with the increase of the annuity payment. 
• At the beginning of the third month, once the transitions are known, the 
size of the risk groups is checked and, if necessary, a consolidated risk 
group is determined.  
• For this procedure, we consider a deceased annuitant to be one who 
died during the previous calendar year, the total sum of their actual in-
dividual account/reserve is distributed, from which we deduct the sum 
of annuity that was actually paid out and add the combined mortality 
and investment return distributed during the previous year. 
• The actual number of the deceased (and of course their concrete identi-
ties), is determined in March, together with the investment return of the 
previous calendar year. 
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• By the end of February the most up-to-date mortality projection must 
be prepared (if we agree on an annual adjustment. However, the ad-
justment of the mortality projection occur less frequently, but this does 
not change the logic, it must still be completed by this time). 
• At the end of the first quarter (in March) we define the combined in-
vestment and mortality profit, and the size of the buffer, taking into ac-
count those who change providers (both to and from the provider). 
• From the beginning of the second quarter (beginning in April), annui-
ties may actually be increased (if they increase all).   
 
Another manageable factor is that new entrants and those who died during the 
year are not included in the above computation, since from this perspective 
they will only be taken into account at the beginning of the following year.  
Naturally, the provider immediately begins paying annuity to new entrants, 
and the annuity payments of the deceased are immediately terminated.  
An important element of this model is the premium equaliza-
tion/settlement mechanism. This requires a fix point to which the market 
can correlate, so a centrally prepared, unisex projected mortality table must 
exist on the market. This is not a problem, of course, since it is already avail-
able in this model (because of allowing annuitants to switch providers mid-
term). 
When a client purchases an annuity from a provider, they pay a net premi-
um calculated on the basis of the centrally determined unisex mortality table 
plus a share of the costs. To meet its mandatory reserving requirement the 
provider immediately calculates the individual reserve by using the differenti-
ated mortality table corresponding to the gender and education of the client. 
There is a difference between the actually collected net premium based on the 
unisex mortality table and the similarly calculated necessary reserve, which 
may be even larger than the unisex premium (e.g. in the case of a woman with 
a university degree) or  lower (e.g. in the case of a man with only elementary 
education). The difference must be transferred to a central body, a clearing 
house that operates the settlement mechanism, and from which providers re-
ceive transfers. There may be a choice of operating method, i.e. whether pay-
ment should occur immediately or regularly after accumulating for a certain 
period, and there are arguments for and against both. 
As I have already mentioned, in the case of this solution the problem may 
arise that the losses and profits generated during a given period at different 
providers may not necessarily offset each other, since on the one hand the 
unisex table may not be accurate, and on the other we cannot assume that cli-
ents who represent good or bad risks for providers are concluding annuity 
contracts in the same proportion all over the annuity market at every moment. 
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If the central mortality projections were correct, the balance of profit and loss 
will be zero in the long term, but that almost certainly will not be the case in 
the short term.  
What I would propose as the best solution to this problem would for the fi-
nal balance generated by the premium settlement mechanism and the prepara-
tion of central mortality projections to be related, and for one of the guarantees 
that projections are suitable be that this balance must tend towards zero in the 
long term. Temporary deficits are covered by the state, but are repaid from the 
transitory surplus, but these surpluses must indeed be transitory, meaning 
money must not be systematically extracted from the annuitants. 
However, since attaining a zero balance of the premium settlement mecha-
nism does not require the life expectancy projection to be correct, this rule is 
not a proper test of mortality projections, only of whether the unisex table is 
correct or not. In fact, a neutral balance could also be achieved within the sys-
tem by manipulating the life expectancy projection, meaning further regula-
tions are required to test the adequacy of projections. 
4.3.5. THE CENTRAL POOL MODEL 
The model was first proposed by György Németh (Németh [2006]), where the 
central institute of the pool is the so-called “government actuarial”, which 
would redistribute the mortality result among the providers (in his proposal 
these are clearly non-profit pension funds). Németh finds that there is no justi-
fication for differences in the annuity premium offered by pension funds if 
there is no possibility for differentiation, and indeed these can lead to opera-
tional distortions, which can be prevented by having a single provider (or in 
reality by using a central pool). In his view this does not mean a single organi-
sation, but a single set of rules – contrary to Stahl’s proposal promoting the 
idea of a central provider.  
Based on the above, the model’s most important elements and their internal 
relationships are as follows: 
 
Table 17: The most important elements of the central pool model 
Competing or non-competing 
providers 
The service is provided by several competing providers, 
among whom the clients may choose (with certain re-
strictions). 
Does it provide the full 
annuity or only the first part 
of it (phased withdrawal)? 
The different providers provide the full annuity, so the prob-
lem of selecting between providers emerges and must be 
managed. However, stating that providers “provide the annui-
ty” is somewhat inaccurate in the case of this model, in the 
light of the following. 
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Managing provider selection 
problems. (The final bearer of 
the mortality loss) 
Provider selection problems are managed with the help of a 
maximum pool, so the mortality result is distributed amongst 
the providers every year. This Inevitably means that both the 
technical interest rate and reserving are fixed, i.e. determined 
centrally. The mortality result so remaining within the entire 
market basically belongs to the annuitants.   
Is the provider a for-profit or 
non-profit organisation? 
The providers may theoretically be non-profit companies (as 
in the case of Hungarian-type pension funds, for example), as 
well as for profit companies (fundamentally investment 
ventures, meaning they cannot ultimately bear the mortality 
loss because they are not insurance company-type institu-
tions). 
Is the annuity composed of 
one or two parts? 
Both solutions may be possible depending on the decision of 
the regulator, but only one of them may exist on the market at 
a given time. 
Indexing 
Definitely excess return refund, as this is the only solution 
where it makes sense to have investment competition between 
providers. Consequently the clients may change provider 
even once annuity payments have begun, which is not par-
ticularly difficult to organise in view of the centralised nature 
of the service from a certain aspect. The indexing of individ-
ual clients depends on a combination of the yield achieved by 
their provider and the actual mortality result, and this sum 
could even be negative, although we can assume this happens 
only rarely. 
 
The abovementioned relationships may be presented in the diagram below: 
 
Diagram 10: The internal relationship between the elements  
of the Central Pool Model  
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the year, preferably the very period in which the pool determines the mortality 
result of the previous year, and in turn the index. In addition, clients can also 
view the performance of their investors at this time. In this model the full an-
nuity service may be centralised, and in fact it is expedient to do so, including 
for client records. In fact, individual providers are not even required to know 
who their clients are. If they don’t know, the intermediaries may be eliminated 
from the system, which will save on costs, although the role of intermediaries 
is not quite clear, since it is often intermediaries who make clients aware of the 
fact that they can leave under-performing providers. 
An internal alternative of the model is that the provider may be a non-profit 
organisation (e.g. Hungarian-type pension fund), or a for-profit organisation, but 
it is worthwhile reviewing the arguments both for and against these solutions.  
In the Hungarian system the argument in favour of pension funds would 
have been that these were existing institutions, which, in lack of solvency 
capital, were however in themselves ill-equipped for providing a suitable life 
annuity. This solution would have allowed the annuity service to be organised 
on the basis of the existing pension funds. 
However, in the case of the central pool it is also worth centralising admin-
istration and membership records, partly because this helps the calculation of 
the mortality result, and partly because if a central institution is established 
anyway, then it is expedient to have it perform related activities. If we compare 
this with the fact that in the “heyday” of the private pension system the majori-
ty of pension funds in Hungary did not conduct investment activities, but en-
trusted investment companies to perform this task, then – had this model been 
introduced – the pension fund would have “emptied”. That is why, in Hungary, 
with relation to this model it would also have been worthwhile to consider 
“disconnecting” the pension funds from the annuity system, and to entrust 
investment companies directly with performing investment activities.  
So the idea that competing providers should be for-profit institutions is 
strongly promoted in this model, which primarily means insurance companies 
and investment enterprises. However, in the case of insurers the central pool 
represents a very strong reduction in risk, so this is not a tailor-made solution 
for those institutions. The minimum pool, which is generally a part of the in-
surer annuity model, is much better suited to insurance companies. This leaves 
investment enterprises as possible providers. But of course these cannot bear 
the mortality loss, not even ultimately (not even if so-called “longevity bonds” 
exist on the market!), so in contrast to the other models, in this model the mor-
tality loss is ultimately borne by the annuitants even in the case of for-profit 
companies. However, in view of it having the largest possible risk community, 
haphazard fluctuations are almost entirely filtered out of the mortality risk, and 
accordingly in this case this only means the longevity risk. 
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4.3.6. THE PENSION FUND ANNUITY MODEL 
Based on the above, the model’s most important elements and their internal 
relationships are as follows: 
Table 18: The most important elements of the pension fund annuity model 
Competing or non-competing 
providers  
The service is provided by several competing providers, 
among whom the clients may choose (with certain re-
strictions). 
Does it provide the full annuity 
or only the first part of it 
(phased withdrawal)? 
The competing providers only provide the first part of the 
annuity, within the framework of a phased withdrawal (i.e. 
not as an annuity). This partly manages the selection prob-
lems that result from prohibiting differentiation. 
Is the annuity composed of one 
or of two parts? 
Consequently, the annuity is composed of two parts, where 
the first part is a phased withdrawal that allows insured 
individuals to postpone the start of the annuity and to leave 
the majority as a potential inheritance (i.e. “clients have full 
control of their money”). However the insured individual 
must immediately buy the deferred part of the annuity on 
retirement. 
Managing provider  selection 
problems 
The provider delegates the remaining selection problems, 
which are a priori smaller than if the provider gave clients 
an immediately commencing life annuity and which are 
borne by the deferred annuity part, to a central provider by 
transferring the deferred annuity, meaning the provider is 
fully exempt from such risks. 
Is the provider a for-profit or 
non-profit organisation? (Who 
ultimately bears the mortality 
loss?)  
The provider is a non-profit company, (under Hungarian 
circumstances) a pension fund as the name of the model 
indicates. However, since it cannot under any circumstances 
provide a life annuity, it can also certainly not bear the 
mortality loss; this can only appear at the central provider. 
The central provider manages mortality risk as described 
with regard to the central provider model. 
Indexing 
Theoretically, indexing may be solved by either indexing 
technique, and arguments may be raised for and against 
both solutions. Arguments in favour of indexing to inflation 
include the fact that it enables the relatively seamless 
linking of the two annuity parts, and that it is difficult to 
organise a change of providers during the term in the case 
of deferred annuity part, although without this “already 
acquired clients” are exposed to the provider being in a 
monopolistic position (from the client’s perspective) in the 
case of the other indexing technique. An argument against 
is that in this case it is not particularly expedient to have the 
service provided by competing providers, or rather this only 
arises as an option if the existence of competing providers 
can already be taken as granted. 
In the case of indexing based on excess return refund it is 
justified to afford clients the possibility to both change 
providers and to choose according to investment portfolio. 
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The abovementioned relationships are presented in the diagram below: 
 
Diagram 11: The internal relationship between the elements  
of the Fund Annuity Model  
 
I have already written down everything that is important with relation to the 
details of this model68 in the case of previous models above, so I do not intend 
to repeat those. It is important to note that since the pension fund cannot bear 
mortality risk, (because it lacks solvency capital), the client can again not 
choose a (temporary) life annuity during the deferred period according to this 
model; clients may only spend their savings (or leave them as a legacy) within 
the framework of a phased withdrawal. Another reason that providers cannot 
                                                          
68 Despite the fact that for a long time the Hungarian pension profession took as 
granted the fact that private pension annuities would be provided by pension funds, the 
pension fund annuity model is not elaborated on in the literature. This is related to the 
fact that the rules on private pension annuities in general were not set down in Hungary 
until 2009 (in an Act that did not come into force). For a long time there was an illusory 
way of thinking about the annuities provided by the pension fund, it was assumed that it 
was in no way different from the annuity provided by insurers – at most the legislators 
set certain restrictive conditions as for example in the case of Swiss indexation, but 
these were not deemed problematic. The exception was János Stahl, who found both 
unisex annuity and Swiss indexation problematic; therefore in [2005] Stahl proposed 
indexation based on the combined investment and mortality result, allowing the nomi-
nal diminishing of the annuity, which is the essence of the fund annuity model. Howev-
er, he also proposed that there should also be a central provider, so he did not systemat-
ically elaborate the pension fund annuity model. 
Differentiation between 
annuitants and competing 
not-profit providers are 
both forbidden
Selection problems 
amongst providers
Spliting the annuity into 
two parts, divididing the 
parts between two 
providers
The first annuity-part is 
phased withdrawal
The annuity part is inheritable and may commence 
later, the form of investment (and according the 
method of indexation ) maybe chosen by the clients; 
changing providers mid-term is allowed
Providers are not-profit 
organisations
The mortality loss is borne by the central provider of 
the deferred annuity part, or transferred back to the 
clients
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be responsible for providing full life annuities in the case of pension fund 
annuity Is that, with no solvency capital, there is no penalty for under-pricing, 
meaning that in the short term it is worth attracting clients by making irrespon-
sible promises; the worst that can happen is that providers will be incapable of 
fulfilling their promises in the long term. The problem of possible unpunished, 
under-priced life insurances can only occur in this model, so this possibility 
must also be excluded by the regulator! 
4.4. Model elements relatively freely applicable to several models 
Above I have elaborated on those elements of the annuity system that are not 
optionally variable, and whose selection assumes the selection of additional 
elements, and in turn excludes the selection of others. Nevertheless there also 
exist relatively neutral solutions that, under certain conditions, may be includ-
ed in several annuity models, or even all of them. 
Homogenisation of annuities according to annuity size (partial homoge-
nisation, naturally), which reduces the danger of providers suffering a large 
mortality loss, because although they may have projected mortality properly, 
larger annuitants systematically live longer than smaller annuitants, may be 
raised in respect of every annuity model. The emergence of the problem may 
also be traced to the prohibition of differentiation, since the size of the annuity 
presumable correlates well with factors that probably cannot be taken into 
account, such as level of education or state of health. Homogenisation increas-
es the precision of calculations in the case of every annuity model, but this is 
particularly true for models that apply immediately commencing life annuities, 
and so in these cases the implementation of homogenization, i.e. the maximis-
ing of possible annuities, is highly recommended.  
The issue of homogenisation is raised not only from this technical perspec-
tive, but also as a question relating to annuitants having full control over their 
pension capital. The question is, is it worth requiring insured individuals to 
convert their savings to an annuity above a certain pension level. I think the 
answer is no, because the aim of making it compulsory is to make sure every-
body attains a certain level of pension, i.e. to safeguard people from behaving 
in a short-sighted manner. Realising a higher level can be left to the devices of 
the annuitant, while short-sightedness does not cause social problems beyond a 
certain level of pension. Luckily, raising the issue of homogenisation from two 
different perspectives converges to the same solution.   
Naturally, we must also decide what method to use to set the maximum an-
nuity. There are two options: 
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1. Independently for the annuity of the funded system. In the alternative 
SoS model this of course corresponds to the entire pension annuity.  
2. By consolidating the annuities of the funded and pay-as-you-go sys-
tems, meaning a maximum is set for funded annuity payouts, and the 
excess partly supplements payments made via the funded system.  Ad 
absurdum this may be 0, if the pension from the pay-as-you-go system 
also reaches this minimum. 
 
Option 1 is easier to manage within the funded system, as this requires no data 
from the pay-as-you-go system and probably also leads to more homogeneous 
annuities than option 2. However, despite this it is possible that the problem of 
inhomogeneity is better managed by option 2 because there is a general ten-
dency for people with larger savings to also have a longer life and also receive 
higher pensions from the pay-as-you-go system, meaning the annuity they 
receive from the funded system will be below average. Naturally, when select-
ing option 2 one must take into account the fact that although this may result in 
the annuity from the funded system being zero, but only above a certain mini-
mum level (see the section on “minimal annuity”). 
Whatever the decision of the legislator; the capital remaining above the 
minimum level required to assure the maximum annuity may be withdrawn by 
the insured party in a lump sum, and may be used at their discretion. (One 
possibility it to use it to purchase a non-mandatory annuity on the free market, 
but they could also leave it as an inheritance or invest it, etc.) In the annuity 
models that begin with a phased withdrawal, this issue is raised such that the 
first amount withdrawn may be a larger sum, which may be defined according 
to these principles.  
A rule of this kind can be included in every annuity model without difficulty. 
Naturally, a logical question is why clients should be obliged to accumulate 
money within a mandatory pension system at all, if they are then not obliged to 
use this money as an annuity within the framework of that system. There are 
experts who say that if there is an upper limit with respect to current income 
for payment into the funded system (as was the case in Hungary), then this in 
turn also defines the maximum annuity, and so this issue doesn’t need to be 
dealt with separately. Although this may be partly true, in the case of prede-
termined maximum income there is a significant spread of possible annuities, 
so they do not give a precise maximum because: 
1. The level of income may change or fluctuate: during the lifetime of an 
individual (and especially in the case of women who leave work to 
raise children) incomes may sometime exceed the maximum and then 
there may be a period with no income at all (and consequently no pen-
sion contribution). 
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2. The magnitude of the annuity payment also depends on the given age of 
retirement. Payouts will be considerably higher for people retire later, 
compared to people who take out early retirement. 
3. The remaining life expectancy also changes during the course of time, 
and accordingly the amount of capital needed to achieve the same min-
imum pension level also changes unpredictably. 
 
Furthermore, a minimum pension of this kind must also be indexed, and this 
does not necessarily concur with the return of already accumulated pension 
assets. Due to all these factors, it is to all intents and purposes impossible to 
precisely calculate in advance whether the later annuity will or will not exceed 
the maximum, and accordingly a certain excess will almost certainly occur in 
the case of some insured individuals, even in the case of a suitably determined 
annuity maximum. At the same time, the two rational considerations that:  
1. it is expedient to make sure that future pension are as close as possible 
to this maximum, and that 
2. we should avoid needlessly forcing insured individuals to accumulate 
more  capital than is necessary for purchasing the maximum annuity 
 
could lay the foundations for the future reform of mandatory funded pension 
systems. In a system that takes the above criteria into consideration, pension 
contributions to the mandatory funded system do not have an income-linked 
maximum, but the accumulated pension capital does (calculated with a margin 
in view of the above uncertainty factors), and this is “reverse calculated” from 
the maximum annuity level. If private pension savings reach this level, pay-
ment to this system terminates. Through this we can avoid situations in which 
an insured individual with a promising carrier ends up with a low pension only 
because, although they may have often earned a high income during the course 
of their life they did not pay a high enough pension contribution during such 
periods, while at other times they had a low income or no income at all. 
An argument against this solution is that pension contributions must primar-
ily be paid at a young age, when the money is theoretically also needed for 
other things, but there are also arguments against this (e.g. the consumption 
level of young people “balances out” at a lower level, or their lower net in-
come inspires them to greater efforts, which is easier to do at an early age than 
at an older age, etc.).  
Logically, we could of course state that since the question of a mandatory 
maximum annuity has been raised, then the question of a minimum annuity 
could also be raised in a similar fashion, but this is a technical issue for the 
regulator and shall not be discussed here.   
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Joint life annuity could also be a possible element of any annuity model. 
The fact that annuitants cannot choose between annuity types and that this is 
instead chosen for them by the model in the interests of eliminating the risk of 
adverse selection as a result of being able to choose between annuity types, 
was the default in the case of every model. If there is only one type of annuity 
in a model then this condition is met. However, it is also met if there are sever-
al types of annuity, but they are clearly assigned to the individual client 
groups. In practice this means that single people are given single life annuities 
and couples69 are given joint life annuities. Accordingly, joint life annuities 
may theoretically also be included in any annuity model. 
The abovementioned models practically speaking included two types of an-
nuity: 
1. An immediately commencing, single life, simple annuity (life-long, 
with no guaranteed period), or 
2. A deferred, single life annuity with the possibility of phased withdrawal 
during the deferral period (from the individual reserve that is kept sepa-
rate from the premium of the deferred annuity). 
 
I think that joint life annuities must also correspond to the type of single life 
annuity used in the model, meaning is should be an immediately commencing, 
simple, joint life annuity, or a deferred joint life annuity. 
It is worth precisely planning the exact structure of the joint life annuity. I have 
proposed one possibility above, but that can be further fine-tuned by taking 
into account various specific life conditions (a big age difference between the 
spouses, a big difference in the commencement of the pension, one member of 
the couple is still working, while the other is already retired, etc.), and the 
regulations concerning the annuity should be refined accordingly. 
Similarly, the impact on the annuity type must also be taken into consideration 
in the case of divorce and marriage and the regulations must be refined accord-
ingly, with specific regard to the possible unusual situations (widows remarry-
ing, divorce before retirement or after one member of the couple retires, etc.). 
The joint life annuity in itself solves the problem of long-term widow’s pen-
sions within the funded system. It is important to note that the term “widow’s 
pension” is often used to refer to two different benefits, which commence 
immediately after the death of one member of the couple: 
1. A temporary annuity, usually in the event of death while still working, 
and a 
2. Lifelong annuity, in the event of death following retirement.  
                                                          
69 Or people living together in any documented manner that is difficult to change 
and precisely defined by law. 
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A joint life annuity solves the problem of type 2 widow’s annuity. In theory, 
the Hungarian private pension system handles the type 1 instance via the inher-
itance of pension accounts, but it does not necessarily manage the problem in 
the best possible way, because there may be many different amounts on the 
pension account of the deceased spouse, in comparison to the lost income of 
the deceased spouse, depending on which phase of the lifecycle they happen to 
have died. In addition, heirs may often be chosen freely (according to Hungar-
ian private pension regulations, for instance), meaning this amount might not 
necessarily go to the widow. Therefore, the implementation of the following 
two rules should be considered instead: 
1. The temporary widow’s pension due in the event of death while still of 
working age is in reality is a life insurance; it would be expedient to 
explicitly include this in the system and separate its premium from the 
pension account, 
2. The pension account is inheritable, but in the case of a married couple 
the heir is always the spouse, and the accumulated pension assets are 
transferred to the spouse’s pension account and will later increase their 
old age pension.  
 
In most annuity models it is expedient to implement an individual reserve 
(buffer) to smooth mortality fluctuations, and possibly to bear the final mortal-
ity risk (up to the extent of the buffer, naturally). This solution should be con-
sidered with respect to all models in which the ultimate bearer of the mortality 
loss is the insured individual – so primarily in the central provider model, in 
the pension fund annuity model and in the central pool model. It should also be 
considered in cases where the for-profit provider provides an immediately 
commencing annuity (so in the insurance annuity model), i.e. when  
a. the fluctuation of the mortality loss has an impact on the bigger portion 
of the term, meaning that overall the accumulated loss may be bigger 
than in models that use a deferred life annuity, and/or 
b. as a general rule the mortality loss is born by the provider, but as a re-
sult it charges too high an “option fee” and accordingly decreases the 
annuity payout by too much. 
NOTATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	i : technical interest rate 	v : discount factor  
 d: 1-v 
x: the entry age of the insured party/annuitant (also y in the case of 
joint life annuities) 
t: number of (integer) years since the commencement of the insur-
ance/annuity  
m: length of the deferment (integer years)  
n: term of insurance (e.g. a temporary annuity) in whole years
 
l: number or people still alive at age x from a population with a start-
ing age (l8) of 0 = life table d: number of deaths at age x within the same population. d = l-l5 
ω: the maximum possible (highest statistically relevant) age used in the 
life table (l^> 0, l^53= 0, for all t>0 integers) q: probability of death 0 = fghg = hg=hgVWhg  p: probability of survival p = iGVWiG  p#| : probability of survival by m years p#|  = iGVjiG . Naturally p|  = p, 
and p8|  = 1 e: expected remaining lifetime at age x.	e = iGVW5iGVk5⋯5iliG + ;, or e = p|  + p;  +⋯+ p^-_  + ; a|:  single net premium of an immediate, perpetual annuity payable in 
arrears with annual EUR 1 payment ä|: single net premium of an immediate, perpetual annuity-due with 
annual EUR 1 payment. a| = ä|-1 ä| : single net premium of an immediate, n-year term annuity-due, annu-
ity-certain with annual EUR 1 payment  
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ä: single net premium of an immediate life annuity-due with annual 
EUR 1 payment for an annuitant aged x years ä:| : single net premium of an immediate, n-year term temporary life 
annuity-due with annual EUR 1 payment for an annuitant aged x 
years ä#| : single net premium of deferred (m years deferment) life annuity-due 
with annual EUR 1 payment for an annuitant aged x years ä: single net premium of an immediate joint life annuity-due with 
annual EUR 1 payment for annuitants aged x and y years. The annu-
ity payments last until the first death ä:| :  single net premium of an immediate, n-year term temporary joint 
life annuity-due with annual EUR 1 payment for annuitants aged x 
and y years. The annuity payments last until the first death, but for a 
maximum of n years ä|$ : single net premium of an immediate life annuity-due with g years 
guaranteed period at the beginning, with annual EUR 1 payment for 
an annuitant aged x years ä$| : single net premium of an immediate life annuity-due with g years 
guarantee period at the end, with annual EUR 1 payment for an an-
nuitant aged x years ä|:  conditional life annuity. The payments commence at the death of y 
and last until the death of x. (If x dies earlier than y, the ä| =ä-ä annuity ceases without any payments) ä| :  conditional, n-year term temporary life annuity. The payments start 
at the death of x and last until the end of the n-year term (its remain-
der). ä|  = ä| -ä:|  ä| :  conditional, n-year term temporary joint life annuity. The payments 
start at the death of x or y, and last until the end of the n-year term 
(its remainder).  ä|  = ä| -ä:|  ä:| 4: conditional, n-year term temporary joint life annuity for three per-
sons. The payments start at the death of y or z, and last until the end 
of the n-year term (its remainder), but maximum until the earlier 
death of x. ä:| 4 = ä:| -ä4:|  V3: individual reserve of an annuity or other life insurance at the t anni-
versary of the term before paying the outstanding payment A: single net premium of a whole life insurance with EUR 1 sum as-
sured.  
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A:  single net premium of a whole life insurance with two annuitants 
and EUR 1 sum assured A$ :  single net premium of a special whole life insurance with EUR 1 
sum assured. The first insurance period is not a year, but g years, 
which means the death benefit can be paid g years after the com-
mencement of the insurance at the earliest A#| :  single net premium of a “deferred” whole life insurance with EUR 1 
sum assured. Its payment is conditional: the sum assured is paid on-
ly if the death of the insured party happens after m years (deferment) 
following commencement A:| : single net premium of a term (death) insurance with EUR 1 sum 
assured, and n-year term.  A:| : single net premium of a pure endowment insurance with EUR 1 sum 
assured and n-year term. A:|  = p|  ∙ v A:| : single net premium of an endowment insurance with EUR 1 sum 
assured and n-year term A:| = A:|  + A:|  A:| : single net premium of an endowment insurance with two insured 
parties, EUR 1 sum assured and an n-year term. Payment on the first 
death. P: annual net premium of a whole life insurance with EUR 1 sum as-
sured. P = nGäG  P:| : annual net premium of an endowment insurance with EUR 1 sum 
assured. P:| = nG:o|äG:o|  
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